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

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DISSENT, issued April 1, 1977, is published quarterly, spring, summer, fall, and winter, by the DISSENT Publishing Corporation, 505 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 100017. Subscriptions: $10.00 for one year; $17.00 for two years; $6.00 for students for one year; foreign subscriptions, including Canada, add $1.00 for mailing costs per year. All payments from foreign countries must be made by United States money orders or checks payable in United States currency. Single copy, $2.50. For special rates on bulk orders from organizations, teachers, etc., write directly to DISSENT. For information on newsstand and bookstore distribution write to: Eastern News Co., 155 West Fifteenth Street, New York, N.Y. 10001.

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Irving Howe

A Word for the Dissidents

The crisis in the Communist countries is a permanent one. It may flare up at some moments and die down at others, but it now seems to be built into the very structure of that society. For their own survival and comfort, the party bureaucrats do not wish a return to open terror—besides, it creates an atmosphere inhospitable to a modern economy. But to retain their monopoly of power, they cannot allow voices of dissidence to cohere into an organized opposition or to reach the masses of the people. As a result, the Communist regimes oscillate between bouts of repression and intervals of partial tolerance, seeking some point at which authoritarianism can stabilize itself. Each short-run "solution" leads to new difficulties. Each improvisation deepens the problem of morale among the party bureaucrats themselves, who now seem increasingly deprived of the "fix" of ideology.

What becomes clear in Eastern Europe is that repeatedly new groups, new generations of dissidents appear. Not only in Russia but also in Poland, Czechoslovakia—even Rumania! The range of dissidence is very wide, from versions of Bolshevik orthodoxy arrayed against the party leadership to versions of Christian confession devoted to setting moral examples. Among the dissidents there seems to be a tendency to move from political demands to moral absolutes, because their frustration at being unable to bring about changes within society drives them to seek transcendence beyond society. But it takes no great sophistication to see that, in authoritarian countries, religio-moral resistance has deep political implications—the authorities in those countries know this only too well. They find momentary schemes for dealing with the dissidents, such as exile and psychiatric confinement, when the threat and reality of imprisonment and labor camps do not suffice. But even as some dissidents break, others grow stronger, more courageous and outspoken.

In these circumstances there is reason to applaud the stance that the Carter administration has taken. It has brought to an end the sneaky *Realpolitik* of Henry Kissinger, which in effect acquiesced in repression. It is good, I think, that President Carter has spoken out for Sakharov, one of the great men of our time, even as it has also been made clear that this does not signify any wish to return to the extremes of the Cold War or any policy of sabotaging the negotiations for mutual arms control. No doubt, there are built-in limitations in an approach to the Soviet Union that tries to combine some outspokenness about human rights with negotiations for measures of détente. But this is the right course to take.

Meanwhile, we respond once more to the bravery, the boldness, the intelligence of the dissidents in Eastern Europe. We know only their names, perhaps we shall never meet—but they are our friends. Speaking for freedom, they help to redeem our age. □

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Some Problems Facing Carter (and Us)—1977

We asked a number of experts to write briefly on some of the major social, economic, and political problems facing the new Administration in Washington. Here are their answers. —EDS.

Robert Lekachman

Economic Policy

By comparison to the Kennedy-Johnson 1964 tax cut or even the Ford administration's 1975 acceptance of congressional demands for antirecessionary action, the Carter program, as originally presented to Congress at the start of the new Administration, was disappointingly small. The total—some $16 billion, mostly in tax changes—was substantially less than 1 percent of Gross National Product. The 1964 stimulus was approximately double that figure.

Kennedy-Johnson economists, moreover, started with a less unhealthy economy than did the Carter team. Unemployment in 1962, the year in which Kennedy first sought congressional action, averaged 5.6 percent. In those innocent days, this was an unacceptable figure and the Administration aimed at a 4 percent "interim" unemployment target and an ultimate 3 percent figure, then accepted as the minimum frictional number. By depressing contrast, 1976 unemployment averaged 7.8 percent, higher than in any year since the end of the 1930s, and Charles Schultze, the new chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, predicted that if all went well the Carter program would by the end of 1979 push unemployment well below 6 percent, presumably to the same 5.5 to 5.9 percent range that sufficed to alarm the Kennedy economists into recommendations of stronger economic medicine.

The shape of the Carter proposals is as unsatisfactory as its size. A relatively small proportion of the two-year program is devoted to direct job creation, whether by public works, public-service jobs, subventions to cities, or special youth programs. The most substantial component of the package is the tax rebates, labeled by Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur F. Burns as the least efficient way to stimulate the economy. Moreover, the poorest 4 million Americans will receive no benefits from the rebates because, so the Treasury asserts, it is administratively too difficult to locate these losers. In fairness, the public works and public-service job programs will be much larger in 1978 than in 1977 and presumably will replace as stimuli the one-shot tax rebates.

On the face of it, however, Carter's economic targets are little different from those recorded in the last Economic Report of the Ford administration. Alan Greenspan and his associates on the Ford CEA were conservatives. Schultze and his two fellow members are loosely labeled liberal. There is something to be explained when the game plans of the two sets of experts bear so eerie a resemblance.

No need to search very hard for answers. One of them is evidently a new president's need to reassure a crucially important constituency generally hostile to him and his party. According to *Fortune*, businessmen voted about 8 to 1 for Mr. Ford. It made political sense to restore the confidence of that community in every reasonable way. Mr. Carter did so by appointing moderates to the Council of Economic Advisers, a prominent, though progressive, businessman as Treasury secretary, discarding his campaign endorsement of stand-by wage-price controls, and opting for a program of economic expansion sufficiently modest as to evoke from the *Wall Street Journal* the judgment that the stimulus was luckily too tiny a percentage of GNP to do much harm.

The second reason for Carter caution relates to recent experiences of persistent inflation even in the presence of unusually high unemployment. The phenomenon, puzzling to economists, of stagfla-

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tion has made the economic establishment extremely wary of reawakening inflationary expectations now that for the moment at least they appear to have simmered down. Without effective controls over prices in the concentrated sectors of the economy, a credible full-employment program on the part of any national Administration would certainly encourage the large corporations that dominate the economy to raise their prices well before consumer demand places the sort of pressure upon existing capacity that justifies such price increases. Of course, once the cost of living begins to leap higher month by month, unions will struggle for better contract terms. Their success will excuse a second round of price increases, and so on.

As Kenneth Galbraith has recently written, the sincerity of liberal attachment to full employment is measured by the individual liberal's attitude toward controls and inflation. By now it should be plain to all intelligent folk, with the notable exception of trained economists, that full employment without controls *is* possible but the penalty is inflation. It is equally possible to combine full employment and reasonably stable prices but only within the context of an effective incomes policy.

It follows that a president and a Congress who reject both inflation and controls implicitly also surrender as a realistic objective any hope of full employment. Schultze's stated unemployment targets of course implicitly ratify this conclusion. I suppose this early in a new Administration one should seek such rays of hope as can be identified. One of them is the presence of W. Michael Blumenthal at the Treasury. An unusually intelligent tycoon, Mr. Blumenthal is one of the few major businessmen to endorse the concept of national economic planning. He sounds genuinely concerned about unemployment. One of his allies in the cabinet is likely to be Labor Secretary Ray Marshall, whose research and actions have focused upon the training and employment of the young, black, Chicano, and female.

The temper of Congress may be a second hopeful portent. Congress has been disposed to enlarge the Carter program, in particularly its direct job-creating elements. And the President himself seems occasionally willing to accept a substantially higher final total. Of course the impact of a vile winter may serve all parties as a dignified reason for amending the original Carter proposals.

There is a more speculative reason for hope. Like John Kennedy. Jimmy Carter ran on a notably vague program as a democratic moderate or mild conservative. Economic events and his own sharp intelligence pushed Kennedy into steadily more activist economic policies. The disorder of the world economy, the continuing energy crisis, the simmering banking crisis (represented by $50 billion of dubious loans given by major American commercial banks to Less Developed Countries that don't have a prayer of repaying them unless this country, Western Europe, and Japan agree to stabilize, at generally higher levels, the prices of the raw materials that are their major sources of export earnings), and the depressing effects of these events upon corporate profit expectations and domestic growth rates—all these elements combine to compel any intelligent national Administration to increase its intervention into the economy.

National economic planning, not of course called by that name, is likely to come as an inevitable response to interlocked domestic and international economic dilemmas. For democratic socialists, this prospect in itself deserves only the faintest of cheers. Should it soon arrive, national economic planning will naturally represent the present constellation of interests. Which is to say that our planning will be at best supervised by alert businessmen of the Blumenthal-Rohatyn stripe, men and women (Juanita Kreps at least) who accurately identify planning as necessary reinforcement of existing arrangements.

Still, in a conservative country it is best to be led by alert members of the dominant elite rather than by their dimmer brethren. Perhaps that is the major message of Jimmy Carter's narrow triumph over Gerald Ford. □

David M. Muchnick

Cities

In June 1976, Jimmy Carter promised the nation's mayors a "compassionate, realistic" urban policy. Although the President has yet to elaborate his vision of a revitalized urban America, enough has been said and done during the campaign, the transition, and the first two months in office to illuminate the new Administration's balance between realism and compassion in the foreseeable future.

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Campaigning last April, Mr. Carter made aid to the cities dependent upon spending for national defense as a first priority. Three months later, he softened that stand; he endorsed the mayors' plank in the Democratic platform declaring the "social defense of the nation as important as its military defense." Yet, apparently, cutting defense spending to finance domestic investment remains unrealistic. Concluding his first budget review, President Carter was expected to recommend an estimated $10 billion increase over the present fiscal year's $110 billion for defense. The President responded to the pleas of his new Secretary for Housing and Urban Development for additional funds for her "starved" Department by giving her about half of the budget increases she had requested.

The platform on which the mayors and Mr. Carter had agreed also called for a "massive effort" to meet the needs of our major older cities. Nonetheless, two months later *Business Week* quoted a "Carter aide" as saying, "There is no Hubert Humphrey Marshall Plan for the cities in the cards at the moment." Nor would there be a federal commitment to the older cities sufficient to enable them to compete economically with their suburbs and the Sunbelt cities. Realistically, *Business Week* concluded,

> restoring the cities to self-sufficiency means enabling them to compete economically with the suburbs for [the middle class and business]. Nobody knows just how to do this, except that it would require . . . the kind of investment that has produced pieces of the city, including whole business districts, in the suburbs over the past several decades. Neither Carter nor Ford is talking about such investment. Anything less is not likely to make much difference to cities as centers of business, social, and cultural life. [September 20, 1976, p. 20.]

Not surprisingly, the nation's mayors were "extremely disappointed" by President Carter's two-year $31.2 billion economic stimulus package. Newark's Mayor Kenneth Gibson, the president of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, testified that the Carter program would fall short of urban needs to create jobs and expand city services. The mayors proposed a one-year $20 billion stimulus, including $7.7 billion in tax cuts and $12.3 billion in federal spending for countercyclical revenue sharing, public-works projects, and public-service jobs. There remains a sizable gap between the President's plans for $4.5 billion in public-works spending over the next two years and the nearly $24 billion sought for such projects by 25,000 localities last December.

In late December, the President-Elect fulfilled his campaign promise to meet with New York Governor Hugh Carey and New York City Mayor Abraham Beame and discuss the fiscal crisis. Depressed by a court order that had upset the moratorium on repayment of nearly $1 billion in short-term city notes, the two officials left the meeting in high spirits, buoyed by Mr. Carter's pledge that "bankruptcy is not a viable alternative for New York." Nevertheless, when New York's banks and municipal unions sought the specifics of Mr. Carter's commitment to the city, the Administration retreated to the hard line prevailing in Congress. Present economic and political circumstances warrant neither an extension of the three-year emergency-loan program nor federal guarantees for future city borrowings. New York City's Deputy Mayor John Zuccotti, who had been a strong candidate for secretary or undersecretary of HUD, said that Mr. Carter expected the $1 billion moratorium problem to be solved "locally." Yet, as the city reached the fiscal brink in early March, the President apparently reversed himself and dangled the elusive carrot of a long-term loan extension to induce New York's banks and unions to settle the immediate crisis.

The selection of new HUD Secretary Patricia Roberts Harris was another disappointment to the mayors and the housing industry. The National Association of Home Builders criticized Mr. Carter's failure to designate a "person with demonstrated experience and expertise in housing and urban development." The U.S. Conference of Mayors said that the nomination revealed "a striking insensitivity to the problems of cities." It may have upset the mayors that their own Conference president, Mayor Gibson, reportedly was dropped as the nominee only at the last moment. Regardless, it is the symbolism in the Harris appointment that is significant. Once again it appears that the interests of cities can be subordinated, and on this occasion not to national defense or macroeconomic considerations but to the President's own political interests—a gesture to his female and black constituencies.

The Harris nomination also presaged the advent of a caretaker regime at HUD for the immediate future. There were rumors that the new Secretary is marking time, waiting for the first vacancy on the Supreme Court. And there was some concern that it may take as long as two years for her to learn the

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complexity of urban problems and to master the departmental reins. Before her nomination, the deputy director of the HUD transition team, Al Stern, had cautioned against expecting any bold or startling new programs. "We have no quick fix for housing and urban problems," he said. The objectives will be to improve the efficiency of existing programs and to target money to the areas of the country with the greatest need.

Although, by early March, his commitment to the cities seemed ambivalent, there remains a broad consensus that Jimmy Carter will be more compassionate, more cooperative, and more accessible on urban affairs than his Republican predecessors. Newark's Mayor Gibson refused to take the Carter economic package as a symbol that the President would be less sympathetic to urban needs than the mayors had expected. Reportedly, Secretary Harris surprised and impressed the mid-January convention of the U.S. Conference of Mayors with her grasp of their problems and her pledge that "the White House is now in the hands of a friend of the cities." The President sent five cabinet appointees and four top White House staffers to address the convention—a gesture Mayor Gibson hailed as "the beginning of a new relationship" in which "we will be consulted before—and not after—executive decisions have been made." The Administration's message, Gibson concluded, "reinforces our optimism for the recovery of our cities." The governors of several Northeastern states had expressed similar feelings after an earlier series of meetings with the President-Elect and his advisers to discuss regional redevelopment plans. A year-end editorial in the *New York Times* hailed Mr. Carter's meetings with mayors and governors as "showing considerably more understanding of and sympathy for the plight of urban America than his predecessor." Indeed, Jimmy Carter has reportedly accepted the invitation of the Episcopal Bishop of New York to visit the South Bronx and see the slums for himself.

No one was surprised when the Carter administration announced plans to extend the community development program for another three years, to increase its funding to $4.3 billion by fiscal year 1980, and to target the funds toward the big cities with the greatest needs. Yet, if the present formula for allocating funds is not amended, it still will continue to favor the South over the Northeast and Midwest and it will favor the suburbs and rural areas over central cities. If no changes are made in the existing program, the 17 biggest cities in the Northeast and Midwest (with the exception of New York and Chicago) will stand to lose on the order of $170 million yearly—to the further deterioration of their own municipal services and financial situations and to the eventual benefit of prospering suburbs and Sunbelt cities. One Administration aide predicted that big-city mayors with fiscal problems would welcome the proposed amendments warmly, some smaller towns would be less delighted, and urban counties would be cool to the changes. A HUD official added that the Administration wants to make sure that localities help poor people with the money they receive under the act.

PRESIDENTIAL COMPASSION on housing and community development issues is critical to preserving any semblance of decency in America's older cities. Compassion affects the terms of *dis*development and shrinkage now being negotiated by these cities as they are forced to adjust to the new realities of global political economy and southern and suburban development. Compassion indeed is the critical difference between the Carter administration's liberal technocrats and the preceding regime's conservative technocrats. President Carter's compassionate realism is simply more humane than President Ford's new realism. Nevertheless, although humane technocrats may cushion the sacrifices of municipal readjustment, as *Business Week* realistically suggested, compassionate realism is not enough to enable our older cities to challenge the social, economic, and political forces that lead to their decline.

The sources of the Carter administration's realism run deep. The President has pledged to be "tough" on all requests for new spending and to balance the federal budget by 1981; yet his economic package may produce an estimated $60 billion deficit in the current fiscal year's budget. White House economic planners expect that it will be about four years before the private economy will operate at full steam and have the capacity to generate the $60 billion fiscal dividend thought necessary to finance adventurous social programs. In addition, mayors and their constituents, professional experts and interest groups, the Senate, House, and HUD are either divided or undecided on what should be done to restore our cities.

What's more, the Carter administration's realists have apparently accepted the prevailing patterns of metropolitan development and disdevelopment as

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natural and inevitable phenomena that set the boundaries of compassionate tinkering with urban problems. This uncritical acceptance is the essence of technocratic thinking. "Technocratic urbanology" obscures the fact that the present course of metropolitan development and disdevelopment is the product of a more-or-less easy alliance between national and transnational corporations, the federal government, and suburban landowners. As corporate and governmental allies increasingly plan the relationships between economic growth and local development and disdevelopment, they have stripped the power of self-determination from localities—be they beneficiaries or victims of private or public investment decisions. Favored by these investment and location policies, the suburban members of this alliance have also been encouraged by the federal executive and the Supreme Court to encapsulate minorities and poor people within the central cities—leaving conservative and liberal technocrats to argue only over the limited degree of access to be permitted by the suburban ring. And so this technocratic urbanology obscures the fact that only by upsetting the structural arrangements of the corporate-federal-suburban alliance can we free our central cities from their straitjacket of the politics of the desperate fight for survival. Yet, technocratic urbanology suggests no reason for raising the question, for it is antiurbane as well. It fosters a materialist view of cities as fungible repositories of capital, machines and labor, whose social value is merely a matter of utility for profitable production. When a location has been stripped of its profitability, it is left to become a shadow of its former self, perhaps even a ghost town. Accordingly, we are being taught to accept as fact that America can live without the past grandeur of her older cities.

As a nation we pay a heavy toll for limiting the urban debate to the degree of compassionate tinkering that technocrats are permitted to indulge in by the corporate-federal-suburban alliance. Currently we are simply relocating our traditional mode of urban development to sunnier regions—and there, too, the tell-tale signs of metropolitan inequalities and central-city deterioration are beginning to appear. Yet, the rise of the Sunbelt and the suburbs has critical significance. It symbolizes the uncoupling of the last century-and-a-half's deterministic relations among industrial production, territorial location, and residential patterns. Masses of workers and machines grouped conveniently close to rivers and railheads are no longer technically necessary for industrial production. We are *free* to choose rationally among alternative ways of organizing our productive sector, our living arrangements, and our political institutions to fulfill our democratic dreams of self-determination and self-governance. However, technocratic acceptance of contemporary developmental parameters threatens not only critical thinking about such alternatives but even the most traditional projects for redeveloping our older central cities.

Worse, technocratic urban policy threatens to destroy our urbanity and to tear apart our national community. The residential ghettos of our metropolitan areas foster not only different images of reality among middle-class suburbanites and impoverished central-city slum dwellers—but genuine fear and ignorance. Many older residents of the metropolis have forgotten and many younger ones are not learning how to live in the universalism that cities must have in order to work—in what Kalman Silvert called the affectionate impersonality that permits strangers to live in close cooperation in complex urban settings. Parasitic regional development, too, fosters disloyalty to our national community. When midwestern farmers condemn aid to New York City and conveniently forget who pays to maintain parity pricing if trouble hits the farm, when southerners cheer the drop-dead message to New York and readily overlook whose tax dollars and jobs have been pouring into their region and which cities have given refuge to millions of displaced southern farm workers, and when Texas corporations sit on their natural gas reserves and freeze northern families, they disavow their membership in a national community. Damning New York is the behavior of America's new urban villagers—people who live in cities but are not yet urbane, people unable to empathize across local and regional bounds and pledge allegiance to a national community.

Our urban crisis presents an ultimate crisis to our national community and our democracy. Jimmy Carter's decency and compassion are reportedly genuine and surely refreshing. They may even hold us together for a while—at least until the honeymoon is over. But compassionate tinkering will not resolve the urban crisis. Democratic solutions require us to think critically about the kinds of spatial, economic, and political arrangements we can create to realize our ideal of a national community of equally participant in-

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dividuals empowered through these arrangements to reason together in a continuing process of defining the common good. □

Cushing Dolbeare

Housing

As of this writing, the Carter administration has given few clues to its housing policy. On the one hand, both President Carter and new Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Patricia Roberts Harris are committed to deal with the urgent housing problems of low- and moderate-income people. On the other hand, the President is committed to a balanced budget by 1980. The two commitments are incompatible: it simply is impossible to make a meaningful impact on low- and moderate-income housing needs while straining to balance the federal budget—unless there is a substantial tax increase, or a new method of subsidizing housing that will remove the constraints of federal budget-making. Neither is likely.

The Carter administration probably will propose some modest increases in the programs developed and implemented by the Ford administration and the low-income public housing program, a measure mandated by the Congress last year. The Ford administration last year proposed more money for housing than Congress appropriated, and its proposal for 1978 was calculated to fund 600,000 subsidized units. Most of these units would be provided through the programs of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, but some 100,000 are targeted for small towns and rural areas through the Farmers' Home Administration. The total sum includes existing units as well as new construction and rehabilitation. Nevertheless, through the Ford proposals, for the first time since 1972, the subsidized housing level established as a goal in the Housing Act of 1968—600,000 units annually—would be met. It seems more likely, however, that Congress will change the mix of programs proposed by Ford—probably with more emphasis on new construction and less on subsidizing existing units—rather than propose significant increases in the amount of subsidized housing.

How does this level of housing subsidy compare to housing needs?

It can be assumed that few people live in bad housing by choice. This is confirmed by 1974 Annual Housing Survey data, indicating that less than 1 percent of households with incomes above $25,000 live in housing that lacks plumbing, heat, or kitchen. Therefore, although cross-tabulations by income are not available, the 1974 Annual Housing Survey shows the following numbers of people with specific housing problems, which can be assumed to be income-related.

No bath	2,107,000	households
Shared bath	526,000	"
No kitchen	1,441,000	"
Shared kitchen	141,000	"
Bedroom lacks privacy	6,352,000	"
Bedrooms used by 3+ People	3,784,000	"
Rodents present	6,676,000	"
Exposed wiring	2,373,000	"
Rooms lack outlets	3,078,000	"
*Structural deficiencies	15,909,000	"

*Structural deficiencies include one or more of the following: water leakage in basement, roof leaks, open cracks or holes in interior walls or ceilings, holes in floor, broken plaster or peeling paint.

The foregoing data demonstrate that some 16 million units, out of a total occupied inventory in 1974 of 71 million units, are "structurally deficient." In addition, there are units that are overcrowded, and others that lack basic plumbing, heating, or kitchen facilities.

Quality is only one dimension of low-income housing needs. Other critical dimensions are cost and opportunity to choose the type, tenure, and location of one's housing.

- COST: Again, according to the 1974 Annual Housing Survey, there were 9,664,000 renter households paying more than 25 percent of their incomes for rent. This is an increase of more than one-half million from the 1973 figure. In 1970, 8,145,000 households paid more than one-quarter of their income for rent.

Recent data for owners are not available. However, the 1970 Census of Residential Finance showed that 18.7 percent of all owners carried

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housing costs in excess of one-quarter of their income.

Based on these data, it seems conservative to assume that 40 percent of all renters and at least 25 percent of all owners—11.4 million owners and 10 million renters—are spending more than one-quarter of their incomes for housing in 1977. Just as people don't choose to live in poor housing, they don't choose to spend high proportions of incomes on housing unless they have to. More than half the renters paying over 35 percent of their incomes for rent had incomes below $3,000, and an additional 30 percent had incomes between $3,000 and $5,000. (Only 0.1 percent had incomes above $15,000.) And so, more than three-quarters of the households with incomes below $3,000 paid over 25 percent of their incomes for shelter; two-thirds paid over 35 percent.

• CHOICE, ACCESS, SUPPLY: Overt discrimination is only one method of excluding minorities and low-income people from choice of and access to decent housing. Perhaps even more effective is exclusion through provision of housing for affluent people only. This is manifested locally by exclusionary zoning and building regulations and at the federal level by failure to subsidize low- and moderate-income housing.

Based on analysis of 1974 income levels, roughly one-fifth of all households require very deep subsidy (cost of housing plus all or part of such operating expenses as heat, repairs, and taxes); one-fifth requires major subsidy (cost of producing housing, but no operating subsidy); one-fifth requires moderate subsidy (interest rates of 1-4 percent); one-fifth requires shallow subsidy; the top fifth can probably buy or rent new housing without assistance.

While I will focus here on households requiring major or very deep subsidies (the bottom 40 percent—roughly 28 million households), it is important to bear in mind that only about 15 million households can afford new housing without subsidy. Thus, if there is to be a sustained effort to keep the building industry going and provide new housing units at the level of 2 million to 3 million annually, either the bulk of production will have to be subsidized to some degree or costs will have to be substantially lower. It seems inconceivable, however, that costs in the shortrun can be reduced to levels that will make unsubsidized new housing generally available to households with below-median incomes.

Therefore, to achieve balanced production, 60 to 80 percent of all new housing should be subsidized, with 40 percent receiving major or deep subsidies. Otherwise, low- and moderate-income households will not have access to new housing, much of which is concentrated in new neighborhoods, and perhaps even have no access to entire communities. Because this has not been done in the past, we have divided our society into black and white, rich and poor, urban and suburban, with housing a major cause.

Assuming that by and large one- and two-person households will prefer to rent, and larger households will prefer to buy their housing, well over half of all small units built should have deep subsidies, while roughly 20 percent of all owned housing requires deep subsidies. For 31.5 percent of one- and two-person households have incomes in the lowest quintile, and 25.1 percent fall into the second quintile; whereas only 8.4 percent of three-or-more-person households have incomes in the lowest quintile, and another 14.9 percent in the second quintile.

Clearly, there is both an overlapping in the above categories of need, and also a degree of acuteness. Analysis of the available indices shows that the basic problems of quality and cost are highly correlated with income, with poorest people having the greatest problems; the problems of moderate- and above-moderate-income people have to do more with lack of choice and inability to satisfy preferences than to what might be categorized as absolute need.

• TO RECAPITULATE, there are, at minimum, some 16 million housing units with structural deficiencies of one sort or another, and there are, at a conservative estimate, some 21 million households paying more than they can afford for housing. While many occupy housing with structural deficiencies, they are in a sense additive, because repair of the deficiency is almost certain to increase housing cost.

The consequences of not dealing with low-income housing problems have been with us for decades, because these problems have never been meaningfully addressed. They include householders' physical problems, illnesses and injuries such as mental retardation caused by low-grade lead poisoning, and alienation or segregation by economic status and race or nationality. As we know, lack of decent housing and adequate privacy is a major barrier to self-development and self-fulfillment.

Nationally, we have paid a stiff price: the lack of

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decent housing and suitable living environments is a major, though of course not the only, contributor to a divided and alienated society, crime, high unemployment, and a breakdown of family life.

On both human and economic terms, federal action should be delayed no longer. We never could afford the human cost of neglect, and still can't. On economic grounds, the cost of meeting our low-income housing needs has increased with each year of neglect. E.g., in the mid-1960s, I estimated the cost of providing every low-income household with decent housing at rents or costs they could afford as about $3 billion annually; a comparable estimate, though somewhat more elaborate, made in 1975 put the cost at $100 billion annually! This vast difference is only in part accounted for by differing assumptions; in larger part it has resulted because we have, during the last decade, permitted the abandonment of a good portion of the housing stock of our inner cities, and because high costs and financing terms have shut off a continuing supply of modest-cost housing for purchase by middle-income working families.

If we addressed our housing needs meaningfully, we would create full employment in a very short time, enabling us to curtail other programs designed to create jobs, and to lower the cost of unemployment compensation and related training programs. □

Dennis Anderson

Arms Control

There are three simultaneous arms races—the Soviet-American competition in nuclear arms, the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries, and the worldwide traffic in conventional arms. All three have been flourishing, at a worldwide cost of over $300 billion a year. Until recently, these interlocked arms races have cast a deepening sense of despair among the specialists who monitor them. Predictions of nuclear war in this century have multiplied, particularly since India showed that a Third World country could develop a nuclear "device" from atoms supposedly designed for peaceful purposes.

The Carter administration, however, is changing the climate in which decisions about arms are made. In his inaugural address, Jimmy Carter reiterated a campaign theme when he said: "We will move this year a step toward our ultimate goal—the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth." In his first contacts with the press, the new President asserted that he: (1) is prepared to bypass the dispute over the U.S. cruise missile and the Soviet Backfire bomber in order to obtain quick consummation of a SALT II treaty; (2) wants a rapid halt to underground nuclear tests and advance notice of missile tests; (3) personally intends to review all arms sales. Vice-President Mondale's first trip to Europe was marked by pressure on France and West Germany to curb nuclear exports. And Mr. Carter has even ordered the Pentagon to study how many missiles would be needed for "minimum deterrence."

While it is too early for anything to have changed in a substantive way, hope is beginning to return to the arms-control and disarmament community.

A SALT II treaty that implements the ceilings agreed upon at Vladivostok in 1974 would permit extraordinarily high levels of destructive power. Each side would be allowed 2,400 missiles and bombers, of which 1,320 could carry multiple nuclear warheads. These ceilings and the technology of multiple warheads (MIRVs) would enable the United States to deploy about 13,000 strategic warheads (almost doubling the 1974 level) by 1985, the expected terminal date of the treaty, while the U.S.S.R. could deploy about 8,000 (more than tripling the 1974 level). Each warhead can destroy a city. Unless the Vladivostok ceilings are lowered, in SALT II and/or SALT III, these arms-control agreements will serve to institutionalize the steady upward mobility of the nuclear arms race. Nonetheless, a high ceiling is better than no ceiling, so the Carter administration is preparing to nail down SALT II as soon as possible and to try to negotiate real arms reductions in SALT III.

With most of SALT II already agreed before the 1976 presidential campaign, Gerald Ford faltered under Reaganite pressure and failed to make the decisions required to seal final agreement. As a result, the question of whether to include the Backfire bomber and the cruise missile within the ceiling of 2,400 launchers remains unsolved. The Backfire is reported unable to make a round trip

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from the Soviet Union to the United States and back home; the Soviets may thus have a defensible position when they say it is not a strategic bomber. The cruise missile, on the other hand, is a small, pilotless, accurate drone that is currently under development by the United States to carry an H-bomb 2,000 miles after launch from an airplane. In its various projected versions, the cruise missile could be fired from submarines or flatbed trucks. Because of its tiny size it could easily be hidden, thus rendering inspection by spy satellites extremely difficult. Since spy satellites constitute the main form of inspection of arms control agreements—the "national means of inspection" of treaty language—the cruise missile poses a problem of watershed proportions. The fact that it is cheap and relatively simple adds to the urgency of the problem.

Even a small cut now in delivery systems would be read as a superpower gesture toward serious cuts later.

TWO FRANTIC EFFORTS by the hardliners to preclude alternatives to the nuclear arms race are bound to influence the politics of SALT. The first is the continuing campaign to persuade the American public and the government that the Soviet Union is seeking military superiority. The second was the campaign to block the nomination of Paul Warnke for director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The well-publicized hardline Team B, headed by Professor Richard Pipes, succeeded in nudging the Ford administration's last National Intelligence Estimate toward the conclusion that the Soviets are pursuing strategic superiority. Simultaneously, the Committee on the Present Danger and other private groups issued dire warnings about the "Soviet threat." While some of these warnings implied that the U.S.S.R. is preparing for a surprise nuclear attack, the more sophisticated analysis of Professor Pipes stressed other dangers. "Strategic superiority, one must bear in mind," he wrote, "has many uses besides its application in nuclear war: It can be used to shield a conventional war, to extract political or economic concessions, to intimidate, to compel acquiescence."

President Carter told his first press conference,

> At the present time, my judgment is that we have superior nuclear capability. The Soviet Union has more throw weight, larger missiles, larger warheads. We have more [warheads], a much higher degree of accuracy, and also, we have three different mechanisms, which are each independently adequate to deliver atomic weapons: airplanes, submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles . . . . Either the Soviet Union or we could destroy a major part of the other nation if a major attack was made—with losses in the neighborhood of 50 to 100 million people . . . . The threat of this kind of holocaust is what makes it important that we do keep an adequate deterrent capability, and it also is crucial for all of us to remember that it is necessary to have drastic reduction in dependence on atomic weapons.

If Mr. Carter hopes to succeed in reducing this dependence, he will have to repeat his public lessons on the ABCs of the nuclear age. At some stage he will also have to deal with Professor Pipes's notion that strategic superiority has political uses. By way of introducing new perspectives, the President might ask what use can be made of military power, nuclear or conventional, in countering such *other* threats to our security as the spread of nuclear weapons, worldwide shortages of energy and food, and pollution of the oceans.

The opposition to Paul Warnke reflects how far the Administration must lead the country before a redefinition of national security can take hold. Using an anonymous memo prepared by the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, Senate cold warriors attempted to prove that the former Pentagon Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs favors "unilateral disarmament." The basis for this charge was a 1975 article in which Warnke urged U.S. initiatives to reverse the arms race. He wrote:

> . . . It's futile to buy things we don't need in the hope that this will make the Soviet Union more amenable. The Soviets are far more apt to emulate than to capitulate. We should, instead, try a policy of restraint, while calling for matching restraint from the Soviet Union.
>
> If the Soviet Union responds by some significant slowing of its own strategic arms buildup, we can at the end of the first six months announce additional moves.
>
> There is, of course, a chance that the Soviet response may be lacking or inadequate. But our present lead in technology and warheads makes it possible for us to take this initiative safely . . . .

If that cautious approach is "unilateral disarmament," then John Kennedy was a member of the War Resisters League.

The *Wall Street Journal* put its anxieties in more political terms. Citing the presence of Anthony Lake and Leslie Gelb at the State Department and David Aaron at the National Security Council, the *Journal* complained that "it's difficult to avoid the

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impression that on foreign and defense matters we are getting a McGovernite administration." The editorial was entitled "Jimmy McGovern?"

These political and journalistic efforts to preserve an armed *status quo* are pressed by individuals whose worldview is dominated by deep suspicion of the Soviet Union. Certainly, the Soviet government is not run by benign libertarians. Yet the Soviet state shares with our own some basic common interests: the avoidance of nuclear war, reduction of the economic burdens generated by arms races, the need to cooperate in meeting certain problems that don't stop at national borders. Arms races undermine common interest. It will take all of Jimmy Carter's persuasive talents to mobilize public support for strategic deescalation. He can count on sustained stonewalling by the Four Cs: the Committee on the Present Danger, the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, *Commentary* Magazine, and the Complex (military-industrial)—plus their friends in Congress.

ONE OF the Administration's earliest challenges in the arms field will come on the question of underground nuclear tests, which were permitted under the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. In 1974, the Nixon administration—then under fire because of Watergate—signed two cosmetic treaties with the Soviet Union. One, the threshold test ban, would permit continued underground tests below 150 kilotons (the level of 10 Hiroshimas). The other would permit "peaceful nuclear explosions" (PNEs) below the same level. These twin treaties are awaiting ratification. Critics have attacked the threshold treaty for permitting continued development of smaller nuclear weapons. They have criticized the PNE treaty for the encouragement it offers to nonnuclear states to follow the PNE route to the development of atomic bombs.

On February 8, President Carter declared:

> I have called on the Soviet Union to join us in a comprehensive test ban to stop all nuclear testing for at least an extended period of time, two years, three years, four years. The Soviets are interested in using nuclear explosives to divert the course of a river in northern Russia. I don't think they need to test any more. If they want to put that as a proviso in the agreement . . . I think that would be something we could negotiate and let us have observers there to learn from them and vice versa.

Mr. Carter thus bypassed the difficult problem of whether to seek ratification of two defective treaties inherited from his predecessor. In leaving a loophole for the Soviets to use PNEs for earth-moving, however, the President risks a dangerous precedent. Any use of nuclear explosives to divert the course of a river will inevitably lead to the release of radioactive debris into the air. Aside from its effect on Soviet citizens and subsequently others, once the radioactivity crosses a border it constitutes a technical violation of the 1963 Test Ban Treaty. Anything less than a truly comprehensive ban leaves a hornet's nest of problems. It will be interesting to see how the ex-nuclear engineer deals on the one hand with the Russians, who became enthusiastic about PNEs after the Americans soured on them, and on the other hand with the hawks, who will probably oppose any treaty.

Another litmus-paper test of the Carter administration will be its stance toward new weapons systems that provide for greater accuracy against Soviet missiles. Accuracy makes the opponent nervous about losing his land-based deterrent, and it encourages a first strike at times of crisis. "Why not hit first and leave them empty holes to shoot at?" If the Administration is willing to face the fury of the hawks by restraining development of the cruise missile, the MX mobile missile, and the Mark 12A warhead, it can ease the way to meaningful negotiated reductions.

On another front, the Administration is reviewing the policy of exporting nuclear technology and conventional arms. The United States is clearly No. 1 in both categories. The Atoms for Peace Program has spread nuclear electric power reactors around the world; other industrial countries have also entered the nuclear-export business. The spent fuel from these reactors can be reprocessed into weapons-grade plutonium unless safeguards prevent this diversion. As a result, there could be as many as 35 nuclear-weapon states within a decade unless the trend is reversed. Among them are Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Israel (if it doesn't already have an untested stock of bombs), Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan. The long list is not reassuring.

U.S. exports of conventional arms have soared from $1 billion in 1970 to $13 billion worth in 1976. The bulk of these arms sales go to the oil-producing countries in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, and to Israel. Arms sales to other areas of the Third World have increased 500 percent in the last five years. This arms traffic has tended to stimulate regional arms races, a particularly appalling trend

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in the Third World where military budgets are rising proportionally even faster than in the superpower competition.

Yet another test of the Carter administration will be its willingness to exercise leadership in setting a more restrained example in the export of nuclear technology and conventional arms, then seeking agreements with other exporters to reduce the traffic worldwide.

Over the next four or eight years, the Carter administration could make the essential difference. With proper leadership at home and on the world scene, this first American president to come to office with a technical knowledge of nuclear weapons could help significantly to reverse the three arms races.

If not, then we should all read the National Academy of Sciences report, "The Long-Term Worldwide Effects of Multiple Detonations of Nuclear Weapons." Assuming a war in which one-half of all the nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals were used, the report concludes that the earth's ozone layer would be seriously depleted. The result (quite in addition to the effects of blast, fire, and radiation): crop failure by direct damage to plants and by major alterations of climate, intense sunburn in a few minutes for exposed humans, and marked increase in skin cancers.

What was that they were saying about "military superiority"? □

Ellen Kelman

Welfare Reform

Welfare was not a major issue in the 1976 presidential campaign. Mindful perhaps of the disaster of McGovern's negative-tax proposal, Jimmy Carter avoided commiting himself to specific reform proposals. In December, new HEW Secretary Joseph Califano surprised no one by announcing that welfare reform would have to wait until it could be undertaken comprehensively.

Yet the problem of welfare remains a pressing one. For those on the left it poses an agonizing dilemma: while, until recently, ideology and practical concern for the economic plight of the poor united in condemning the present welfare system and in urging certain basic reforms, this may no longer be true. Ideological objections remain as valid as ever. The welfare system still categorizes the poor into the "deserving" and undeserving. It still treats the poor essentially as beggars. It still operates under the assumption that being poor is, in some way, the individual's own fault rather than the fault of a society that has built in a place for poverty. But changes in the nature of welfare in recent years have raised questions about the outcome of many reforms that have long been advocated by the left. Who now stands to benefit most by those reforms? The poor? Or the taxpayer and local governments?

Consider two concepts that have long dominated radical discussion of the welfare issue—guaranteed annual income and federalization of welfare.

Guaranteed annual income is usually discussed as some form of negative income tax and thereby represents a major break with traditional American ideas about provision of aid. These discussants have all assumed that the poor should be classified into those deserving and those not deserving aid. While the number of those deemed "deserving" has grown, the basic concept, that only those among the poor whom the economically solvent define as unable to earn a living should receive aid, has persisted for more than 200 years. Provision of a guaranteed income can be seen as a concession on the part of the nonpoor that poverty itself is the *creation* of a given social structure. It shifts concern from the individual reasons for poverty to concern with the condition of poverty itself. A negative-tax provision associated with an income guarantee could insure that most people are still made better off by working than by not working, whatever the level of the guarantee.

Until the 1970s, support of a guaranteed income was a matter of faith on the left. But things have changed. Many now argue that the Supplemental Security Income program passed by Congress in 1974 and the Food Stamp program that now aids enormous numbers of people who would not traditionally have been considered "deserving" are effectively an income guarantee to an increasing percentage of the poor.

Formally, however, the country is still committed to categorization of the poor, and Jimmy Carter's campaign pledge to employ federal

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resources to guarantee dignified aid to the genuinely unemployable while at the same time withdrawing assistance from those who choose not to work does not bode well for a change to a universal income guarantee.

Given this set of facts, is it not more likely that an attempt at establishing a universal income guarantee will simply lead to an attack on SSI and Food Stamps than to formalized guarantees?

WHAT OF federalization? The term can be taken to mean anything from complete federal responsibility for welfare to federal provision of earmarked funds to localities with minimal guidelines on how the money is spent. Federalization has taken on special significance in the context of New York City's repeated brushes with bankruptcy. It is now discussed primarily as a means of rescuing local governments from the ruinous burden of welfare payments. This may be a necessary and even an admirable goal, but it should not be confused with welfare reform; it is fiscal reform undertaken with little concern for the interests of the poor. Yet only recently federalization was seen primarily as an answer to problems more directly related to welfare than to local finances, and it still will affect the welfare system in ways that transcend its effect on city budgets.

There are two sorts of concerns for which federalization has traditionally been proposed as an answer.

The first, a major issue among liberals throughout the 1960s, was discrimination at the local level. In 1960, many people were appalled at action taken by the state of Louisiana, when 20,000 children, most of them black, were kicked off the Aid to Dependent Children rolls because their mothers had given birth to one or more illegitimate children since going on welfare. While the state was eventually pressured into backing down, support in the liberal community began to build for the federal government to take over the funding and administration of welfare, so that such incidents could not be repeated. This issue is no longer a driving force among advocates of complete federalization. Even liberals who once championed federal intervention have reacted against the confidence so many showed during the 1960s in the superior wisdom of the federal government.

The second problem to which federalization was supposed to provide an answer involves both equity and economics. There is wide variation among states in the amount of both cash and other forms of assistance that recipients of welfare receive. This not only appears unfair but is believed to encourage patterns of migration that directly hurt states inundated with potential welfare clients.

A federally funded floor on welfare payments has often been suggested as the most logical solution to this problem.

One objection to this solution, that the variation in the cost of living in different parts of the country warrants variations in welfare payments, is easily met. Payments could be pegged to the cost of living in each region of the country. There are, however, two other kinds of problems that strike me as somewhat more intractable. The first was referred to above. Through the proliferation of in-kind assistance programs and informal income supplements, many poor people are already receiving an income equivalent greater than any minimum income suggested in any politically realistic proposal for federalization of cash-transfer programs. Replacing these programs and supplements with all or some simple income transfers would only hurt many of the poor unless it were done on a more generous basis than seems likely. Yet "cashing out" many programs and thereby simplifying the administration of assistance is the main appeal that federalization holds for many political figures including, presumably, Jimmy Carter.

Thus, as with a guaranteed income, the poor might not stand to gain from federalization of welfare. It is a unit of government that might gain—local governments that will have shifted the burden for cash transfers to the federal government while keeping much of their control of the treatment the poor receive. The apparently "simple" solution of federal assumption of the financial burden of cash transfers appears unlikely to *help* the poor.

Assume that, in a burst of federal generosity, the Carter administration decides to cash out in-kind programs all around the country and to establish a federal minimum cash payment equal to the average cash equivalent (including the informal "emergency" subsidies) received by welfare clients throughout the country. Ignoring the improbability of this action, what do we do about states currently above the national average?

Many opponents of Nixon's Family Assistance Plan (among them the National Welfare Rights Organization) argued that state supplements would inevitably decrease and eventually dis-

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appear, trapping the poor in a squeeze between the federal and local governments.

There is still another, and in some ways more compelling, argument favoring federalization of welfare. Insofar as the left has any hope of ever affecting the ideological bias of the welfare system, it will be on the federal level and, indeed, the moves mentioned above toward providing increasingly unconditional assistance—Food Stamps and SSI—both originated at the federal level.

Still, neither of these programs was intended to signal a major shift away from the basic principal of categorical and conditional aid, and hence we should avoid being overly encouraged by them if our hope is that federalization will lead directly to such a shift. And we should remember that, even were such a shift to take place, it might be purchased with increased suffering among current welfare recipients.

FEDERAL FUNDING of welfare without detailed federal control seems to be the solution of the hour to one set of our national problems—the financial difficulties facing the cities. Indeed, President Carter expressed interest in some such solution during the campaign. And it is unarguably in the interests of the urban poor as well as the urban rich that the cities continue to provide the services that bankruptcy would disrupt. Yet it would be a mistake to look upon the interests of either the poor or the cities as a whole as unambiguously served by federalization *per se*. Federalization may be *an* answer to both the problems of the cities and the problems of the welfare system; it is unlikely that it is *the* answer to either or both.

What is the bottom line on all this? First, that President Carter's most basic decision in terms of welfare will be whether he is more concerned with the economic status of the poor, the solvency of the cities, or with the burgeoning of federal welfare costs. Second, that for the left the immediate future must be a time in which to show caution in urging welfare reform. Part of the left's position must be determined by Jimmy Carter, for so far as his prime commitment appears to be decreasing welfare costs under the cover of rationalizing its administration, pressure for reform may simply provide him with a convenient cover for punishing the poor. So far as he exhibits a genuine commitment to improving the lot of the poor, the left can attempt to insure that no reform, such as federalization, be undertaken without explicit consideration of its *real* effects on welfare recipients. □

H. Brand

Poverty

Poverty in the United States remains a widespread and persistent problem. In 1975 the Census Bureau reported that nearly 26 million persons had incomes, or were living in households having incomes, that fell below the so-called poverty threshold ($5,500 for a family of four that year). Well over 8 million of these persons were children under 14; more than 3 million were men and women 65 and over. One half of all the heads of families in poverty reported that they had been employed the previous year, and nearly one third of these had worked at year-round, full-time jobs. An additional 11 million persons had incomes just above the poverty level, i.e., at most $6,900. More than one fourth of all black families and close to 13 percent of all white families lived in or near poverty as officially defined.

Recent research work conducted at the Brookings Institution and by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has cast doubt on these figures. The researchers have asked: why in the face of enormous increases in federal outlays for income supports should the reported incidence of poverty still be so high? Total income security transfers rose nearly eightfold between 1960 and 1977 (fiscal years)—from $23 billion to $182 billion. Yet the number of persons "in poverty" declined by only about one third. In attempting to answer the question, the researchers have defined new standards for measuring poverty. They have added the cash value of income in kind—e.g., Food Stamps, Medicaid, rent subsidies—to the money income received by the poor. By this measure, the number of people in poverty dwindles to near insignificance--5-6 percent of the total popuation, less than half the proportion under the current Census definition. Their approach permits these researchers to claim that "substantial progress has been made during the past two decades toward . . . the reduction of poverty" (Brookings), and that "the incidence of poverty among families has fallen by approximately 60 percent since 1965" (CBO). The problem is thus being defined away.

These claims, however, are thoroughly misleading, and because of their likely impact on

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legislation and public attitudes, they are damaging to the interests of the poor.

The basic issue here is the concept of poverty used in determining the cutoff above which people are no longer considered "poor." Today, as in 1965 when it was first defined, the cutoff is equivalent to an income fitting a stylized household budget: it is based on the Department of Agriculture's "economy" food plan, designed for "emergency or temporary use when funds are low"—a plan that by the Department's own estimate would preclude the vast majority of persons who use it to obtain a nutritionally adequate diet! The food plan constitutes one third of the budget total, which is the ratio of food expenditures to total family expenditures found by various surveys.

This concept is characterized, first of all, by excluding any changes in the norms of adequacy, as indicated by prevailing average family incomes or the family budgets formulated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The only allowances made in setting the poverty threshold is price change over time. The buying power of a poor family's or person's presumed subsistence budget thus remains static. In asserting that poverty has greatly declined, the researchers at Brookings and the CBO have unquestioningly accepted the official poverty line, although its inadequacies are patent and have been widely discussed.

In 1975, the average (or median) income of a four-person family was $15,848. The poverty threshold for a comparable family represented 35 percent of that average. This 1975 ratio marks a steady deterioration in the relation of the official subsistence cutoff to average family income: in 1960, the ratio had been 49 percent, and 40 percent in the mid-60s. Had the poverty cutoff for a four-person family in 1975 been the same as in 1960, it would have amounted to $7,600. The population in poverty would then have totaled 30 million persons, spelling virtually no improvement in the poverty count since the middle '60s.

The official poverty cutoff, moreover, compares very unfavorably with the lowest of the three budgets priced by the BLS annually for four-person families, which roughly indicate different levels of living. In 1975, the lowest BLS budget totaled $9,600, representing a very austere living standard. Yet this sum stood 74 percent above the 1975 poverty cutoff for a four-person family. When payroll and personal income taxes were deducted from the budget, it still stood 50 percent above the poverty threshold (assuming families in poverty pay no such taxes). However, the average American family does not subsist on so stringent a sum as the lowest BLS budget costs. Its living standard was more closely represented by the BLS's "intermediate" budget, which, after deducting payroll and income taxes, was priced at $12,400 in 1975. The official poverty cutoff for a four-person family amounted to little more than one third of this budget in 1975.

NO ECONOMIC DEFINITION of poverty can be meaningful unless it relates to prevailing social norms of consumption and community participation. Adam Smith wrote that "by necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the century renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without." This dictum was implicitly accepted by Marx and informs his conception of wages as the price of labor power. It is also implicit in relating increases in wages and fringe benefits to increases in national productivity; and it underlies the "wage replacement rate," which is a key determinant of benefits under unemployment insurance (although that rate averages less than 60 percent of wages earned prior to job loss in one half of all states). The standard set by the static subsistence budget, whose cost defined the official poverty threshold, results in the statistical fiction that the number of persons in poverty is declining. This decline is then cited to justify a reduction in the resources needed for alleviating poverty.

Adding the cash equivalent of income in kind to the poverty cutoff does nothing to reduce poverty in terms of the prevailing social norms of need. It does, however, further emphasize the fictitiousness of the official poverty threshold, derived as it is from an obviously inadequate and generally unusable food plan.

According to a study by the Joint Economic Committee's Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy in April 1972, the cash equivalent of income in kind received by an unemployed mother of three children, "theoretically" lifted her total income (including public assistance grants) by 41 percent. But various adjustments must be made, and the value of the in-kind income is reduced to an extra 31 percent. E.g., the study (like the CBO study of recent date) assesses medical benefits at cost to the state, which is much higher than the more normal value of medical outlays (mainly insurance payments) associated with the "lower" BLS budget

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for a four-person family. The study includes the rental value of public housing, but most of the poor do not live in public housing, nor are they eligible for it. So what remains of in-kind income is mostly Food Stamps and school luncheons. Assuming that the relation between cash and noncash income in 1972 still obtained in 1975, noncash benefits added $1,700 to the poverty threshold cash income of a four-person family, raising its total (cash and noncash) income to $7,200. But this was still considerably less than the income this family would have received, had the above-mentioned 1960 ratio of the poverty cutoff to the median income of all four-person families still prevailed.

In assessing income in kind given to the poor, the income in kind of higher income groups must be taken into account, if social norms are to set the terms of adequacy. Any such comparison turns out to be most unfavorable to the poor and other low-income recipients; the relative position of these people will likely be much worse after than before income in kind has been added to cash income.

The steep rise in government transfer payments (only about half of it has benefited the poor) must be viewed against the equally steep rise in private and public employment benefits. Health benefits paid under private and public (civil service) plans rose nearly sixfold between 1960 and 1973; retirement benefits rose nearly sevenfold. These benefits, moreover, have been heavily subsidized, and cost the federal government well over $8 billion in fiscal 1976 in employer taxes foregone; roughly the same amount was paid by the federal government in income security benefits to mothers and children. Generally, compensation other than pay for time worked, including also increasingly liberal paid leave provisions, has been rising—from 15 percent of the total compensation of factory workers in 1959 to 23 percent in 1974. Furthermore, the tax deductibility of mortgage interest on homes spells a subsidy of $5.4 billion in the current fiscal year; federal housing assistance to low-income families amounts to $3 billion. Other, similar comparisons could be drawn, all pointing to the same conclusion: *the relative position of the poor does not improve when in-kind income is added to their cash income; on the contrary, it worsens.*

Emphasis on the official poverty threshold obscures the fact that most poor people subsist on incomes well below that threshold. The mean (average) income of all low-income families (including those with incomes 25 percent above the poverty line) was $2,749 in 1974; of families without children under 18 (probably mostly aged persons), $1,888; of families with one or more children, $3,026. Some of these families undoubtedly owned assets such as a home or savings from which they could supplement their income. But government surveys have time and again shown the meagreness of these assets, including owned homes, which for lack of funds often cannot be maintained or even properly heated, and whose imputed rental value therefore declines.

There also is known to be substantial understatement of income by respondents to Census inquiries. Correction of such understatement would, in the aggregate, add 11 percent to respondents' social security income, 25 percent to public assistance income, and 42 percent to income from unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, and veterans' payments. Let us say that the average low-income family with one or more children understated its income by 25 percent; then, after figuring in the "understatement," its "corrected" income, at $3,783, would still have fallen well below the official poverty level.

WHY DOES POVERTY PERSIST? The larger reasons fall outside the purview of this article. The immediate reasons lie mainly in the parsimony of public assistance grants and social security benefits. Two illustrations must suffice: in 1975, the average benefit of a retired worker and his wife was about $3,750 per year. Fewer than half of all retired workers also draw private pensions, and these are usually very modest. The BLS's "lower" budget for a retired couple was priced at $4,500 in autumn 1975. Public assistance payments to families with dependent children are even more stingy; they averaged $2,756 in 1975.

It is unlikely that the problem of poverty will be resolved without a massive redistribution of public resources. A substantial proportion of these resources is currently expended on subsidies to the middle class (examples have been cited); these resources should be used to alleviate poverty, although resistance may be too strong for this to be realized. And vast sums are spent on military items that have no rationally conceivable purpose, but it is unlikely, in the present context of political forces, that they will be reduced and in part reallocated to human purposes. There prevails, as perhaps the fundamental source of persistent poverty, a substantial low-wage component of the wage system, and a pervasive insecurity of job tenure in

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most industries. These factors contribute to depressed retirement benefits, severe losses in income, and often the disintegration of families. I believe social security should replace all private and civil service pension systems, and pay benefits equivalent to the after-tax value of the last few years of preretirement earnings. Unemployment benefits, similarly, should replace lost earnings in full. Heads of families on welfare should be offered the services enabling them, if they are able-bodied, to work, with public-assistance grants making up the difference between their wages and an adequate income, i.e., one that corresponds to the cost of the BLS's "intermediate" budget. But I do not believe that any of these ideas will soon be accepted. Poverty therefore will persist. □

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Michael Harrington

Advance, or Retreat, in the 1970s?

The following article is a slightly abbreviated version of a speech given this past February at the convention of the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee, of which Michael Harrington is chairman. — EDS.

During the next four years the long-run contradictions of American society, above all its hostility to full employment, are going to be its short-run problems. The achievement of even significant reform will require a challenge to the basic corporate domination of the economy. And it is quite possible that we will see the effective dissolution of the liberal ideology formulated by the New Deal. Indeed, right-wing liberalism has already sounded retreat.

It is not enough simply to try and halt that retreat, for, just as the new nay-sayers argue, many of the old verities no longer apply. Paradoxically, the fulfillment of liberal values now demands that the nation move beyond liberalism.

The signs of liberalism 's retreat are visible on all sides. The Democratic governor of New York proposes a conservative Republican budget, which attacks the poor and the unemployed and pampers business. The Brookings Institution, long a think tank of Establishment liberalism, publishes scholarly papers demonstrating that there can be no new social initiatives for at least five years. And during President Carter's very first week in office, his Budget director modified the Administration's economic program to give more subsidies to corporations in order to mechanize jobs out of existence in the midst of the deepest unemployment crisis since the Great Depression.

Yet the human needs that cry out for federal action—the rotting cities and preventable deaths, the wasted generation of jobless youth, and so on—are more urgent than at any time since the '30s. Why, then, this retreat?

One reason is that a program of systematic public miseducation, initiated by Richard Nixon, has persuaded a large sector of the public that Washington has spent and innovated wildly in the

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'60s and failed in practically everything it did. In fact, there were successes, like Medicare and the reduction of unemployment, while the failures were caused by overselling and underfinancing, and the subordination of social programs by corporate goals.

There is, however, another reason for the retreat from liberalism that is even more serious than Nixon's pernicious myth of the '60s. If one grants the liberals-in-rout a crucial premise, then they are quite right. If one is unwilling to attack the systemic bias of the American political economy in favor of the corporations and the corporate rich, then we do indeed face intolerable constraints. And conversely, if the democratic left maintains its commitment to liberal aims, like full employment, it will have to fight for structural changes that go beyond liberalism.

Within liberalism two souls were always in conflict. Liberalism, on the one hand, inspired all the movements that sought progressive change within the system: trade unionists and minorities and women, as well as the middle-class reformers. For the last 40 years, liberalism was as far left as mainstream politics would go in this country. On the other hand, the liberal ideology tacitly accepted the corporate domination of the economic infrastructure even when it opposed particular big business policies. The welfare state was designed to make capitalism work, not to replace it.

So despite the successful reforms of those years, corporations remain in control of the investment process. They decide what kind of jobs are to be generated, and where and when. Public intervention is shaped by private priorities in order to get cooperation from the board rooms. Trickle-down is *the* policy of the United States and as a result public monies often induce public disasters. The subsidies paid to agribusiness allowed it to mechanize twice as fast as industry in the postwar period, displacing millions of the rural poor who were forced into the cities just when other federal incentives were financing an exodus from the cities of jobs and affluent taxpayers. The costs of this process were socialized, the enormous profits privatized. The consequent fiscal crisis was then blamed on liberals who often did no more than seek relief for the victims of government policies in which profits are more important than people.

In good times, there were social gains as well as losses. But even then the contradictions accumulated, and in the '70s they boiled to the surface. There was a cyclical crisis, and perhaps also a secular crisis, of capitalist growth throughout the Western world; international competition subverted the absolute dominance of the world market that America had enjoyed between 1945 and 1960; multinational oil companies received gigantic federal subsidies and were allowed to make the energy economy both wasteful and dependent on foreign sources and thus prepared the way for the sucess of the OPEC cartel. Above all, it turned out that even a very modest approximation of full employment (a 3.6 percent jobless rate in 1968) threatened corporate profitability—but that the traditional remedy of restoring profitability and price stability by increasing unemployment no longer worked.

This last point is critical, for full employment is the key to progress in every sector of the society. With chronic high unemployment there will be neither the political nor the economic conditions for ending racial and sexual discrimination in the labor market. There will not even be the relatively modest amount of money needed to fund national health. It is unlikely that we will raise our foreign aid much above the present, derisory 0.27 of GNP and, even more important, it is unlikely that we will cooperate in helping the Third World industrialize. Disarmament will be made difficult because of the understandable resistance of people working in the defense industry.

So this is the critical issue for the Carter Administration. And it is here that we see the most shocking signs of liberal retreat.

In testifying at hearings on his nomination as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Charles Schultze said that the *success* of the Carter economic plan would only reduce unemployment to 7-7.5 percent in 1977, 6.5-7 percent in 1978, and below 6 percent by the end of 1979. A few months earlier, Schultze had argued in a Brookings volume that, on the assumption of 5 percent rates of unemployment, there would be no money for expanding existing social programs or innovation *during the next five years*. That grim prediction, given his testimony, is optimistic since he does not think we will get down to that 5 percent jobless level during this decade!

These intolerable figures are said to be the result of a new structure of the labor market. When the general unemployment rate reaches 5.5 percent, we are told, the most advantaged workers—adult males—are in short supply. That bids up their wages and makes for inflation, even though the disadvantaged—who are disproportionately

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minorities, women, and youths—are still on the street in the millions. Therefore, in this society one deals with the problem, not by direct job generation or even fiscal and monetary policy, but by manpower programs that will improve the productivity of those disadvantaged groups so that they can be integrated into the labor force without causing inflation.

The evidence is overwhelming that this approach simply will not work. There are debates about how effective the job training programs of the '60s were. But we do know, one of their most problematic aspects was that they were not funded massively enough relative to the need and to the subsidies being handed out to the corporations. Mr. Schultze has, however, made out a devastating case that there is not enough money even to finance an effort comparable to that of the '60s even though the problem, as measured in mass unemployment, is double what it was then. And second, the 1960s' effort took place while joblessness was declining. But, as Schultze's own unemployment figures show, the economy will be much more resistant to full employment than it was in the last decade.

In fact, the Chairman of President Carter's Council of Economic Advisers has secretly adopted a classic Marxist thesis—but for conservative reasons. He is telling us that this society requires a labor reserve army that will be disproportionately composed of the minorities, the women, and the young, in order to function. There is indeed a profound tendency in this direction built into the American economy, since periodic unemployment works to restrain labor militancy and wages, restore discipline in the plant, and thereby make for new conditions of profitability.

BUT THIS TENDENCY can be fought *if* one is willing to make structural changes in the economy. It is here that we see a watershed in the current crisis. Liberalism was committed both to reform and to the status quo. Its left wing emphasized the struggle and the reforms; its right wing, the limits. In opposition to Republican reaction or in a period of economic upswing and gains, the two could coexist uneasily. In the future, that will not be the case. On the one side there will be the liberals in retreat, so deferential to established power that they will effectively tolerate levels of unemployment that will subvert the best hopes of the Carter administration, domestically and internationally. And on the other side there will be those who will fight for the structural changes in the system that can make full employment possible.

We are not projecting a doctrinal war between two liberal sects, one progressive and the other conservative. Rather, we see the possibility—indeed the probability—of a complex historic process in which the contradictions of the economy and society will explode within very practical debates over public policy. These issues, in short, will not be primarily argued out as counterposed theories, but in terms of sharply different political programs. We propose that the entire democratic left, and not just its socialist wing, mobilize behind the approach that we now outline.

We stand behind the unanimous commitment of the 1976 Democratic Convention and the repeated promise of its presidential candidate: that every worker in America has a *right* to a job. We agree with the AFL-CIO that Mr. Carter should immediately move to redeem that promise by a $30 billion economic program that will reduce joblessness by 2 million.

The best way to accomplish this goal is through a vast increase in public-service employment in the federal, state, municipal, and nonprofit sectors. We know from the careful analyses of the Congressional Budget Office that such an investment is the cheapest and most productive way of stimulating the economy. Tax write-offs for corporations do not simply reinforce the maldistribution of wealth and power; they are also ineffective and expensive tools in regard to full-employment policy.

We most emphatically do not propose to federalize all of the work programs. Indeed, we stress that one of the most important areas for the creation of new jobs is within the framework of neighborhood and community programs. The Rural Electrification Administration has demonstrated that money from Washington can be used to underwrite and encourage the creativity of the grass roots. And that would be an important dimension of our proposal.

But how will these jobs be funded? By redeeming another basic Carter campaign pledge: tax reform. There are tens of billions of handouts in the Internal Revenue Code. Rather than "solving" the current crisis through the suffering of the unemployed, we should move to require the rich to pay at least their fair share and thereby help fund full employment. The redistribution of wealth is thus not simply an egalitarian ideal. It is a practical necessity if we are to face the immediate crisis of the economy.

Peace is another weapon in this fight. If the Administration vigorously pushes SALT II to a

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successful conclusion and sets the Vienna discussion on conventional arms limitation in motion, we might finally get that peace "dividend" we have been talking about for so long. Within this context, we do not simply oppose the Cold Warriors, like the Committee on the Present Danger, because their proposals for a reescalation of the arms race threaten the security of America and the world. We are also against them because their program would destroy the possibility of progress at home.

That progress demands national economic planning. We do not, like the tax-cutters, trust in the corporate-dominated market to make the right allocation of resources. The disasters currently being visited on huge cities and entire regions is overwhelming proof that private choice does not maximize the common good. But then Washington has not really been taking a hands-off attitude toward the market. It has constantly intervened in the investment process and almost always with the same aim: to reinforce the goals of the corporations. It is time for a national planning mechanism that will shape the investment process on the basis of social priorities.

There are proposals already before the Congress in the Humphrey-Hawkins bill pointing in this direction. Humphrey-Hawkins is a "process" bill that does not mandate any specific action for the fulfillment of its goals but describes a way of coming to such decisions. It is extremely mild and has already been watered down, but it can be taken as an important point of departure. Within the Humphrey-Hawkins framework, we could then fight for:

- The creation of a publicly-owned gas and oil corporation;
- Credit allocation, requiring all banks to provide a percentage of their loans for specified social purposes;
- A tax credit only available for investments that promote the goals of public policy, e.g., for companies that hire minorities or women, and that move into areas like New York City, etc.;
- Public and employee representation on the board of directors of all major corporations so that all basic decisions on pricing, technology, plant location, etc. are made in the open and, if necessary, are the subject of public hearings to see to it that public priorities are followed;
- A national policy to restore the railroads under public ownership within the context of a planned development of mass transit;
- Job guarantees, on the Amtrak model, for all workers displaced because of defense cuts, environmental protection, or American measures designed to facilitate the industrialization of the Third World.

Clearly this is an extensive agenda and it requires careful consideration in each and every detail. We are committed to it because we regard democratic decision-making as a central value that is constantly overridden by corporate power. But we also believe that, with all of the errors inevitable in any human enterprise, our program will be more efficient than the present, scandalously wasteful system.

This agenda is not yet socialist, even though it moves in that direction. Indeed almost every proposal we have made is contained in the 1976 Democratic platform or, like tax reform, was vigorously endorsed by Jimmy Carter during the campaign. A serious political movement must begin where the people are. The plurality of Americans who voted for Jimmy Carter know that they need full employment, health care, livable cities, fair taxation, and the like. And the 47 percent who were nonvoters, a group that is mainly composed of working people, the minorities, and the poor, require such measures too. But no one will get them if the liberal retreat becomes national policy.

The first step, then, is to mobilize the Carter majority and the nonvoters in a democratic left coalition of trade unionists, the minorities, feminists, and reformers. Its program would call for the kind of structural change we have outlined here, proposals that move in a socialist direction but are not themselves socialist. In the foreseeable future, the tactic of that movement should be one of struggle to help, or if necessary push, the President to fulfill the key promises of the Democratic Platform and campaign of 1976. Clearly, there are forces hostile to that undertaking within the Administration—and just as clearly, there are those who are friendly to it. We are not outsiders on the fringe of American politics. We are simply, but most emphatically, demanding that the Democratic Presidency live up to its own promises.

We do not propose that the democratic left become socialist in this period. There is not a potential majority for such a step, not within the democratic left itself and certainly not in American society. But we believe that, here and

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now, democratic socialism must once again become a normal and natural tendency within the mainstream of American political life. If the democratic left adapts itself to the reactionary antisocialist myths pervading this country, this will not merely push back a renascent socialist movement that is hardly a mass threat in America. It will move all political debate and all legislation to the right, since proposals will be formulated so as to prove that they do not threaten the corporate *status quo*—that they are not socialist.

Second, we must frankly say that we believe that the democratic left must sooner or later—the sooner the better—move to a full socialist position. The evils we have described are systemic, part of a structure in which there is private corporate domination of an increasingly social and international technology, with disastrous consequences for Americans and the poor of this world. That system itself is in movement, forced to adopt noncapitalist techniques of making economic decisions politically in order to preserve capitalism.

So the choice before us is not "free enterprise" or "statism." It is whether the increasing collectivization of economic life is going to take place behind closed doors where basic choices are made by an alliance of government bureaucrats and corporate executives, which is the present trend; or whether it is possible to make that collectivization democratic and libertarian and communitarian. It is the struggle toward this latter goal that defines socialism today.

We make no messianic claims about the future we seek. Socialism could solve some of the most critical of human problems, like hunger and preventable disease and urban decay, but it will not transform human nature. Our goal is political: not the creation of heaven on earth, but the construction of a better earth. We do believe, however, that our movement is relevant to the profound spiritual crisis of these times, even it it in no way pretends to be a substitute religion. For one of the sources of the bewilderment and confusion one senses throughout this culture is that we have done such a poor job in mastering the products of our own genius, that we seem so often to be the victims of our creativity. And one of our hopes is that the people, in the course of winning control of their society, will find new meanings in their individual lives.

The business of America, it was once rightly said, is business. Economically, politically—morally—that is no longer good enough. The work of this society should be the democratic satisfaction of the needs, not only of its own people, but of humankind throughout the world. We propose, then, not simply a program, but a vision. □

William Kornblum

Why the Insurgents Lost in Steel

Months, even years will pass before the dust settles over the issues raised by the Steelworkers' 1977 International union election. Lloyd McBride, the candidate representing the union's incumbent administration, clearly has won a convincing electoral victory by amassing some 58 percent of the total vote. Still, at least 238,000 Steelworkers in the U.S. and Canada did vote for the insurgent slate headed by Ed Sadlowski. This fact, and the very bitterness of the campaign, requires that the union's new leaders take steps to meet the challenge raised by the insurgents. The Sadlowski forces now must find ways to survive politically in the coming lean years—which may prove extremely difficult.

The Sadlowski slate lost, because it failed to win wide margins in its areas of strength, margins needed to offset predictable severe losses in Quebec and the South. The insurgent campaign, represented by the Steelworkers Fight Back organization, was counting on heavy voting and two-to-one victories in a number of key Districts. When early returns showed these Districts had failed to deliver as heavily as hoped, it was clear that the Sadlowski slate would lose.

Perhaps the major disappointment for the insurgents came in the Pittsburgh region, where three USWA Districts with a combined membership of about 162,000 Steelworkers generally cast almost 20 percent of the union's

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votes. This major steel-producing region has never thrown its support to I. W. Abel, the incumbent USWA president who will retire in June 1977. In 1969 Emile Narick, a relatively unknown union staff official, outscored Abel in the region by 24,000 votes, and Narick never mounted a thorough campaign. Given Ed Sadlowski's immense popularity in basic steel, it was generally thought he would do as well, if not better. It appears now that Sadlowski carried the region by only 5,000 votes, far short of the amount required to match losses in the deep South.

> I'm not sure what went wrong there [Sadlowski said in a conversation shortly after the February 8 election]. That's something we'll be talking about around the fire for the next years. I do know that the layoff of about 60,000 Steelworkers in Pennsylvania because of gas shortages hurt us badly. The big majority of those people were our supporters. Don't forget that at the end of the campaign the staff really poured it on in that area, which is something they never had to do when Narick ran . . . .
>
> I was even a little disappointed by the results in my own District 31. We were hoping to match the 20,000 vote lead we won there two years ago, but it turns out we'll probably fall a little short of a 15,000 margin. The most obvious thing though is that—except for Texas, Quebec, and a few other places where we couldn't place observers at the polls—this was a very close election, much closer than the overall totals show.

Indeed, voting results in the main industrial corridor of North America, along the basin of the Great Lakes and down through the Delaware Valley to Baltimore, show that, while the margins of victory were not what had been hoped for, the insurgent slate scored upsets in every District except Canton, Ohio, Abel's original home base.

WHEN ONE LISTENS to Steelworkers discuss the election, the most frequent explanation for the results in basic steel usually hinge on the issue of the Experimental Negotiating Agreement (ENA), which has governed bargaining between the large corporations and the union since 1972. Sadlowski has been extremely critical of the agreement, because it gives up the right to strike over wages and working conditions (except on local issues) and, most important, it had never been submitted to the membership in basic steel for a referendum. But Sadlowski's grounds for attacking the agreement do not seem to have been generally understood.

In the big U.S. Steel Fairless works in Levittown, Pa., the workers voted for Sadlowski and his slate by a margin of 700 votes out of about 3,000, a spread that many felt was lower than expected.

> I thought Eddie would take our mill by at least 1,500 votes [said Louis Genevie, a veteran of more than 20 years in the blast furnaces at Fairless]. I think at the last moment some of the older fellows got a little nervous about Ed's stand on the ENA. You began to hear things like, "Well, Eddie Sadlowski is a young guy with a great future, but maybe not just yet though." This hurt, because quite a few of them were worried that Ed might be strike happy, which was the story the staff was spreading around. And a lot of our members lost sight of the union democracy issues.

In comparison with the lively campaign waged by both sides at Fairless and other major steel-producing centers, the election was a most one-sided affair in much of the South and in Quebec. Texas in particular gave lopsided counts to the McBride slate. Despite all the publicity the campaign generated, it appears that in perhaps 50 out of 147 local unions in that state there was not one vote cast for the Sadlowski slate. This is the kind of machine-voting pattern that would make the boss of any "river ward" proud. And in Quebec the same situation prevailed, but for less obvious reasons.

"It's like we're at the end of the string," a French-Canadian Steelworker said to me during a preelection visit there, "We don't hear much from the International officers until election time. What matters most to us is our own Quebec and Canadian leadership." Under the directorship of Jean Gerin-Lajoie, a Rhodes Scholar and Ph.D. in economics, the Steelworkers in Quebec were a major force behind the election of René Levesque and the Parti Quebecois. Unfortunately for the insurgents, the Steelworkers' campaign took place in Quebec while the flush of nationalist victory was still being felt, and the Quebec director used the opportunity to demonstrate his strength to the officials in Pittsburgh. Thus Gerin-Lajoie promoted his assistant, Gerard Docquier, as candidate for Canadian national director and in return, for support for his man, the Quebec leader promised to deliver his District to McBride. Sadlowski's only hope was that the vote in Quebec would be light, as it had always been in the past, and that he would obtain at least 15 percent of it as had Narick in 1969. And significant gains by the insurgents in Ontario could offset expected losses in Quebec.

Unofficial returns from Quebec indicate that, by

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turning out at least 65 percent of the District's membership, Gerin-Lajoie was able to present the McBride slate with a margin of over 20,000 votes. "We will hold all our elections in the plants," a Quebecois union staff official told me before the election, "And you will see a very heavy vote from Quebec because every member will have a very easy time in voting. They will vote for Docquier, and then they will just vote for the remainder of the McBride ticket." Here, as in Texas, the machine vote was astounding, for in about 30 local unions there was not one vote for the insurgents. A Steelworker from the Chicago office lamented:

> How could these be real figures? We had no observers in these mines and other locals up on the Saint Lawrence river. We had a terrible time beginning a campaign up there, because none of us speak French; we didn't have people who lived there. We couldn't really afford to place an organizer up there. All we could do was a little leafletting and hope for the best, so naturally we got killed. You can bet that next time we'll know how to work Quebec!

The assumption in this Sadlowski organizer's remarks is that there will be another election like the one just passed. There was, however, much speculation during the campaign that, if elected, the McBride slate would support proposals to alter the union's constitution in favor of a convention rather than a referendum vote for International officers. McBride himself denied this charge in a debate with Sadlowski that was televised on Meet the Press nine days before the election. Still, such a change remains a real possibility and would bring the Steelworkers in line with most other AFL-CIO unions, which do elect their officers in convention. It would also be a defeat for the traditions of democratic competition within the Steelworkers' union.

THROUGHOUT THE CAMPAIGN the McBride forces, and most notably I. W. Abel and George Meany, made much of Sadlowski's active solicitation of non-Steelworker funds. Such Meany followers as Albert Shanker also castigated Sadlowski for accepting financial help from "outsiders." Victor Reuther, Joseph Rauh, J. K. Galbraith, and Arthur Schlesinger—all of whom signed fund-raising letters for the Sadlowski side—have come under special attack by Meany, Shanker, and others. In some ways this may be one of the positive, if unintended, consequences of the election. Those named as "outsiders" are strenuously defending their rights to support the candidate of their choice in this important election. After all, Abel and his staff, along with other AFL-CIO officials, indeed made no secret of their opposition to the McGovern candidacy in 1972, and their massive financial support for the Jackson presidential campaign is public record. As it turned out the Sadlowski campaign could barely afford to keep its Steelworker volunteers supplied with leaflets. Moreover, the 20 or so "organizers" who did coordinate the insurgent campaign were, but for two or three exceptions, Steelworkers either on layoff or vacation. These 20 field organizers beat the union staff of some 900 organizers wherever they could campaign for a substantial length of time. The places where the insurgents lost were the areas where they had not done prior organizing and therefore had no organizers. Now there remain few such areas in North America.

Steelworkers with whom I spoke during the campaign rarely thought the issue of public appeals for funds was important. Most took it for granted that donations were necessary. Yet many workers thought the effort to discredit Sadlowski and link him with various left groups did cause losses, especially in the South where the Fight Back organization was unable to reach the membership well enough. It is impossible to know for certain, but it seems likely that the combined effect of the attempts to smear Sadlowski as a radical, the attack on his funding sources, and last-minute editorials in most metropolitan newspapers warning of possible "labor strife" did dampen the support for the insurgents in the steel centers.

Although aware of these problems, Sadlowski could not project a more "centrist" image as the campaign wore on. If anything, he and his running mates tended to broaden their attacks on the Abel administration's record and to use increasingly hard language in their criticism of the union staff. This was done in order to waken the interest and participation of Steelworkers employed in the fabrication, container, smelting, and service industries within the union. These locals are dispersed throughout the U.S. and Canada and generally operate in smaller shops. If the opposition fails to condemn the poor working conditions, lower wages, and benefits typical in these industries, the workers will pay little attention to the election. Only the "machine" voters will bother going to the polls. Thus, by incessant leafletting in the small shops, the insurgents were able to cut well into the traditional strength of the union administration, especially in New Jersey, Baltimore, New England, Ohio, and California. And this

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achievement may create important new pressures for change in union policy.

EVEN AS the campaign began, after the union's Las Vegas convention at the end of August 1976, it was certain that the Sadlowski challenge was pressuring the Steelworker leadership to bring about long-awaited changes. Expansion of the Union's Executive Board from three to five members allowed the appointment of a new vice-president for human affairs and a vice-president for administration. The former position went to Leon Lynch of the union's Pittsburgh office, the first black man to hold a place on the Board. The expansion also made it possible to include Canadian National Director Lynn Williams, the first Canadian candidate for International office.

Now that the election is over, some of the administration's campaign promises are taking on immediate importance. The contract negotiations in basic steel feature a demand, elaborated by Abel and McBride during the campaign, for "lifetime" security for workers in basic steel. Another campaign promise, to guarantee "due process" rights for workers in shop grievances, had not yet appeared in the basic steel bargaining. It will be worth watching development of this issue, because it was an extremely important rallying point for the insurgents.

There is no question that the insurgency will continue. Sadlowski must step down as District director in the Chicago-Gary District; he will be replaced by his close friend Jim Balanoff, the fiery leader of Inland Steel Local 1010, one of the largest in the entire union. As a result of the election there are now strong insurgent organizations in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, and much of Ohio. So the coming months and years of Steelworker politics promise to be even more lively than things have been in the past. □

Gang of Four?

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Steven Kelman

Swedish Elections — a Test for Socialism?

It was widely, and correctly, noted after the defeat of Sweden's Social Democratic party that the new "bourgeois" government was unlikely to turn back the clock on the welfare-state policies for which Sweden is renowned. (Swedes, including members of these parties themselves, generally refer to the nonsocialist parties as *de borgerliga partierna*—"the bourgeois parties.") This is not necessarily because a majority of nonsocialist voters do not desire cutbacks: survey data show that a majority of nonsocialist voters believe welfare spending should be cut back, and a not insignificant minority among nonsocialist voters believes in radical changes away from government "interference." That this current is hardly represented at all among *leaders* of the nonsocialist parties is an interesting commentary on the nature of the Swedish political system.

But here I would like to discuss a different theme. We are missing an important and disturbing aspect of the Swedish elections by reassuring ourselves that the election did not represent a rejection of the welfare state. For, in a sense, socialism itself was on the agenda in the Swedish elections, and it lost even before the ballots were counted.

Socialism was on the agenda in Sweden in the form of a plan for "employee capital funds," which grew out of some motions at the 1971 Congress of the Swedish Confederation of Labor (LO) and was accepted "in principle" at the LO Congress in June 1976, just months before the September elections.

Ever since the 1950s collective bargaining in Sweden has been highly centralized, so that the basic contract is worked out through national negotiations between LO and the Employer's Federation. From LO's point of view, the major advantage of central negotiations is that it gives the labor movement a chance to implement a wage-equalization policy emphasizing wage increases for the low-paid workers. As part of this policy, low-profit companies have not been allowed to get away with paying substandard wages to their

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workers by pleading hardship. The theory was, brutally, that such firms would have to "shape up or ship out"—a theory that could be applied thanks to the active labor-market policies by the Social Democratic government endeavoring to get new jobs for workers displaced by firms going bankrupt.

There was a flip side to this coin of basing wages on the type of work done and not on the profitability of the individual firm. This was that *especially* profitable firms escaped with wage increases smaller than they could have afforded to pay. Thus appeared an unintended effect of LO's wage-equalization policy, the "excess profit" problem. As LO fought harder for wage-equalization in the late '60s and early '70s, complaints from high-pay workers increased. Group interest could be presented as trade-union militancy by arguing that "low-pay workers don't benefit because we hold off from getting everything we can from the company—only the company benefits." (Communists and Maoists in the union were especially active in agitating among high-wage workers.)

Now, in fact, this argument is not correct, since LO's stance in central negotiations certainly obtained more for low-paid workers than they would have gotten through other forms of negotiation, not the least because LO had a tacit ally among more profitable and /or high-wage firms. But the "excess profit" problem was clearly a threat to continued LO emphasis on wage equalization, and at the 1971 LO Congress Rudolf Meidner, senior researcher for the organization, was asked to prepare a report for the 1976 Congress on how this problem could be dealt with.

What Meidner and his associate Anna Hedborg came up with ("instead," one is tempted to add) was a plan for the gradual transfer of ownership of all but small firms to the unions. In their report to the 1976 Congress (preceded a year earlier by a study document that was the basis for discussions by union activists), they rejected various of the proposals that had been floating around for dealing with the "excess profit" problem, such as progressive corporation taxation or direct transfers of cash from high-profit firms into "branch funds" that might directly help struggling firms. Instead, it was proposed that some percentage of a company's profits each year should be set aside for new issues of stock that would be put into a central "employee capital fund" whose directors would be appointed by the labor movement. Depending on the percentage of profits put aside, and depending on how profitable the firm was and how much stock it previously had outstanding, there would, after some years (20 to 30, for example), arise a situation where the employee capital fund took control of the company. The power to appoint members of corporate boards would be delegated by the central employee capital fund to the union locals at the firm, and to branchwide councils whose directors would be appointed by the national unions representing the workers in that branch and by other unions as well (so as to prevent "group egoism"), the power to appoint members of corporate boards.

THE MEIDNER PROPOSAL was a scheme for introducing socialism to Sweden—a "worker control" socialism rather than mere state ownership. Clearly it meant that private ownership of the principal means of production would be abolished. In other words, a radical change from the Swedish mixed economy.

There was something very Swedish about the plan. It proposed to continue a tradition in the Swedish trade union movement of a "responsible" concern for maintaining high level of industrial investment. In fact, the report rejected progressive corporate taxation or branch transfers in large measure because they took capital away from successful firms that could be used for investment. (Under the Meidner proposal, by contrast, profits would stay *in* the firm—the only thing that would leave would be stock certificates created *de novo* for a sum corresponding to a portion of company profits.)

A second very Swedish aspect of the proposal was its almost bizarre gradualism. Under the plan, socialism would be achieved not by gradually removing firms from private ownership, one by one, but rather by gradually taking over ownership of large numbers of firms—one year the employee capital funds would own 2 percent of the shares, the next year 3 percent, and so on.

After the draft of the Meidner proposal came out in 1975, LO arranged a series of circles to discuss the idea. About 18,000 union activists participated and gave their overwhelming approval. What little criticism appeared came more from the left than the right. Meanwhile, a lively intellectual debate ensued among Party theoreticians—in books and in articles in the Social Democratic theoretical organ *Tiden*—as to the merits of "worker control" socialism as opposed to "state ownership"

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socialism. Socialist critics of the Meidner proposal within the Social Democratic party argued that there was a danger that society might not be able to exert control (on behalf of consumers, for example) over worker-owned companies. After LO officially accepted the employee capital fund plan "in principle" at its June 1976 Congress, giddiness became rampant in the Party, particularly its left wing. An article in *Tiden* stated that the question of abolition of private ownership of the means of production was now on the verge of being solved; the task for Social Democracy was to deal with the question of how socialized production could be made human and nonalienating.

The giddiness proved, to put it mildly, premature. Shortly after the LO Congress, the nonsocialist parties went on the offensive against the Meidner plan. They used classic antisocialist arguments: the adoption of the proposal would lead to an "enormous concentration of power" among trade-union bosses, freedom would be threatened, Sweden risked going down the path of Communist dictatorship. In no country where socialism had been introduced, Center party leader Thorbjörn Fälldin told his party's congress shortly after the LO Congress, had freedom been preserved. Around this time the conservative daily *Svenska Dagbladet* commissioned a poll regarding the Meidner plan. It showed that close to two-thirds of all Swedes were against it, including about one-half of LO members!

The opposition parties made the Meidner proposal one of their main campaign issues. It will be hard to say exactly how important the issue was for the Social Democratic defeat until the scientific analyses based on survey data have come out. Nevertheless, from a democratic socialist point of view, the key question is not how much the Meidner plan contributed to the Social Democratic defeat. It is the fact that *the Social Democratic party leadership did not even join the battle, but retreated without a fight.* Apparently, Party leaders judged a vigorous defense of the abolition of private ownership would produce electoral catastrophe. So, although LO had adopted the proposal at its June Congress, Olof Palme and other Social Democratic leaders persistently refused to endorse it, speaking instead in generalities and arguing that they would have to await the report of a governmental commission of inquiry—with representatives of all the parties, and labor and management—expected around 1979, before taking any definite position.

IT SHOULD certainly not be the role of American socialists to moralize about the stance that was taken by the Swedish Social Democratic leadership. (It might be noted, however, that after the election a number of somewhat bitter commentaries appeared in the trade-union newspaper *LO Tidningen* about the Party's "defensiveness.") Instead, one should consider the significance of the fact that in the Western country where the labor movement is stronger than in any other, and where it had been in power for nearly 50 years, the advocacy of an end to the private ownership of the principal means of production still produces resistance from much of the population.

One might compare this with the reception of Social Democratic proposals for codetermination, which were passed by Parliament in 1976 and are going into effect this year. These proposals give unions the right to negotiate over traditional "management prerogatives," such as changes in production methods, personnel policies, and work environment. It is hard to say how much change these proposals will actually produce, but the changes could be significant, especially since the unions are devoting considerable resources to educating their local officials in how to use their powers under the new law. It is interesting that these proposals were adopted without significant resistance from either the nonsocialist parties or the Swedish people.

During the '60s a Swedish Social Democrat named Gunnar Adler-Karsson invented the concept "functional socialism" to describe the Swedish road to socialism. By this he meant that ownership of property was in fact a bundle of prerogatives, and that a Social Democratic government could gradually whittle away the various prerogatives without formal ownership rights being transferred. The Meidner plan represented a departure from the "functional socialism" idea. The 1976 election results in Sweden indicate that, whatever the ideological merits of these different approaches, Social Democratic parties in advanced industrial societies may be headed for electoral trouble if people perceive that major changes in the structure of property ownership are being proposed. □

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Roy Medvedev

Solzhenitsyn: Truth and Politics

A Discussion of *Gulag Archipelago*, Volume III

Two and a half years after the publication in the West of the first volume of *Gulag Archipelago*, with the sensation that produced and the subsequent expulsion of the author from the U.S.S.R., the third volume of this monumental work has come out in Paris, in both Russian and French.

One might have thought the first two volumes would have exhausted the basic theme of Solzhenitsyn's literary investigation. Not only the history and structure of Gulag but all aspects of the life of the prisoners and of their keepers, the types of concentration camps, and the character of the different "waves" of unfortunates who replenished the "population" of this fearsome Archipelago by the millions—all this was dealt with in the first two volumes of Solzhenitsyn's book. But the author was right when he said in the Preface to his second volume that even with the help of hundreds of former zeks who had provided him with their letters, memoirs, stories, and statements he had been able to open only "a peephole into the Archipelago, not the view from the tower."[1] Many books and memoirs were written about the Stalin camps even before Solzhenitsyn's study: more than 30 have been published in the West alone. But all these, put together, still do not exhaust the dreadful subject. It is not surprising, therefore, that Solzhenitsyn found himself at no loss for materials for his third volume.

One of the important subjects treated in the third volume is the postwar history of the Gulag Archipelago: the revival of the hard labor of Czarist times *(katorga)*, even as a juridical category, and the establishment on the basis of the former "corrective-labor camps," of the system of Special Camps *(Osoblagy)*, where most often the inmates consisted exclusively of politicals from the various "waves." Solzhenitsyn also gives a detailed description of the various types of penal exile *(ssylka)*. Here, going back into history again, he tells of the deportation of the wealthy peasants and the "kulak supporters" in the years of collectivization, and the deportation to the East of the many nationalities Stalin found "inconvenient." Solzhenitsyn began the first volume of his book with the chapter "Arrest" and he now concludes Part Six with the chapter "Zeks in Freedom"—a description of the release of those prisoners who managed to survive into the 1955-57 period of rehabilitations. The last, relatively brief section, Part Seven, gives the reader a picture of the present system of Gulag, where relatively few "politicals" still remain but where, as before, we are far from the justice and humaneness that even the criminals deserve—those Solzhenitsyn writes of with such distaste in the first two volumes of his book. It is unquestionably to the author's credit that he has given the first detailed description of the tragic events in Novocherkassk in 1962 and of a number of other hushed-up tragedies of the post-Stalin years.[2]

The Translator's Notes appear on pp. 153.

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However, the main theme of the new volume is a detailed description of the gradual, slow, but steadily intensifying change of mood and behavior among the prisoners, the various forms of passive and active resistance, beginning with escape attempts and protest actions and ending with armed uprisings. It is with emotion that we read the scrupulously detailed descriptions of several escape attempts known to Solzhenitsyn (usually unsuccessful ones). As for the revolt of the prisoners at Kengir[3]—apparently the biggest revolt in the entire history of Gulag—the description of that event is the central and most important part of the third volume. Solzhenitsyn takes satisfaction in reporting that the majority of informers uncovered by the zeks in the Special Camps were secretly killed. He is delighted at every instance of resistance to arbitrary rule. He does not conceal his feeling of triumph in recounting the story of the Kengir uprising and regrets only that not all the barracks and not all categories of prisoners took part. The chapter headings speak for themselves: "The Wind of Revolution," "When the Earth Is Ablaze in the Compounds," "We Break the Chains Barehanded," and "The Forty Days of Kengir." And it would of course be unfair to Solzhenitsyn to do more than comment that in this case (departing from the theories he expounded in the second volume) he himself defends the right of the oppressed to rise up against their oppressors, meeting violence with violence, the right of slaves to make a revolution in the name of freedom and justice.

In my reviews of the first and second volumes of *Gulag Archipelago* I have already given my estimate of this book as one of the most valuable documents of our era, one of the greatest books of the 20th century.* I have no reason to change this assessment after reading the third volume. Solzhenitsyn himself, in his Afterword, apologizes to the reader for the unwieldy size of this work and for certain artistic failings. But these apologies are needed least of all in regard to the third volume. For it is based, to a much greater extent than the earlier volumes, on the personal experience of the author, and this gives it more the quality of an artistically crafted memoir than a "literary investigation." And as a writer Solzhenitsyn is especially strong precisely in describing events he himself has seen. That is what makes the central chapters of the third volume the most satisfying artistically and the most powerful. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the third volume is a worthy conclusion to this tremendous work, the general attitude toward the book has subtly changed during the last year or year and a half in the West and in the U.S.S.R. The appearance of the third volume no longer caused a sensation; in many Western countries the press took only brief notice of the event. And though the entire finished work of Solzhenitsyn now stands before the reader—a work that I am convinced will remain the *chief* work of his life—there is less being said and written, and there is much less controversy, about it than there was when only the first volume had appeared. There are apparently several reasons for this.

*Roy Medvedev's review of the second volume appeared in the Spring 1976 issue of Dissent, also in George Saunders's translation.

Does Solzhenitsyn Tell the Truth?

IT IS LOGICAL to wonder how such a question could arise. After all, we know Solzhenitsyn as a passionate lover of truth, author of the appeal "Do Not Live by the Lie,"[4] fearless critic and exposer of the crimes and lies he saw around him. Despite that, the question arises, especially in Western Europe, where he now lives and has the opportunity to say what he thinks for all to hear and to publish everything produced by his pen.

Solzhenitsyn himself has declared more than once that he imagined the West quite differently than he now finds it, at first hand. But the West, too, has in many respects begun to look at Solzhenitsyn differently in recent years, and this is especially true of the students and intellectuals, not to mention the politically active elements of the working class. In his numerous political articles, press conferences, letters, television and other appearances, and

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speeches during the past two years Solzhenitsyn, as everyone knows, has voiced many reactionary and utopian ideas and advanced some obviously absurd theories, revealing his lack of knowledge of the elementary facts of both Russian and world history. He has discredited himself as either politician or prophet precisely with that part of the Western public that reads the most and is traditionally liberal.

Is the author of *Gulag Archipelago* a reactionary?" asks Yefim Etkind in one of his articles.[5]

> This question is being asked more and more often. Solzhenitsyn sometimes angers his audience by flinging out spurious slogans or provocative assertions, plainly contrary to the truth. But is Balzac judged by his antirepublican and legitimist articles? It was Victor Hugo who, with good reason, regarded him as a revolutionary writer. [*Le Monde*, March 10, 1976.]

However, this covers only part of the truth. For Solzhenitsyn has been speaking out in the West less and less as an *artist and writer* and has more and more involved himself directly in politics, taking positions that at times are shocking even to the most right-wing political figures in the Western world. In fact virtually all of the *purely literary* works that Solzhenitsyn has published in the last three years (including *Gulag Archipelago*) were written in the U.S.S.R. before the writer was expelled.

But unfortunately it is not only Solzhenitsyn's reactionary and utopian views that are at issue. There is also the question of Solzhenitsyn's way of defending his views, the polemical methods he permits himself to use in combating his political opponents. Solzhenitsyn is outraged at the Bolsheviks for many of the unworthy means they employed to achieve a goal they considered worthy, but he is not at all hesitant in his own choice of means. In his polemical ardor he has frequently resorted to flagrant distortion, juggling of the facts, deliberate omission or hushing things up, and the use of smear techniques against people he does not agree with. This disdain for moral considerations on the part of Solzhenitsyn the politician undermines the trust of a good part of his readership in Solzhenitsyn the artist. And that is why many of them ask, Isn't he exaggerating in *Gulag Archipelago*? Isn't he resorting to falsification here too? It would seem that this is one of the chief reasons for the decline in Solzhenitsyn's popularity and in that of *Gulag Archipelago*.

While I am not one of Solzhenitsyn's cothinkers and do not share his political views, I must attest that all of the basic facts about the Gulag Archipelago presented in the third volume do correspond to the truth. Solzhenitsyn paints a grim picture of the Stalinist concentration camps, and it is sometimes hard to believe. But the reality was precisely as he shows it. A great deal was even worse, for there are more than a few "islands" of the Archipelago that Solzhenitsyn did not describe, that he does not even know about.

There are, to be sure, a number of inaccuracies in the third volume, cases where something is presented as a fact that was actually just one of the camp myths. For example, there is an erroneous legend, which Solzhenitsyn himself presents only as a *rumor* without citing any evidence, having to do with disabled veterans of the Great Patriotic War. "And what necklace should we weave this into?" he writes. "What category of exile should we assign this to—the exile of disabled veterans of the Patriotic War? *We know next to nothing about this, and those who know are very few.*" (Emphasis added. —R.M.)

"They were sent to some northern island—they were sent off because, for the glory of the fatherland, they had let themselves be disfigured in the war, and the aim of sending them off was to contribute to the health of the nation, which was putting on such a winning performance in all types of athletics and ball games. There on an unknown island, these unlucky heroes of the war were held, naturally without the right of correspondence (an occasional letter got out, that is how this became known), and just as naturally, they were

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kept on meager rations because only their labor could warrant a lavish one. And it seems they are living there to this day" (p. 390).

It is true the war left many disabled veterans. I remember, even at the end of the first year of the war, how many of these unfortunates were begging on the trains, near the markets and tearooms, or simply on the streets. Released from the hospitals, they did not know where their families were or often did not want to return to their wives or sweethearts as cripples. At the end of the war, it is true, these people somehow disappeared unnoticed from the streets of the big cities. But they were not shipped off to some unknown northern island to die in order to "contribute to the health of the nation." Toward the end of the war, in all the major cities of the country, a network of special hospitals was organized for chronic invalids and helpless disabled veterans who had no families or did not wish to live with their families. When I was studying at Leningrad University in the first years after the war, our department was a "sponsor" for one of these hospitals for "chronic cases," as the war invalids were called. The fate of these people was, of course, hardly enviable; only a few of them were able to work in the shops attached to the hospital. However, none of them starved because they did not "warrant a lavish ration."

The only other inaccuracy I will mention is Solzhenitsyn's remark, made in passing but highly meaningful, that he had met quite a few people from the Baltic countries and Western Ukraine in the Special Camps, but hardly any Georgians, and although in exile there had been "some people from the Caucasus, no one could recall a single Georgian among them" (p. 389). A great deal of evidence can be cited, however, to show that the terror of the 1930s raged even more furiously in Georgia than in most of the other republics, that it was precisely the death sentence that was handed down there most often, and that the methods of torture there were notorious for their refined cruelty. During the disastrous battle of the Kerch Peninsula in the summer of 1942, several Georgian regiments fell into encirclement and thousands of Georgian soldiers were taken prisoner. After the war most of these men were sent to the Archipelago. And if Solzhenitsyn met few Georgians in exile, that is mainly because these people of Southern birth and sensitive temperament nearly all died in the camps well before the end of their term.

Such inaccuracies are perhaps even fewer in the third volume than in the first and second. Yet if one were to follow the formula used in the American court system (and apparently the British, too), "Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?" Solzhenitsyn would not be able to assent to the last two parts of this formula. For the terrible truth the great artist has revealed to the world in his book bears within it a layer of untrue and tendentious argument that, though not great in size, is rather obtrusive in substance. This has its source primarily in certain concepts new to Solzhenitsyn (at least, they are expressed for the first time in *Gulag Archipelago*) and in his attempts to twist reality to fit these concepts.

New Motifs and Influences in "Gulag Archipelago"

IN HIS Afterword the author writes: "I must explain that never once was this entire book, with all its parts, on one and the same desk!" (p. 579). But that was written in 1967. And the present volume has come out in 1976, with the author preparing it for publication in Zurich, where his desk was not "burning up beneath him," nor the ground under his feet. Although Solzhenitsyn nowhere speaks of it, it is not hard to conclude, by comparing the first and third volumes, that by this time the author did have the entire book before him "on one and the same desk" and that quite a few pages, even the better part of the first chapter, were inserted during the past few years in the West.

In my review of the first volume of *Gulag Archipelago,* I wrote that Solzhenitsyn nowhere tried to whitewash, justify, or praise

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the Vlasovites,[6] let alone all the other former Soviet citizens who fought on Hitler's side against the Soviet army. Solzhenitsyn merely tried to show some of the circumstances that would seem to mitigate the guilt of these people and render the postwar reprisals against them excessively harsh. In the third volume, however, the author has decisively altered his conception. Now he quite plainly whitewashes and justifies the Vlasovites. Moreover, he particularly singles out the Soviet soldiers and commanders who went over to the fascist side not in 1943 but in 1941, right after the outbreak of the war, in the months when the German army was moving rapidly and victoriously eastward.

Solzhenitsyn painstakingly gathers information about the military and semimilitary formations that were created long before the Vlasov units, and about the establishment of "people's militia" in Byelorussia for "defense" against the partisans. He is ready to understand, forgive, and justify the collaborationist "burgomasters," "elders," police, and even those who served in punitive detachments recruited and formed by the Germans, not to mention the Cossack regiments and divisions organized by Hitler's forces in the Don and Kuban regions. While he uses the term "foolish calves" (*telyata*) for the Soviet young people (including himself) who rushed eagerly to the front lines to defend their homeland, he regards those who went over to the enemy side as heroes rising up in an epic struggle against the Stalinist tyranny, people whose noble impulses, unfortunately, were neither understood nor made use of by Hitler and the German General Staff, owing to German obtuseness.

A question involuntarily occurs to the reader: how to explain this striking shift in the author's position? But Solzhenitsyn gets around the problem very simply. He writes:

> In the first part of this book the reader had not yet been prepared to receive the full truth. . . . There, at the beginning, when the reader had not yet walked with us the full length of the road through the camps, he was only asked to perk up his ears and invited to think a little. Now after all the prison transports, transit prisons, logging details, and camp rubbish heaps, perhaps the reader has become more inclined to agree. [P. 30.]

It is impossible to believe that this is a sincere explanation. It gives rise to an involuntary feeling—at least for most Soviet readers, even Solzhenitsyn's admirers—of protest and mistrust toward the author.

It is generally known that after Hitler's attack on the U.S.S.R. even the old White Guard emigrés split in their attitude toward the war. One section of the emigré community, headed by General Denikin and the Cadet leader Milyukov,[7] favored the victory of the U.S.S.R.; another section took a neutral position; and only a small section went along with the fascists. All of Solzhenitsyn's sympathy is now on the side of the last group, and he regrets only that there were too few of them and that they did not have the full confidence of the German occupationists. Solzhenitsyn understands very well that Hitler's forces wished to destroy not only Bolshevism but Russia as a state, and that in our prewar newspapers not everything was untrue. He understands very well that "for the new arrivals Russia was even more insignificant and loathsome than for those departing. The vampire only wanted Russia's vital juices; let the body fall lifeless wherever it might" (p. 28). Nevertheless, in this very book one can find more than a few pages with apologies for treason that are surprising to hear from a Russian writer. For example, here is what Solzhenitsyn writes about the members of the police and punitive forces that served the Germans:

> "Where did they come from? Why? Can it be that the civil war was still smoldering and had flared up again? Are these Whites who were never completely beaten? No! It has already been mentioned that many White emigrés (including the foul and accursed Denikin) took the side of Soviet Russia against Hitler. . . . These tens and hundreds of thousands of police and punitive troops, elders and interpreters, all

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came from the ranks of Soviet citizenry. And there were even quite a few young people, including those who had grown up after October.

What made them do it? Who were these people?

Above all they were people whose families, or who themselves, had been run over by the tank treads of the 1920s and 1930s. Who had lost parents, relatives, loved ones in the murky waves that washed down our sewage disposal system. Or who themselves had sunk and re-emerged in camp or in exile. . . .

And let us not forget [Solzhenitsyn continues] that among these our countrymen who came against us with the sword and made speeches against us, there were completely unselfish people whose property had not been taken, who had not sat in the camps, and who did not have family in the camps, but who had for a long time felt stifled by our entire system—the contempt for the fate of the individual, the persecution of people for their beliefs, the mocking song "Where people breathe so freely," the worshippers bowing to the Great Leader, the official yanking at the pencil, "Hurry up and sign the loan!" and the applause rising to an ovation. [Pp. 18, 22.]

All this is quite enough, in Solzhenitsyn's eyes, to drive good, sometimes even noble, people into collaborating with the occupation regime, serving as "burgomasters" and punitive troops, and to cause them to prefer the devout worship of another Leader, the Fuehrer, and another song, "Deutschland ueber alles." Somehow it is awkward even to refute these arguments that Solzhenitsyn piles up, one upon the other.

To be sure, life was not easy for our people in the 1920s and 1930s and the terrible crimes of the Stalin regime inflicted wounds upon millions of Soviet people that have never healed. However, only a small minority of those who suffered turned to collaboration with the enemy, and that element was not the best but precisely the worst among those who had been victimized. Hundreds of thousands of people could be named—from Vera Khoruzha and Nina Kosterina to S. V. Rudnev and Konstantin Rokossovsky[8]—who had also been "run over by the tank treads" of the 1930s but who fought courageously to defend their homeland from Hitler's forces. But for today's Solzhenitsyn this is no argument—to him these people are either "calves" or "Orthodox loyalists." He takes his stand entirely on the side of the people for whom indignation and outrage at Stalin's crimes, natural to any honest person, had passed over into blind hatred and brought them into a dead end of unreasoning embitterment, so that they no longer thought of changing or removing the bad or evil system in their own country but were ready, out of hatred for one satanic tyrant, to surrender their entire country to another kind of fiend. The only problem was that this other fiend for some reason was in no hurry to buy up their souls and regarded their intentions with suspicion. Just think of it—Solzhenitsyn indignantly tells us—the fascists, in their fear, disbanded the "people's militia" in Byelorussia, and when 730 people in one of the prisoner-of-war camps for officers expressed their desire to join Vlasov's army, the Germans released only eight for military duty. "How typical of German obtuseness," Solzhenitsyn writes (p. 34).

Solzhenitsyn is wrong in thinking that collaborationism was a phenomenon peculiar to the U.S.S.R. The fascists recruited quite a few traitors in all the occupied countries of Europe. One can say with certainty that if there had been no mass terror in our country in the 1930s, no forced collectivization, and no famine of 1932-33, the occupation regime would not have been able to find nearly so many supporters in the captured Soviet territories. Likewise, the partisan movement might have been smaller if the fascists had not followed a policy of such total terror and pillage in the parts of the U.S.S.R. and the countries of Eastern Europe they conquered. But after all, Hitler went to war in order to establish German domination over all of Europe and to extend Germany's *Lebensraum* at the expense of the "inferior" Slavic nations, which were in fact scheduled for partial annihilation, removal to the East,

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denial of any form of state or independent status, and conversion into the slaves of the "superior" race of "Aryans."

Solzhenitsyn knew this when he fought bravely as an officer in the Soviet army; he still knows it today. It is all the more incomprehensible, then, that he should write so inspiredly about treason, not only by individual soldiers, but by entire Red Army units in the first weeks of the war, portraying this treachery as heroism and even as the salvation of Russia's national honor.

Solzhenitsyn expresses this quite openly:

> And so the Soviet-German war—to our pride and joy—showed that we were not such slaves as we were written off to be in all the liberal historical studies. Slaves would not strain themselves to bring Father Stalin's head within reach of a saber. . . .These were people who had borne twenty-four years of Communist happiness on the skin of their backs, who knew as far back as 1941, when no one else in the world knew, that nowhere on the planet and never in history was there such a cruel, bloody, and at the same time sly and tricky regime as that of Bolshevism, . . .that no other regime in the world would compare with it, not even the raw and immature Hitler regime, which at that time had blinded every eye in the West. And here a time had come when weapons were placed in these people's hands. And were they supposed to sit still and let Bolshevism survive its final hour, to grow again in all its savage oppression? And were they supposed to take up the struggle against it only afterwards (a struggle that has not begun anywhere in the world to this day)? No, the natural thing to do was imitate the trick used by Bolshevism itself. Just as it had buried its teeth in the body of a Russia weakened by the First World War so the thing was to smash Bolshevism in a similar situation in the Second World War. [P. 31.]

Solzenitsyn continues:

> I will be so bold as to say that the Russian people would have been worth nothing, would have been a nation of hopeless chattel, if they had let slip the chance, during war, at least to draw back and fire a few curses at the Beloved Father. In Germany there was a conspiracy of the generals, but what did we have? Our top generals were worthless, corrupted by party ideology and self-seeking; they had not even kept alive the national spirit that one finds in other countries. Only the rank and file of peasants, soldiers, and Cossacks raised their fists and struck a blow. It was entirely a movement of the ranks—so close to the vanishing point was the part played by the emigré former gentry, the former wealthy elements, and the intelligentsia. And if this movement had been given its head when it surged up in the first days of the war, it would have become a new Pugachov rebellion[9]—in the breadth and depth of the social layers involved, in the popular support it had, in the part played by the Cossacks, in its aim of "settling the score with the high and mighty criminals," in its elemental driving force, despite weak leadership. . . . It was not fated, however, to develop to the full, but to perish in dishonor, branded with the words "Betrayal of our sacred homeland." [P. 35.]

All of this is fantasy and imagining, based on no reality whatsoever. If the moods that Solzhenitsyn attributes to the "rank and file," that is, the majority of the population, had really existed the army could never have won the war or even continued to function. Solzhenitsyn, who fought in the war himself and more than once has shown a certain feeling of pride in his own military record (this can be felt even in the first volume of *Gulag Archipelago*), must have seen how self-sacrificingly the Soviet soldiers fought against the fascist armies. Despite casualties that were *ten times* greater than in the First World War, despite battles that were incomparably more terrible than the Samsonov disaster of 1914,[10] despite the loss of almost half of Russia, our people did not fall for the false promises of Hitler's fascists. They not only stood up against the massive German military machine, which was backed by the economic resources of all of Europe and by dozens of divisions from countries allied with Hitler, but they overcame the enemy.

A vicious ideological mishmash like this, the idea of a "Pugachov rebellion" headed by Hitlerites, was bound to develop among those

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who fled to the West after serving Hitler as police, punitive troops, and hirelings of other sorts. They seek in these hallucinations some justification for their rather tainted performance under the fascist occupation and wish now to present themselves as "ideological opponents" of Soviet power. Apparently Solzhenitsyn's present circle of intimates consists largely of such people. And apparently that is the reason his three years in the West have not had a very beneficial effect on Solzhenitsyn the artist.

We are inclined to attribute to Solzhenitsyn's new milieu many of the other pages in the third volume, for it is simply hard to believe that he wrote them in the U.S.S.R. or that he gave them to some of his friends to read while still there, as he claims in his second Afterword (p. 581).

For example, Solzhenitsyn apologizes totally for the principals and teachers who continued to run the schools in the occupied towns and villages according to the program dictated by the fascists. What is wrong with that? he asks.

> Of course one had to pay a certain price. The portraits with the big whiskers had to be taken out of the schools and, perhaps, portraits with the little mustache brought in. An evergreen had to be decorated, not for New Year's, but for Christmas, and on that occasion (and on some imperial anniversary instead of October), the principal had to give a speech praising the wonderful new life, when in fact things were pretty bad. But they had to give speeches before in praise of the wonderful life when that too had been pretty bad.[P. 16.]

And this is written by the author of "Do Not Live by the Lie!" Yes, it is true that much of what teachers and principals told their pupils in the 1920s and 1930s did not, to put it mildly, correspond to the truth. But the overwhelming majority of educators at that time believed what they said; they believed as much in the verities of Marxism-Leninism as the young Solzhenitsyn did then. And they knew as little about the crimes of the Stalin clique as Solzhenitsyn did, with all his intelligence and the doubts he had even then about Stalin and the "public" political trials organized in 1936-38. But not to know about the crimes of the occupation regime, while living in the fascist-held territory, was impossible. Children as well as teachers knew about them. That is why the best of them, like the hero of Vasil Bykov's short novel *Obelisk,* joined the partisans and did not give speeches in praise of the occupation.[11]

Solzhenitsyn does not overlook the fate of the young women who became the mistresses of German soldiers and officers. This is an ancient theme, and Maupassant, for one, handled it brilliantly as long ago as 1880 in his celebrated *Boule de suif.* Here too, however, Solzhenitsyn holds to a unique point of view. This is what he writes:

> First, about the women, who as we know are now emancipated. . . . But what is this? Didn't we create a worse Kabanikha for them by accusing them of antipatriotic and criminal behavior for freely disposing of their bodies and selves?[12] Hasn't all of [pre-Stalinist] world literature glorified love that is free of national bonds and the wills of generals and diplomats? . . .Above all, what age were these women when they met the enemy not in battle but in bed? Not older than thirty, it would seem, perhaps even twenty-five. That means their earliest childhood impressions were formed after October, in Soviet schools and by Soviet ideology! Are we so quick with anger at the work of our own hands? Some of these young women had been stirred up by our constant screeching for fifteen years that there is no such thing as one's homeland, that the idea of the fatherland is just a reactionary invention. Another type of these women were bored with the pristine puritanism of our meetings, rallies, and demonstrations, cinematography without kisses, and dances without embraces. A third group was overcome by politeness and gallantry, by the little things in a man's personal appearance, the outward show of courtship, which no one had taught our lads during the five-year plans or under the commanders of our army, cast in the Frunze mold. Those of a fourth group were simply hungry, with a primitive kind of hunger, that is, they had nothing to put in their mouths. A fifth group, perhaps, saw no other way to save themselves or

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their relatives and not to be parted from them. [Pp. 13-14.]

It is strange to think that all this was written by a Russian, an officer who went through the war, who in 1943-45 must have seen clearly, as he passed through the liberated Russian towns and villages, what the "politeness and gallantry" of the German officers and soldiers amounted to then. Moreover, it was not only the women who slept with Hitler's men (and with the camp bosses in the camps) whose "earliest childhood impressions had been formed in Soviet schools and by Soviet ideology"; that was also true of the women who died of hunger without selling themselves for a bar of chocolate or a pair of stockings. And there were many more of these—millions of them! Certainly none of the women who "met the enemy not in battle but in bed" deserved the long terms in hard-labor camps many of them received. But they did deserve the derisive term "German bedstraw" with which their former friends and fellow villagers labeled them in the years of occupation. Solzhenitsyn emphatically disagrees. True, he does write something vague about moral censure, qualifying it with a "perhaps." But those he considers most to blame are "all of us, their contemporaries and fellow countrymen. What were we like," he writes, "if our women were attracted to the occupation troops?" (p. 14).

Once More on the Communists in the Camps

THROUGHOUT Solzhenitsyn's book, and the third volume is no exception, we find revulsion and hatred not only toward Communists in general but toward party members who spent up to 10 years, or as many as 18, in Stalin's camps and who suffered torments incomparably greater than those Solzhenitsyn himself underwent. He calls the majority of party members nothing less than "the Orthodox" and contends that after the 20th Congress these "Orthodox" Communists returned to freedom no different than they had been before they went into the camps. In general, he claims, the Orthodox want to forget about the camps and prisons and avoid any acquaintances from the camp days.

> After all, what kind of "loyalists" would they be if they couldn't forgive and forget, and go back to the way they had been? Why, they had sent petitions to this effect four times a year: "Let me go back! Let me go back! I'll be good; I always was!" What did going back mean to them? First of all it meant reclaiming their party cards, their service records, their seniority, the honors they had been awarded. . . .And they came flooding back in 1956, as though from a musty old trunk, bringing with them the air of the 1930s, wishing to take up where they had left off the day of their arrest.[P. 479.]

Both the tone and the content of this tirade call for strenuous objections. Solzhenitsyn knows very well that the Communists arrested in the 1930s came back, not from a "musty old trunk" but from the same dreadful labor camps that he writes about, bearing the marks of torture and harsh trials. And though the majority of them had not betrayed their convictions, their attitudes toward the reality of our life was quite different. (We do not refer to the isolated cases of "forgetful people," who are found in all the categories and "waves" of former zeks.) And they did not come "flooding back" from the camps, but returned to freedom in a thin, straggling line, for most of the Communists arrested in the 1930s were shot or died in the camps.

Solzhenitsyn's biased and ungracious attitude does him no honor. If a Communist conducted himself or herself in a worthy manner, he mentions it only in passing. For example, he reports that the committee that led the Kengir uprising included women, among them "Shakhnovskaya, an economist and party member, a woman already gray." On the other hand if a coward, traitor, or artful dodger is a Communist, he spares no detail in writing about it. But here a difficult figure confronts Solzhenitsyn—Kapiton Kuznetsov, leader of the camp uprising, head of the 40-day government, president of the committee elected by the prisoners. He was a former Red Army colonel, a graduate of the Frunze Academy,[13] a man well on in years. He

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had commanded a regiment in Germany after the war and was given a prison term because "someone under him had escaped to the Western Zone." At the time the uprising began he was in a camp prison for having "blackened the reality of camp life" in letters sent out through free women workers. Presumably Kuznetsov was a party member, but Solzhenitsyn says nothing about this. He has no facts to compromise Kuznetsov with. On the contrary, we learn from Solzhenitsyn's account that Kuznetsov behaved admirably throughout the 40-day uprising. He refused release from prison, his term having come to an end during the uprising; he organized the effort to break open the walls, take out the bars, and make spears from them; in the negotiations with the "important generals" who flew to the camp, Kuznetsov's command "Off with your headgear!" forced even the MVD generals to remove their hats to show respect for the corpses of the zeks who had been killed.[14] In reply to the threats of these generals, according to Solzhenitsyn's own testimony, "Kuznetsov rose. He spoke smoothly and easily and held his ground firmly. 'If you march into the compound with your weapons,' he warned, 'don't forget that half the people who took Berlin are here. And they will overcome your weaponry too'" (p. 328).

What reproach, one wonders, could be brought against this man? This is how Solzhenitsyn concludes his account:

> Kapiton Kuznetsov! The future historian of the Kengir revolt will have to explain this man for us. What did he go through during his imprisonment and what was his attitude toward it? What was the status of his case?... Did he only feel the pride of the professional military man in maintaining such good order in the rebellious camp? Did he take the leadership of the movement because he was caught up in its spirit? (I reject this idea.) Or, knowing his ability as a commander, did he do it in order to calm the flood, bring it back into the riverbanks, and when the movement had spent itself, to lay it at the boots of the bosses? (That is what I think.) [P. 328.]

> The trial of the ringleaders [Solzhenitsyn writes twenty pages later] was held in the fall of 1955: naturally, it was a closed trial and we do not know anything definite about it. . . . We do not know what the sentences were. Probably Sluchenkov, Mikhail Keller, and Knopkus were shot. [P. 347.]

But what of Kuznetsov, who was tried by the same court? The author of *Gulag Archipelago* no longer has anything to say about him. Does that mean Kuznetsov proved to be a provocateur? No, Solzhenitsyn does not assert that in so many words; but it is precisely what he is hinting at. Can you write this way about a person who in all likelihood died a hero's death—especially when you have no evidence for your suspicions? As far as Solzhenitsyn is concerned, if a Communist is involved, you can. And this is not the only example of the double standard Solzhenitsyn applies when he writes about Communists who distinguished themselves in the camps.

On the "Liberal" Russian Autocracy

ANOTHER TYPICAL feature running through the entire third volume, and through the book as a whole, is the tone of constant ridicule in reference to the supposed "savagery" of the Russian Czars and, balancing that, the scornful attitude toward the Russian revolutionaries and liberals who considered the autocratic regime in Russia "intolerable." I have already had occasion to state in print that the savagery of Stalin's terror cannot be compared with that of the Russian Czars, with the exception of Ivan the Terrible. But Solzhenitsyn does not leave it at that. Constantly returning to this theme, he apparently regrets that the last Russian autocrats were so excessively "liberal." For example, Alexander II and the Okhrana did not hunt down the People's Will members the way they should have. Of course, they arrested them now and then and jailed them, but "just long enough to give them a taste of prison and put a halo around their heads" (p. 87). Alexander III also was essentially a "liberal." Although he had about a dozen members of the People's Will executed, he

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didn't go after the relatives and friends of the executed, or he punished them too lightly, "in a fatherly way," as may be seen especially in the fate of young Vladimir Ulyanov. And Nicholas II was in general a "weakling"; he couldn't deal properly with the workers in January 1905, and in 1917 he shamefully lost his self-possession and his crown.[15]

> This Czar and all those who controlled him no longer had the determination to fight for their power. They no longer suppressed anyone, but simply squeezed them a little and then let them go. They kept looking over their shoulder—What will public opinion say? We . . . can make the bold assertion that the Czarist government not only failed to hunt down the revolutionaries but tenderly nurtured them, bringing on its own destruction. [P. 87.]

Elsewhere, in telling of the persecution and trials of Baptists in the 1960s, Solzhenitsyn cannot help exclaiming: "The trial of the 193 Narodniks,[16] by the way, was a hundred years ago. But Lord, what a fuss was made over their sufferings! It's even in the schoolbooks."[P. 567.]

It is obvious how wrong this position is. Just because the crimes and injustices of the period from the 1920s to the 1950s were greater than those of earlier centuries and decades, that does not make a virtue of the injustice of former times, nor do those who fought injustice cease to be heroes in the grateful memory of humanity. But Solzhenitsyn's entire tone, when he deals with this topic, is one of *regret* that the Czarist repression was *not harsh enough*. Oh, what a shame that so few revolutionaries were trampled on, and so mildly: How good if they had all been strangled in the cradle! Solzhenitsyn's confidence that repression tenfold or a hundredfold stronger would have saved Russian Czarism leads one to ask, Why would he want that so much? If millions had rotted in prison and at hard labor, if tens of thousands had been shot, not under Stalin but under Nicholas II or Alexander III, would *those* corpses have smelled sweeter?

East and West

ANOTHER FAVORITE theme of the author of *Gulag Archipelago*, a kind of persistent refrain mixed in with his truly awe-inspiring scenes of the crimes of the recent past, is his jeering at the West, not only the Western leftists and liberals whom he hates but even the right-wing circles, the West as a whole. This scorn for Western political figures is perhaps most blatant in the third volume.

The West, in Solzhenitsyn's opinion, did not help Russia as it should have back in the First World War or in the fatal year 1917. This brought the weakened Romanov monarchy, and after it the Provisional Government, to disaster. The West allowed the Bolsheviks to come out on top in the Civil War and then greeted the millions of Russian emigrés with hostility. The West took no note of the starvation of millions of peasants in 1932-33, nor of the dreadful sweep of the Stalin terror. Then, at the end of the war in 1945, the West gave in to virtually every demand Stalin made.

These reproaches most often flow from a failure to understand that the West itself, since the turn of the century, has been torn by numerous internal and external contradictions and never had the strength or resources to carry out the program Solzhenitsyn now outlines for it after the fact.

But what is absolutely astounding is that Solzhenitsyn takes the West to task (above all the United States) for not starting a new world war against the U.S.S.R. and China after the outbreak of the Korean War and for not using its monopoly of atomic weapons to wage such a war.

> Just as the generation of Romain Rolland was weighed down in its youth by the constant expectation of war,[17] so our convict generation [Solzhenitsyn writes] was burdened by the absence of such an expectation. And only that is the full truth about the atmosphere in the Special Political Camps. That's what they drove us to. A world war could have brought us a quicker death (to be shot down from the towers,

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or poisoned by bread or bacilli, as was done by the Germans), or it could have brought us freedom. In either case deliverance would have come sooner than the end of our terms, in 1975.[P. 51.]

Here once again Solzhenitsyn presents his *own* feelings as those of all the prisoners. I have had occasion to meet hundreds of former inmates of the Special Camps, people of the most varied political views, but I have never heard any of them say they had longed for a third world war.

Solzhenitsyn apparently senses that his words may shock his readers and in a temper he exclaims:

> Are people astounded at such a cynical, such a desperate state of mind? Didn't you think, they say, what calamities this would bring to the vast world out in freedom?—But those who were free never thought one bit about us!—So what did you do, they say, start dreaming of a world war? How could you!—But when they gave these people prison terms in 1950 that would last to the mid-1970s, what choice did they leave them except to wish for a world war? [P. 50.]

Solzhenitsyn is wrong, of course, in maintaining that those who were free never thought about those in the camps. The majority of relatives and friends kept alive the memory of their imprisoned husbands, brothers, and dear ones, waited for them, wrote them letters, and put together packages for them. Nevertheless, Solzhenitsyn takes up this theme again at the end of his book:

> No safe and happy person, either in the West or in the East, can understand or sympathize with the mood of those days behind bars, and it may be that none can forgive us for it. . . . What kind of crippled life must have been built in order to make thousands and thousands in the cells, in the Black Marias, and in the railroad cars pray for a war of atomic annihilation as their only way out? [P. 413.]

Indeed it is hard to forgive such an attitude. Solzhenitsyn lived through difficult and terrible times, when even very strong people were crippled or broken. Solzhenitsyn's own fate is evidence of that. He was a victim of those times, which taught the author of *Gulag Archipelago* not only firmness and courage, not only extraordinary persistence and stubbornness. They also fostered and developed in him such traits as bitter intransigence bordering on fanaticism, fierce attachment to a single, narrow idea, inability to feel anything but hatred for people with other views or convictions, incapacity to see life and reality in all its multiplicity, and indifference in regard to the means chosen to attain one's ends. Although Solzhenitsyn's efforts are now focused entirely on combating socialism and the "Progressive Doctrine" that he hates, the techniques he uses in this struggle are all too reminiscent of everything he justly denounces in *Gulag Archipelago*.

In the third volume Solzhenitsyn tells about a former brigade commander, I. S. Karpunich-Braven, who during the Civil War

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had signed quite a few death sentences without even reading the lists handed to him by the Special Section. After 20 years in Kolyma,[19] this brigade commander settled down in a remote village and refused to submit the necessary forms for rehabilitation. He cultivated his garden and in his spare time copied various aphorisms out of books, for example, "It is not enough to love humanity; you must be able to tolerate people."

"And just before he died," Solzhenitsyn tells us, "he wrote words of his own, such words as to make you tremble—What is this, mysticism? old Tolstoy? 'I lived and judged everything in terms of myself,' he wrote. 'But now I am a different person and I no longer judge from myself alone.'"

Unfortunately, Solzhenitsyn has not yet learned to tolerate people and continues to live and judge in terms of himself alone.

— *Translated from the Russian by* GEORGE SAUNDERS ◻

Translators Notes

1. *Zek.*— Camp slang for "prisoner," abbreviated from the Russian word *zaklyuchennyy*.

2. *Novocherkassk.*— On June 1, 1962, the Soviet government announced sharp increases in the prices of meat and butter. A number of disturbances and protests occurred as a result in many parts of the U.S.S.R. (similar to the more recent and better-known outbreaks among Polish workers, in 1970-71 and again in 1976). The biggest of the June 1962 protests was apparently in Novocherkassk, a city near Rostov in the Kuban region of southeastern European Russia. A number of accounts of the Novocherkassk events have been published in several Western countries, including some by writers sympathetic to the Soviet system, but Solzhenitsyn's account seems to be the first detailed description compiled by Soviet dissidents. According to this account, which agrees in most respects with those published earlier, workers at a large electric-locomotive plant outside Novocherkassk, whose pay rates were cut the same day the price rises were announced, began a spontaneous strike that lasted all day and through the night. Signs were up on the factory walls: "Down with Khrushchev!" "Send Khrushchev for Sausages!" On the morning of June 2, the strike spread to other plants in the city; a demonstration of workers, with portraits of Lenin and posters with peaceful demands, marched to the party headquarters in the central square. The local authorities had fled. The population turned out in large numbers. Workers addressed the crowd from the second-story balcony of the abandoned party building. Meanwhile, the authorities cordoned off the city and began a troop build-up inside it. Around noon, troops took over the party building, removing the workers. A line of submachine gunners pushed the crowd back from the building; they fired warning shots in the air. But there were children in the trees, and they were hit. As they began to fall from the trees, the crowd grew angry. Tensions mounted. A massacre ensued, with at least 70-80 of the crowd killed, most by dumdum bullets. During the afternoon, ferment continued. Word spread that top party leaders had flown in from Moscow, including Frol Kozlov and Anastas Mikoyan, and a delegation of workers had gone to tell them about the massacre. Toward evening a crowd reassembled in the central square larger than ever. The workers' delegation was allowed to speak to the crowd from the party-building balcony. They reported that the Central Committee members promised an investigation and punishment of the guilty. Still the mass meeting in front of the party headquarters did not disperse. Only around midnight, after the crowd had slowly dwindled, was it finally broken up by pressure from tanks and troops firing in the air.

On June 3 speeches by Mikoyan and Kozlov were broadcast on the local radio. They claimed that the events had been provoked by "enemies." Instead of punishing those who committed the massacre, the authorities arrested and deported to Siberia many of the participants and the families of those killed or wounded. A series of trials was held, both secret and "open" (to officials only). At least nine male defendants were sentenced to be shot and two women to 15-year prison terms.

3. *Prison-camp revolts; Kengir.*— In the early 1950s a wave of protest actions began in the camps for political prisoners. In 1951, for example, there was a 5-day hunger strike in the Vakhrushevo camp on Sakhalin; in January 1952, 3,000 prisoners at Ekibastuz in eastern Kazakhstan held a 3-day work stoppage and hunger strike (described by Solzhenitsyn, a participant); and in September 1952 at the "Ozerlag" camp complex there were disorders protesting the killing of a prisoner by guards. Stalin's death in March 1953 intensified the movement, especially when it was followed by an amnesty for prisoners

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(criminals only) and then the fall of Beria in July 1953. There was a big strike in Norilsk in May 1953, another in Vorkuta in July and August 1953 (and additional ones there in the summer and fall of 1954), one in Taishet in early 1955, and one in Khabarovsk in December 1955. After the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress in 1956, largely under the impact of these revolts, the bulk of political prisoners were released and most of the large camp complexes dismantled. However, labor camps for political prisoners continue to exist, on a reduced scale, notably those in Mordovia (Dubrovlag) and the Perm region.

Kengir was, in 1954, a settlement, with an adjacent labor camp; it is now part of the city of Dzhezkazgan in western Kazakhstan. The Kengir revolt involved some 8,000 prisoners and lasted from May 16 to June 25, according to Solzhenitsyn's account. The revolt was provoked by the unwarranted killing of a prisoner by guards. The prisoners took over the five sectors of the camp compound, from which all guards withdrew. However, the authorities retained control of the machine-gun towers and surrounded the camp with troops, cutting it off from outside. The prisoners maintained an orderly routine in the camp, providing themselves with the necessities of life and making rudimentary weapons and defenses. They elected their own governing body and presented the following demands: punishment of the guards guilty of killing and beating prisoners; return of prisoners taken from the camp because of an earlier work stoppage; removal of bars from barracks windows and numbers from prisoners' clothing and an end to the locking of barracks doors at night; elimination of barriers between different sectors of the camp compound; an eight-hour workday (instead of eleven hours); increased pay; freedom to correspond with relatives; review of all prisoners' cases; and direct negotiations with members of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party.

In the uncertain post-Stalin atmosphere, the authorities hesitated and negotiated, cajoled and promised, for a long time. The prisoners tried to communicate the truth about their revolt to the free workers in Kengir and to get support from prisoners in the nearby camps of the Dzhezkazgan copper mines. But that effort failed. Finally the authorities stormed the camp with tanks and submachine guns. In the Attica-like denouement, more than 700 prisoners were killed and wounded. But in the ensuing months conditions were greatly liberalized, and in 1956 the camp itself was dismantled.

4. *"Do Not Live by the Lie."*— An appeal circulated by Solzhenitsyn in *Samizdat* (uncensored material passed from hand to hand) on the eve of his expulsion from the Soviet Union in February 1974. It called on Soviet citizens, especially young people, to break from conformity and stop complying with the hypocritical rituals imposed by the regime, such as voting "unanimously" at meetings for things they do not believe in, stating views they do not hold, etc.

5. *Yefim Etkind.*— Soviet dissident, taught literature and language at a pedagogical institute in Leningrad from 1951 to 1974. His books on French poetry, German drama (Brecht), Russian stylistics, and problems of translation were published in the U.S.S.R. in the 1960s and 1970s. A friend of Solzhenitsyn since the early 1960s, he helped hide the manuscript of *Gulag Archipelago* for several years. When the authorities discovered this, in the latter half of 1973, at the time when Solzhenitsyn was forced to publish the book, they brought pressure against Etkind. In April 1974 the faculty council at his institute "unanimously" voted to remove him from his post as professor; later that year he left the Soviet Union. Medvedev quotes from Etkind's review of *Gulag Archipelago*, vol. 3, on the day of its publication in France. *Le Monde* identifies Etkind at that time as "professor associé à l'université de Paris-X."

6. *Vlasov.* – Andrei A. Vlasov (c. 1900-46). — One of Stalin's top generals until July 1942, when he was captured by the Germans. He agreed to collaborate with the Nazis and formed a "Free Russia Committee" whose anti-Stalin propaganda was used by the Nazis for psychological warfare. Vlasov's "Russian Liberation Army" existed largely on paper until late in 1944, when the Nazis allowed anti-Soviet Russians to form units with their own officers under Vlasov, two and a half divisions strong. As the Nazi regime collapsed in April 1945, Vlasov struck out on his own, supported the Czech uprising in Prague against the Nazis, and surrendered to American forces in Bavaria. Turned over to the Soviet authorities, Vlasov and his subordinates were executed in August 1946. "Vlasovites" (those who fought under him) who fell into Soviet hands were sent off to the camps of Gulag, if not executed for war crimes.

7. *Denikin; Milyukov.*— Anton I. Denikin (1872-1947), Czarist general in World War I, one of the main White leaders in the Russian Civil War, 1918-20. Emigrated to Constantinople, then France. In 1939 appealed to White emigrés not to support Nazi Germany in the event of a war between it and the Soviet Union. Pavel N. Milyukov (1859-1943), Russian historian and politician, central leader of the liberal Cadet (Constitutional Democratic) party, which he helped found in 1905; briefly foreign minister of the Provisional Government in 1917, he cooperated with the Whites in the Civil War. A leader of anti-Soviet emigrés, he edited a Russian paper in Paris, 1921-40.

8. *Kosterina; Khorusha; Rudnev; Rokossovsky*—

Nina Kosterina (1921-41)— daughter of veteran Bolsheviks who had fought in the Civil War, she remained a Communist activist despite the arrest of her father and uncles in the purges; volunteered for duty in the early months of the Nazi-Soviet War, and died in a partisan operation. Often called the "Russian Anne Frank" because of her diary, published in *Novy Mir* in 1962, available in English (New York, 1968). Her father, Aleksei Kosterin, held in the camps for 18 years and rehabilitated in the mid-1950s, became a prominent figure in the dissident movement. He died in 1968 after resigning from the party to protest repression and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. His funeral became the occasion for an oppositional rally by hundreds of dissidents.

Khoruzha; Rudnev; Rokossovsky— all active Communists from the Civil War days, all arrested in 1937 and "rehabilitated" after the 18th Congress (March 1939),

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which brought a letup in the purges on the eve of World War II. Despite arrest and imprisonment, all three fought zealously on the Soviet side after the June 1941 Nazi invasion. Khoruzha (1903-42) served as a partisan and in the underground of her native Byelorussia, where she was captured and killed by the Germans. Rudnev (1899-1943) organized and led a big partisan unit in his native Ukraine, where he died in battle. And Rokossovsky (1896-1968) became famous as one of Stalin's top generals in the war, being made a Marshal in 1944. Stalin placed him at the head of the armed forces of "fraternal" Poland in 1949, a post he left after the Polish October of 1956. Continued to hold prominent posts in the U.S.S.R. until his death.

9. *Pugachov rebellion.*— Peasant revolt of 1773-74 in the Volga region during the reign of Catherine II. Supported by discontented elements of the lower classes—serfs, Cossacks, oppressed nomadic natives—it was led by the adventurer Yemelyan Pugachov (1726-75), who claimed to be Czar Peter III and decreed an end to serfdom. After his defeat, he was taken to Moscow and publicly executed.

10. *Samsonov disaster.*— Defeat of Russian army under Gen. Aleksandr V. Samsonov (1859-1914) in the first big battle between Russian and German forces in World War I. Samsonov's army invaded East Prussia, but the offensive was poorly prepared. His army was surrounded and virtually annihilated (losses of 250,000 or more) at the battle of Tannenberg, Aug. 27-30, 1914; Samsonov shooting himself on the field of battle. This major setback to the Czarist war effort is the central subject of Solzhenitsyn's novel *August 1914*.

11. *Vasil Bykov* (born 1924)— a Byelorussian writer who fought in the Soviet army against the Nazi occupation of his homeland. He is a favorite of Soviet liberals and a frequently published author, though his writings, mainly about the war, are often at variance with officially approved views. His short novel *The Dead Feel No Pain*, for example, depicts Stalinist officers who shot their own soldiers rather than let them be taken prisoner. That novel, published in the Moscow literary monthly *Novy Mir* in 1966, was denounced by *Pravda* and other official publications. *Obelisk* (published in 1973) deals with the rural teacher Moroz, who during the war cooperates with Soviet partisans but continues to run the Byelorussian village school. His purpose is to keep democratic and humanist (Tolstoyan) ideas alive in the minds of the peasant children, previously uneducated under Polish rule, and to shield them from the brutal teachings of the Nazis. When a group of his favorite students is arrested for sabotage, Moroz shares their fate of execution rather than abandon them. The "obelisk" of the title is a modest village monument commemorating the youths.

12. *Kabanikha.*— Character in Ostrovsky's play *The Thunderstorm*. "Kabanikha" is the disparaging nickname (literally "female wild pig") by which the wealthy widow Marfa Ignatyevna Kabanova, upholder of morals, is known in her small Volga town. In the Russian literary tradition, Kabanikha came to symbolize heartless despotism clothed in a rigid and backward observance of the proprieties.

13. *Frunze and Frunze Academy.*— Mikhail V. Frunze (1885-1925), Bolshevik activist who rose to prominence as a Red Army commander in the Civil War. Briefly commissar of war in 1925. Revered in official Soviet history as a model of military virtue. The Frunze Military Academy in Moscow, one of the top Soviet staff and command colleges, is named in his honor.

14. *MVD.*— Ministry of Internal Affairs; this ministry, which had its own troop units, was in charge of the camps.

15. *Okhrana; People's Will; Vladimir Ulyanov; January 1905.*— Okhrana (literally "protection"; short for the Czarist Department of Police's "division for the protection of public security and order") was the general term for the political police under the last three Czars (Alexander II, who ruled 1855-81; Alexander III, 1881-94; and Nicholas II, 1894-1917). *The People's Will* was a revolutionary terrorist organization that emerged from the Narodnik movement in 1879, dedicated above all to assassinating Alexander II, which it did in 1881. Fierce repression followed; five of the top leaders were executed; and by 1894 the organization was destroyed. In 1887 some students revived the name, and began a poorly organized conspiracy to assassinate the new Czar. They were discovered, arrested, tried; five of them were executed, among them Alexander Ulyanov, whose younger brother was Vladimir Ulyanov, the future Lenin. When this younger brother of the executed "regicide" became involved in radical activities, he was banned from attendance at universities and later imprisoned and exiled to Siberia. But Solzhenitsyn is right that the kind of brutal and drastic measures that Stalin later applied to families of his opponents were not used by the Czarist regime of that time. January 1905 refers to the "Bloody Sunday" of Jan. 9, 1905, when troops fired on a crowd of St. Petersburg workers, killing more than a hundred, a massacre that helped set off the mass strikes and disturbances of the unsuccessful 1905 revolution.

16. *Trial of the 193.*— Public trial staged by the Czarist authorities from October 1878 to March 1879 with the aim of showing there was a widespread radical conspiracy. Most of the defendants had not previously known one another, but had taken part, in the early 1870s, in a spontaneous movement "to the people" (to the "Narod"; hence the term Narodnik, or "populist"). The effect of this, and the earlier Trial of the 50, was to publicize the radical movement and win it broader sympathy.

17. *Romain Rolland (1866-1944).* — Nobel Prize-winning French author, humanitarian, pacifist and opponent of World War I, in the 1930s was regarded by the Stalin regime as one of its best "friends" in the West. Rolland apologized for the purge trials.

18. *Kolyma.*— Subarctic region of northeastern Siberia, named after the Kolyma River. It was the site of a labor-camp complex, mainly for mining gold, that was the largest in the area and most notorious for its murderous conditions.

— G. S. □

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Richard Wright

With Black Radicals in Chicago

This spring Harper & Row will be publishing a manuscript by the distinguished black American novelist Richard Wright, which forms a continuation of his autobiography, Black Boy. *This book, entitled* American Hunger—copyright 1944 by Richard Wright, copyright © 1977 by Ellen Wright—*was actually written as part of Wright's autobiography, but for various reasons it was not printed together with* Black Boy. American Hunger *deals mainly with Wright's experience in Chicago during the 1930s—poverty, social dislocation, and involvement with the Communist movement. We are pleased to print here a portion of the book and thank Wright's publisher for allowing us to do so. During the last years of his life Richard Wright was a contributing editor of* Dissent.
- EDS.

I had read widely in revolutionary literature, had observed many Communists, white and black, and had learned to know the daily hazards they faced and the sacrifices they made. I now wanted to give time to writing the book of biographical sketches I had planned. I did not know Negro Communists as well as I wanted to, and when, on many occasions, I had sought to question them about their feelings, their work, and their actions, they had been reticent. My zeal made me forget these rebuffs, for I was sure that an atmosphere of trust would be created as soon as I had explained my project to them.

The Communist party fraction in the John Reed Club instructed me to ask my party cell—or "unit," as it was called—to assign me to full duty in the work of the club. I was instructed to give my unit a report of my activities, writing, organizing, speaking. I agreed to do this and wrote a report.

A unit, membership in which is obligatory for all Communists, is the party's basic form of organization. Unit meetings are held on certain nights which are kept secret for fear of police raids. Nothing treasonable transpires at these meetings; but, once one is a Communist, one does not have to be guilty of wrongdoing to attract the attention of the police. At these meetings members pay their dues, are given party tasks, are instructed in the party's interpretation of world events.

I went to my first unit meeting—which was held in the Black Belt of the South Side—and introduced myself to the Negro organizer.

"Welcome, comrade," he said, grinning. "We're glad to have a writer with us."

"I'm not much of a writer," I said.

The meeting started. About twenty Negroes were gathered. The time came for me to make my report and I took out my notes and told them how I had come to join the party, what

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few stray items I had published, what my duties were in the John Reed Club. I finished and waited for comment. There was silence. I looked about. Most of the comrades sat with bowed heads. Then I was surprised to catch a twitching smile on the lips of a Negro woman. Minutes passed. The Negro woman lifted her head and looked at the organizer. The organizer smothered a smile. Then the woman broke into unrestrained laughter, bending forward and burying her face in her hands. I stared. Had I said something funny?

"What's the matter?" I asked.

The giggling became general. The unit organizer, who had been dallying with his pencil, looked up.

"It's all right, comrade," he said. "We're glad to have a writer in the party."

There was more smothered laughter. Some of the more intelligent ones were striving to keep deadpan faces. What kind of people were these? I had made a serious report and now I heard giggles.

"I did the best I could," I said uneasily, "I realize that writing is not basic or important. But, given time, I think I can make a contribution."

"We know you can, comrade," the black organizer said.

His tone was more patronizing than that of a southern white man. I grew angry. I thought I knew these people, but evidently I did not. I wanted to take issue with their attitude, but caution urged me to talk it over with others first. I left the meeting baffled.

During the following days I learned through discreet questioning that I had seemed a fantastic element to the black Communists. I was shocked to hear that I, who had been only to grammar school, had been classified as an *intellectual.* What was an intellectual? I had never heard the word used in the sense in which it was applied to me. I had thought that they might refuse me on the grounds that I was not politically advanced; I had thought they might place me on probation; I had thought they might say I would have to be investigated. But they had simply laughed. And I began to realize why so few sensitive Negroes had had the gall to come as close to them as I had.

I learned, to my dismay, that the black Communists in my unit had commented upon my shined shoes, my clean shirt, and the tie I had worn. Above all, my manner of speech had seemed an alien thing to them.

"He talks like a book," one of the Negro comrades had said.

And that was enough to condemn me forever as bourgeois.

The more I learned of the Negro Communists the more I found that they were not vicious, that they had no intention to hurt. They just did not know anything and did not want to learn anything. They felt that all questions had been answered, and anyone who asked new ones or tried to answer old ones was dangerous. The word "writer" was enough to make a black Chicago Communist feel that the man to whom the word applied had gone wrong.

I discovered that it was not wise to be seen reading books that were not endorsed by the Communist party. On one occasion I was asked to show a book that I carried under my arm. The comrade looked at it and shook his head.

"What're you reading this for?" he asked.

"It's interesting," I said.

"Reading bourgeois books can only confuse you, comrade," he said, returning the book.

"You seem convinced that I'm easily confused," I said.

"You know," he said, his voice dropping to a low, confidential tone, "many comrades go wrong by reading the books of the bourgeoisie. The party in the Soviet Union had trouble with people like that."

"Didn't Lenin read bourgeois books?" I asked.

"But you're not Lenin," he shot at me.

"Are there some books reserved for some people to read, while others cannot read them?" I asked.

"Comrade, you do not understand," he said.

An invisible wall was building slowly

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between me and the people with whom I had cast my lot. Well, I would show them that all men who wrote books were not their enemies. I would communicate the meaning of their lives to people whom they could not reach; then, surely, my intentions would merit their confidence. I dismissed the warning about the Soviet Union's trouble with intellectuals. I felt that it simply did not apply to me. The problem I faced seemed a much simpler one. I had to win the confidence of people who had been misled so often that they were afraid of anybody who differed from themselves. Yet deep down I feared their militant ignorance.

In my party work I met a Negro Communist, Ross, who was under indictment for "inciting to riot." I decided to use him in my series of biographical sketches. His trial was pending and he was organizing support in his behalf. Ross was typical of the effective street agitator. Southern born, he had migrated north and his life reflected the crude hopes and frustrations of the peasant in the city. Distrustful but aggressive, he was a bundle of the weaknesses and virtues of a man struggling blindly between two societies, of a man living on the margin of a culture. I felt that if I could get his story I would make known some of the difficulties inherent in the adjustment of a folk people to an urban environment; I would make his life more intelligible to others than it was to himself. I would reclaim his disordered days and cast them into a form that people could grasp, see, understand, and accept.

I approached Ross and explained my plan. He was agreeable. He invited me to his home, introduced me to his Jewish wife, his young son, his friends. I talked to Ross for hours, explaining what I was about, cautioning him not to relate anything that he did not want to divulge.

"I'm after the things that made you a Communist," I said.

It was arranged that I was to visit Ross each morning and take notes for two hours. At last, I thought, I would reveal dramas of hope, fear, love, and hate that existed in these humble people. I would make these lives merge with the lives of the mass of mankind. I knew I could. My life had prepared me for this.

Word spread in the Communist party that I was taking notes on the life of Ross and strange things began to happen. A quiet black Communist came to my home one night and called me out to the street to speak to me in private. He made a prediction about my future that frightened me.

"Intellectuals don't fit well into the party, Wright," he said solemnly.

"But I'm not an intellectual," I protested. "I sweep the streets for a living." I had just been assigned by the relief system to sweep the streets for $13 a week.

"That doesn't make any difference," he said. "We've kept records of the trouble we've had with intellectuals in the past. It's estimated that only 13 percent of them remain in the party."

"Why do they leave, since you insist upon calling me an intellectual?" I asked.

"Most of them drop out of their own accord," he said.

"Well, I'm not dropping out," I said.

"Some are expelled," he hinted gravely.

"For what?"

"General opposition to the party's policies," he said.

"But I'm not opposing anything in the party."

"But you have to prove yourself."

"What do you mean?"

"You'll have to prove your revolutionary loyalty."

"That's what I'm trying to do through writing."

"That's not the way to do it," he said. "You must act."

"How?"

"The party has a way of testing people."

"Well, talk. What is this?"

"How do you react to police?"

"I don't react to them," I said. "I've never been bothered by them."

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"Do you know Evans?" he asked, referring to a local, militant Negro Communist.

"Yes. I've seen him; I've met him."

"Did you notice that he was injured?"

"Yes. His head was bandaged."

"He got that wound from the police in a demonstration," he explained. "That's proof of revolutionary loyalty."

"Do you mean that I must get whacked over the head by cops to prove that I'm sincere?" I asked.

"I'm not suggesting anything," he said. "I'm explaining."

"That's a primitive way to measure sincerity," I gasped.

"It's a practical way," he said.

"Look, suppose a cop whacks me over the head and I suffer a brain concussion. Suppose I'm nuts after that? Can I write then? What will I have proven?"

He did not answer. He shook his head.

"The Soviet Union has had to shoot a lot of intellectuals," he said.

"Good God!" I exclaimed. "Do you know what you're saying? You're not in Russia. You're standing on a sidewalk in Chicago. You talk like a man lost in a fantasy."

He said nothing. I did not know that the notes I was taking of Ross's life were being discussed by the local Communist leaders, that my motives were already being questioned; and no doubt my rash words did not help any.

"You've heard of Trotsky, haven't you?" he asked.

"Yes."

"Do you know what happened to him?"

"He was banished from the Soviet Union," I said.

"Do you know why?"

"Well," I stammered, trying not to reveal my ignorance of politics, for I had not followed the details of Trotksy's fight against the Communist party of the Soviet Union, "it seems that after a decision had been made, he broke that decision by organizing against the party."

"It was for counterrevolutionary activity," he snapped impatiently; I learned afterwards that my answer had not been satisfactory, had not been couched in the acceptable phrases of bitter, anti-Trotsky denunciation.

"I understand," I said. "But I've never read Trotsky. What's his stand on minorities?"

"Why ask me?" he asked. "I don't read Trotsky."

"Look," I asked, "if you found me reading Trotsky, what would that mean to you?"

"You have no need to read Trotsky," he said.

"Don't you think I can read Trotsky and not be influenced to follow him?" I asked.

"Comrade, you don't understand," he said in an annoyed tone.

That ended the conversation. But that was not the last time I was to hear the phrase: "Comrade, you don't understand." I had not been aware of holding wrong ideas. I had not read any of Trotsky's works; indeed, the very opposite had been true. It had been Stalin's *The National and Colonial Question* that had captured my interest.

Stalin's book showed how diverse minorities could be welded into unity, and I regarded it as a most politically sensitive volume that revealed a new way of looking upon lost and beaten peoples. Of all the developments in the Soviet Union, the method by which scores of backward peoples had been led to unity on a national scale was what had enthralled me. I had read with awe how the Communists had sent phonetic experts into the vast regions of Russia to listen to the stammering dialects of peoples oppressed for centuries by the czars. I had made the first total emotional commitment of my life when I read how the phonetic experts had given these tongueless people a language, newspapers, institutions. I had read how these forgotten folk had been encouraged to keep their old cultures, to see in their ancient customs meanings and satisfactions as deep as those contained in supposedly superior ways of living. And I had exclaimed to myself how different this was from the way in which Negroes were sneered at in America.

Then what was the meaning of the warning I had received from the black Communist?

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Why was it that I was a suspected man because I wanted to reveal the vast physical and spiritual ravages of Negro life, the profundity latent in these rejected people, the dramas as old as man and the sun and the mountains and the seas that were transpiring in the poverty of black America? What was the danger in showing the kinship between the sufferings of the Negro and the sufferings of other people?

I sat one morning in Ross's home with his wife and child. I was scribbling furiously upon my yellow sheets of paper. The doorbell rang and Ross's wife admitted a black Communist, one Ed Green. He was tall, taciturn, soldierly, square-shouldered. I was introduced to him and he nodded stiffly.

"What's happening here?" he asked bluntly.

Ross explained my project to him, and as Ross talked I could see Ed Green's face darken. He had not sat down and when Ross's wife offered him a chair, he did not hear her.

"What're you going to do with these notes?" he asked me.

"I hope to weave them into stories," I said.

"What're you asking the party members?"

"About their lives in general."

"Who suggested this to you?" he asked.

"Nobody. I thought of it myself."

"Were you ever a member of any other political group?"

"I worked with the Republicans once," I said.

"I mean, revolutionary organizations?" he asked.

"No. Why do you ask?"

"What kind of work do you do?"

"I sweep the street for a living."

"How far did you go in school?"

"Through the grammar grades."

"You talk like a man who went further than that," he said.

"Why would I lie to you about my education?" I asked.

"I don't know," he said, looking directly at me.

"I've read books. I taught myself."

"You know about Ross's indictment?" he asked.

"Yes."

"I don't know," he said, looking off.

"What do you mean?" I asked. "What's wrong?"

"To whom have you shown this material?"

"I've shown it to no one yet."

What was the meaning of his questions? Naively I thought that he himself would make a good model for a biographical sketch.

"I'd like to interview you next," I said.

"I'm not interested," he snapped.

His manner was so rough that I did not urge him. He called Ross into a rear room. I sat feeling that I was guilty of something. In a few minutes Ed Green returned, stared at me wordlessly, then marched out.

"Who does he think he is?" I asked Ross.

"He's a member of the Central Committee," Ross said.

"But why does he act like that?"

"Oh, he's always like that," Ross said uneasily.

There was a long silence.

"He's wondering what you're doing with this material," Ross said finally.

I looked at him. He, too, had been captured by suspicion. He was trying to hide the fear in his face.

"You don't have to tell me anything you don't want to," I said.

That seemed to soothe him for a moment. But the seed of doubt had already been planted. I felt dizzy. Was I mad? Or were these people mad?

"You see, Dick," Ross's wife said, "Ross's under an indictment. Ed Green is the representative of the International Labor Defense for the South Side. It's his duty to keep track of the people he's trying to defend. He wanted to know if Ross has given you anything that could be used against him in court."

I was speechless.

"What does he think I am?" I demanded.

There was no answer.

"You lost people!" I cried and banged my fist on the table.

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Ross was shaken and ashamed.

"Aw, Ed Green's just supercautious," he mumbled.

"Ross," I asked, "do you trust me?"

"Oh, yes," he said uneasily.

We two black men sat in the same room looking at each other in fear. Both of us were hungry. Both of us depended upon public charity to eat and for a place to sleep. Yet we had more doubt in our hearts of each other than of the men who had cast the mold of our lives.

Self-consciously we went on with the work, but something was gone out of it. Did they think I was gathering material for the police? How could I make them understand what I was trying to do? I found that when I talked to them in abstract terms, my ideas were not understood. The irony of it was that I, who had all but to steal books to read, had been branded as an intellectual by the one group that claimed it was dedicated to educating the oppressed and informing them with a vision of life. I was doubted by those who shared more of my life than any others could possibly share of it.

I could not doubt the sincerity of Ed Green. His was a long and militant record in the Communist party. Then why was he suspicious of me? And, if he doubted me, whom could he ever trust? If I was an intellectual, then what was a Negro doctor, lawyer, teacher? The thing just did not make sense. Yet there it was . . .

Ed Green was afterwards killed in action while fighting for the Spanish Loyalists. He knew how to die better than he knew how to live. He was organically capable of only the most elementary reactions. His fear-haunted life made him suspicious of everything that did not look as he looked, that did not act as he acted, that did not talk as he talked, that did not feel as he felt. His existence both gladdened and frightened me. I was glad that he was militant, but I was frightened when I pondered upon what he could do with his militancy. The only people he could move to believe in him were those who shared his own world of fear, and all the world that lay beyond his terribly restricted vision was enemy ground.

I wanted to make the lives of these men known through the images already accepted as the common coin of communication. I wanted to make them know that they had allies, that more people than they knew, and in ways they did not understand, were their friends, and that I was their friend. I wanted to voice the words in them that they could not say, to be a witness for their living. And they were wondering if I were in league with the police!

I had embraced their aims with the freest impluse I had ever known. I, the chary cynic, the man who had felt that no idea on earth was worthy of self-sacrifice, had publicly identified myself with them, and now their suspicion of me hit me with a terrific impact, froze me within. I groped in the noon sun. What was I after? they wanted to know. And when I tried to explain, I always, it seemed, said the wrong things. There were no concrete charges that they could bring against me. They were simply afraid of that which was not familiar. They were more fearful of my ideas than they would have been had I held a gun on them; they could have taken the gun away from me and shot me with it, but they did not know what to do with ideas.

I talked with white Communists about my experiences with black Communists, and I could not make them understand what I was talking about. White Communists had idealized all Negroes to the extent that they did not see the same Negroes I saw. And the more I tried to explain my ideas the more they, too, began to suspect that I was somehow dreadfully wrong. Words lost their usual meanings. Simple motives took on sinister colors. Attitudes underwent quick and startling transformations. Ideas turned into their opposites while you were talking to a person you thought you knew. I began to feel an emotional isolation that I had not known in the depths of the hate-ridden South. □

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Henry Pachter

Some Unorthodox Thoughts about Colleges

Just because traditional education was a matter of routine in which plans were handed down from the past, it does not follow that progressive education has to be a matter of pleasant improvisation.
— John Dewey

I shall first offer some reflections on the social purposes of the college, then cast a critical look at the liberal and populist responses to the challenge of the mass college, and end with some ideas on higher education in a socialist framework. I shall maintain that certain slogans of the left, and even of the radical left—palliatives like "free tuition," "open admission," "student input," "relevance in programming"—do not answer problems that require basic structural changes and a totally new attitude to learning.

The Problem

IN our most populous states, half of all 18- to 22-year-olds are now engaged in some kind of "studies." Although some of them earn "credits" in remedial courses and a third of them are dropping out, it is estimated that by the year 1999 more than 30 percent of the entire population will be holders of some academic title. Of course, this does not make us a nation of scholars; it only shows that education has been converted into a certificate hunt. Scientific polls confirm what every teacher knows: few students come to the university in search of knowledge. Most come because it is the thing to do for a young person of good family—and even more so in the case of not so respectable a background. Parents, church and community leaders, minority politicians, and future employers bring pressure to bear upon the high school graduate to acquire an education, to "amount to something," to bring honor to his national, racial, religious, or home community. They hope that the advancement of their sons will bring social status and self-respect to the group as a whole.

The first immigrant minorities fought their way to a place nearer the top by acquiring the dominant culture. But the late-comers now emulating them only crowd the ladder to the top. If college is supposed to help in selecting the meritorious elite, statistics defeat that purpose: a half, even a third of the population can no longer be called an elite. Employers who only recently were satisfied with a high school diploma are now asking for a B.A.—a serious misconception, for a 22-year-old college graduate is in no way better prepared for many of the available positions than a 16-

This article is based on a paper delivered at a conference on education held on May 9, 1975, and sponsored jointly by the Rockefeller Foundation and *Dissent*.

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year-old apprentice, and in some ways may be less adaptable.

Once the average college graduate expected to be a doctor, lawyer, teacher, etc. Today he or she looks forward to being a bank clerk, a dairy products inspector, an insurance agent, an FBI sleuth, a recreation activities director, an accountant, a nurse, a dietician, an aircraft parts storage supervisor, a communications or media expert, etc. Yet our colleges still expect all these people to pretend, for four years, that they wish to be future scholars and although in most other respects these young people are considered adults, they are forced to live through eight semesters of prolonged adolescence, under conditions many of them had rejected even as teen-agers.

From a privilege, college education has turned into an obligation. "You are the most exploited of all classes!" the late Paul Goodman exclaimed at Berkeley in 1968. At that time, the left thought that the "mass college" was a devilish invention, along with "mass society" and "mass culture," contrived by the corporate state and late capitalism. Little did Goodman (or for that matter C. Wright Mills) know that the complaint is as old as the university itself. A hundred and fifty years ago Honoré de Balzac gave it eloquent expression in *The Country Parson:*

> I studied the exact sciences so hard I made myself ill. My whole future depended upon the admission to the engineering school; I studied day and night; I studied more than I was fit for. . . .It makes me shudder to think of that appalling conscription of brains each year made over to the government merely to satisfy the family's ambition. . . .Many precious faculties which later would develop and grow strong are extinguished by the students' lamp. . . .What end has the government in mind? To obtain the best abilities? If it were hateful of talent, it could not find a better way to produce mediocrities. If it wishes to select and open careers to talent and intelligence, it could have chosen no less suitable a method. . . .

If at least, at the end of four years, we could assure the graduates some professional employment! But that would presuppose restricted enrollment, a tracking system, and rigid examinations on the French model that would not allow more applicants to pass than there were likely positions to be filled. But, mercilessly, we encourage them to graduate and then let them swell the ranks of the academic proletariat. By rights we should really be happy, or even proud, to point at taxi drivers who have a copy of Joyce next to their seat, or to plumbers who can discourse on alienation in Marx; but the idea behind open admission had been to help people *avoid* being taxi drivers! By opening the college doors wide, we have only raised the ante, and soon it may be *necessary* for taxi drivers to have a degree. Far from being the gate to the leisure class, the B.A. is becoming the entrance ticket to the labor force.

For the minorities, the situation is getting doubly tragic. Hardly had they won the right to attend college when it became a duty. And to top humiliation with irony, they now find that it was scarcely worth the trouble. Some may wonder with Groucho Marx: Would *I* join a club willing to have me as a member? or with Alice: How fast must I run to stay in the same place?

The Model of the Elite College —for the Masses

NEVERTHELESS, it is axiomatic that education entails greater respect and higher income. To qualify for higher pay, even kindergarten teachers now need an M.A. (though I have yet to meet one who will admit having learned anything in education courses). Engineers, musicians, dancers, accountants, and other aspirants of practical arts must take 32 points of liberal-arts credits (those who have never tried to teach philosophy to engineers don't know what real frustration is).

Is it really true, as humanities and social sciences departments maintain, that a smattering of psychoanalysis, T. S. Eliot, urban sociology, foreign affairs, and Weber's hypothesis on Protestant ethics make better architects, electrical engineers, dentists, etc.? Or is it perhaps a mere prejudice, inherited

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from the Middle Ages, that knowledge of "higher things"—including Latin grammar, Greek poetry, and astronomy—makes a man capable of advising kings and commanding armies? To this day, higher education seems to imply a license to enlist the services of the lesser breeds who did not have the advantages of a class education. The college lives on the mandarin myth that mastery of the liberal arts makes the adept noble and wise. Sir Edward Coke, Queen Elizabeth's Chief Justice and defender of the Magna Charta, stated in 1682:

> Our student should come to the study of common law from a University where he may learn all the Liberall Arts and especially Logick, for that teaches a man not only by just argument to conclude the matter in question, but to discern between Truth and Falsehood.

Like Socrates, the middle class believed that virtue can be taught and that those who have been in school with the philosophers should rule the state. But it was easy to reverse the conclusion: if all have been educated, they don't need rulers. Hence Wilhelm Liebknecht, Karl Marx's friend, told the proletariat that "Knowledge Is Power," that they must acquire the one to get a share of the other.

It is hardly necessary to quote the great American educators who also held to this liberal illusion: that by spreading knowledge they were promoting democracy. Nor need we wonder why the masses should believe this. For many centuries they have seen that the mighty were educated; they have concluded, erroneously I think, that they were rich because they were educated. Only in some cases was this true. More often, in fact as a rule, the obverse is the case: people became educated because they were rich. Specifically, they were learning all the useless arts as well as Latin formulas, to set themselves off from the common people. Education was for the leisure classes. *Schole*, in Greek, means leisure; Thomas Hobbes rightly opined that "Leasure is the Mother of Philosophy" (quite literally, since the original *Academia* was Plato's pleasure garden).

But as I said, democrats mistook the cause for the effect, and this misunderstanding had serious consequences for both education and democracy. The middle class went after culture in dead earnest: One had to earn his place; advancement was the reward of merit, which had to be proved by studies. The aristocrats, whatever else one might say about them, knew how to enjoy their culture; the bourgeois begrudges his pleasure, or else he feels he has to justify it. Last year the Metropolitan Opera advertised under the slogan, "Strike a Blow for Culture"—as though music-lovers needed an excuse for indulging in pleasure. The notion of Culture was changed accordingly; it became a treasure to be maintained and displayed, embalmed, sterilized, catalogued, annotated, and commented upon. Its study became the main prop of legitimation, the admission ticket into the upper class. Art appreciation was substituted for art, New Criticism for poetry. Culture now can be learned and taught; the administration and retailing of cultural goods can feed thousands of "educated squares."

The expression *Bildungsphilister* is Nietzsche's. He, of course, hated the masses, especially when they threatened to invade his cultural preserve. Even at a time when those masses counted only by the hundreds, he grumbled:

> Perhaps a hundred years hence a few hundred more people may know what poetry is; but we shall have no culture [*Kultur*]. The whole idea of education [*Bildung*] is wrong. Instead of forming liberally educated personalities we bring up professors who use education to avoid living. . .eunuchs trained in aesthetics.

Nietzsche, who elsewhere showed himself so sensitive to the meaning of power and resentment, should have understood why the masses crave the paraphernalia of distinction, the appearance of intimacy with the "higher things in life," which alone can legitimize their claim that they, too, can be noble. As this is the aim of the liberals, it is not surprising that, instead of exposing and exploding the myth of the "liberally educated personality," they tried to become its exemplars, representing

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vicariously the masses. The regime of the middle class made education an initiation rite, with the educated squares its priests and the myth of fair competition its creed.

The Liberal Model

THE LIBERAL UTOPIA is expressed in the slogan "Gangway for talent!" Seemingly this is democratic, for it assures fairness to all in the great race to the top; equal education equalizes the starting conditions for all contestants, giving each an equal opportunity to enter the race. The goal is best realized in the French system of "contests" at the "great schools," and so I have quoted Balzac on the effects of this system. Now we must discuss its aim.

Free tuition has been a major tool for the recruitment of the service elites whom the French call *cadres*; introduced first by absolutist rulers, it is still the custom in Europe, East and West. At all institutions, students pay a nominal fee for registration and a modest contribution to health services and the student union. For indeed, why should not the ruling classes allow the general public to pay for the education of their own sons? Statistical evidence shows that, even under the most fairly designed systems, those whose families have the know-how of the machinery also use its educational facilities to better advantage. They are more apt to finish high school, and after graduation more of them, percentage-wise, go on to college, finish it, and enter graduate studies. Even with free tuition and public support for poor students, it is still true that more doctors, higher civil servants, teachers, engineers, and lawyers had fathers in those same categories and fewer came from a working-class or peasant background.

Nevertheless, a significant number of people from humble families have become "socially upward mobile" through the education system; they have been selected as the most talented or the "fittest" and co-opted into the dominant elites. Their mobility implies an obligation to transfer out of their class into the dominant culture. But under the rule of free tuition, by democratic right, the social mobility of the few must still be financed by those whom they left behind—and no law forces them to reimburse the taxpayers out of the higher incomes they will earn later.

Liberalism wants to equalize opportunity for all individuals but it does not increase the number of places near the top, nor does its educational policy touch the social structure anywhere. It is a myth that "education" as such increases the total number of jobs or the average income in highly industrialized societies. Above a certain level of literacy, additional education may even reduce the number of individuals who know how to produce real values; a society where everybody wants to be in the professions can exist only if it owns slaves or exploits colonies.

The Populist Model

RECOGNIZING that these policies lead to absurd or contradictory consequences, radical critics have abandoned liberalism for populism. The populists no longer hope to equalize starting positions but propose to equalize results or to eliminate competition. The symbol and paradigmatic instance of this approach is the controversial policy of "open admission," the opening of the college to all who have obtained a high school diploma, no matter how inadequate their preparatory schooling has been.

There would be no problem if the high schools were to produce a uniform level of knowledge as they do in France where the questions for the final exams are determined nationally by the Minister of Education. But the horror stories about our open admission policy that have been given wide publicity in the press are unfair to the idea of equality. Open admission was introduced in New York City for purely political reasons at a moment when to refuse it would have meant revolution in the streets. The device was, first of all, used to placate irate blacks, to ward off irrational student revolts and, not least, to get unruly

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kids off the streets. A similarly non-educational reason had prevailed, 30 years earlier, when the Roosevelt administration added two years to the high school curriculum.

The best argument that can be made for open entrance still is the frank admission that it has nothing to do with education but that it may help to solve, or perhaps to transpose or delay, certain social and political problems with which, so far, city-planners and national policy-makers have failed to grapple. But it must not serve as an excuse to postpone the tackling of these problems permanently. The poorest argument is that it helps to find talents that otherwise might have withered. This is not only the most expensive method of talent-hunting ever devised, it is unfair to the better students and cruel to those who have no talent: they have been lured, by false promises, to give up two years of their lives, they have experienced failure and been discouraged from following nonacademic careers that might have been perfectly satisfying to them. Moreover, it is impossible to say whether the rescue of such talent was truly due to the method of admission; in my experience as a teacher in three countries, I have not seen a bright kid whom a poor school prevented from reading above his age level, and most countries offer gifted students, who for some reason could not finish high school, some "special way to college."

The present practice of permissive admission uses a supposedly humane, progressive, compassionate program to impose on the college a burden the high schools and the family failed to shoulder. The errors probably ought to be sought in the elementary school system, and the only way to remedy the damage done is for the college not to lower but to raise its entrance requirements so as to exert pressure on the high school to improve its performance. The present dearth of jobs offers a splendid occasion to bring this lesson home. This has been proven recently in Europe, where the limited facilities at the universities have led to the imposition of a *numerus clausus* based mostly on academic achievement, with the result of greatly improved high school records.

The populists, however, are not concerned so much with the social mobility of individuals as with raising the social status of entire classes or racial groups. This cannot be achieved by forcing everybody to pursue a college education, nor by forcing the college to give everybody the same diploma. It can certainly not be achieved by debasing the grades—which leads only to a further devaluation of the B.A., or to tacit disqualification of institutions known for such practices; minority students who can earn honest grades emphatically reject phony degrees.

Are there no other instruments that may lead to a more democratic interpretation of the college's mandate? Populists charge that the old-style academic college teaches subject matters that are irrelevant, while great masses who are not lacking brains, but may be short on leisure and background, are not getting the intellectual nourishment they crave. Hence, they turn the problem around: let us offer the students courses that do interest them. In a word, concern for the masses and concern for excellence can be reconciled if we can make education "relevant." Unfortunately, this has become a catchword and has been confused with certain New Left slogans. "Relevance" I take to mean that the subject matter must be of interest to both the student and the community, and that the method of teaching must "motivate" him.

Against Gimmickry and False Relevance

TO BEGIN with the last-named complex, teaching methods and classroom relations have been a major concern of the college revolution. Frankly, as a teacher, I don't feel that it is my job to "motivate" the student or to cater to his taste. If it was a misconception of the conservatives that learning must be difficult, it is a misconception of the left that learning must be painless. If it was a misconception of the elite college that

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teachers must tower high above their class, it is a misconception of the left that teachers must learn from their students. Some teachers feel so guilty about their subject that they compulsively try not to appear to be teaching. Or they feel that the subject must be "sold" to the students by a number of marketing devices: creative teaching methods, special student-teacher relations, "student input" in designing curriculum (the student revolution has been bureaucratized even in its terminology), and a number of gimmicks, the gist of which is pretending not to teach the subject.

Thus, the History Department at CCNY designed a course, "The Self and History," to introduce the subject to an unwilling but captive audience; Professor Duberman suggested to the American Historical Association that a course should be taught about gay history; likewise, Professor Morgenbesser proposed to a philosophers' convention a course on the logic of abortion; and one Mr. Comfort, of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, proclaimed in the columns of the *New York Times* that all the logic one ever needs can be learned by motorcycling. These gentlemen seem to think that while all the arts must be learned by doing them, thinking must be learned by doing something else. My prize, however, goes to the history professor who advised the Newsletter of his Association that he was assigning readings on microfilm "so that even the mechanically inclined student may identify with a historical project requiring the use of machinery."

If all the gimmickry still fails to "motivate" the student, populism may turn the problem around: instead of requiring the student to learn subjects that turn him off, why not require the college to offer subjects he can handle? After all, since our aim is to give everybody a certificate, and since we must suppose that every student may be interested in something, we might try offering the smorgasbord of courses that is customary in adult-education institutions. Some are ego-boosting, others ego-searching, especially those in the anthropology and psychology departments. Some cater to the special interests of minorities, others to the need for political orientation and discussion of public issues.

Thus, colleges now offer credit for courses in witchcraft, African dance, photography, dance or music practice, fencing, advertising, guerrilla warfare, current events, etc. Such courses might be legitimate—provided they are motivated by "idle curiosity" and teach respect for "workmanship," two criteria I borrow from Thorstein Veblen. There is no reason why colleges should not expand their area of interest in public issues of the day, hobbies, and vocational training. But I don't see what all this has to do with academic credit and why these courses have to be taken between the ages of 18 and 22. They should be part of what today is called "continuing education."

By contrast, professional training should begin early. To the majority of students and their future employers, this is the essential business of the college. Moreover, as I have emphasized, the community at large is increasingly interested in multiplying the vocational schools so that each student finds a niche where he or she can best contribute to the general well-being. Even Frantz Fanon deplores that so many students from underdeveloped countries go for degrees in the humanities rather than in engineering, pharmacy, agronomy, etc.—a suggestion that my more committed students usually resent. For their idea of relevance is quite different; relevant to them is what ought to be the concern of the community, namely, the philosophical and sociological critique of the institutions—an effort presenting the basic difficulty that one cannot criticize a science or ideology before one knows it.

The trouble with "relevant" courses is twofold—they become irrelevant so fast; and everybody has his own idea of relevance. To make my meaning explicit, I shall draw on my experience with courses that might be called relevant. When I teach my course on "imperialism," I can either start out with

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Thucydides' description of the treatment of Melos at the Athenians' hands and then wind my way, through various types of power play, to the imperial powers of the day, in which case the students who came "committed" stop attending after the fourth week; or I can begin by debating with these students the American involvement in Angola (or whatever the issue may be at the time), in which case the political-science students will never learn who Akbar the Great Mogul was and what imperialism is. In my experience, committed students have decided what is "relevant" long before they sign up for a course. They are prepared to learn only what they approve of: when I taught a course on "China and the Third World," I lost half the class after I had shown the similarities between a poem by Mao and one by Lao Tsu.

To the idea of relevance, I oppose the concept of "tools of the profession." In a course on "revolutions," obviously, one has to talk about those of the past rather than those to come, and generally in "political" courses an academic teacher must insist that Aristotle and Machiavelli are more relevant than Che Guevara and Frantz Fanon. For it is not our business to tell the student what to think about current issues but to give him the tools that should enable him to analyze future situations we cannot even foresee now. Much that seems topical today will be obsolete all too soon; academic studies should concentrate on knowledge that remains usable.

The Purpose of College

IN FACT, if the college has a claim to the position it holds, it is precisely this: that it teaches methods of dispassionate discourse and investigation, leading to knowledge that is verifiable or communicable in a framework of universal objectivity. It cannot give up this claim without undercutting its *raison d'être*, providing the leading elites for the community. Unfortunately, this is also the source of the crisis. The college is supposed to do both: train leadership cadres and make the leadership career accessible to everyone—or make leadership superfluous. It is supposed to develop each personality so as to permit the individual an unfolding to the greatest potential, and to discover those talents whose development would bring greatest profit to the community (which, of course, is not the same thing even if we could agree on which community we mean: as a diamond-cutter, Spinoza may have been a failure). Third—and this is again a criterium on a different level—the college is supposed to develop each person's potentialities so as to maximize earning ability. Which teacher has not had a brilliant student who might have won a Nobel prize in philosophy but then went off to make more money as a brilliant lawyer!

This brings us to the fourth, and final, obligation of the colleges: to cultivate the arts and sciences and the critical faculties of the students so as to maintain the prevailing system of values and to develop the integrative functions of intellectual activities. Which again is in plain contradiction to the generally approved aim of research: to dismantle existing structures and to uncover new truths even at the cost of subverting the dominant ideologies.

Not only do these educational aims clash with each other; their principles are also at variance with other principles imposed on our educational system from the outside. Is education to serve the individual, or is it to serve the government's purposes? To those who instinctively reject the latter alternative, I answer that our government uses education as an instrument of national policies such as: training leaders and experts, equalizing opportunities for all, assuring society of a certain level of literacy and general culture that is necessary for its functioning. Education always serves some political purpose, and deciding what kind of a college we want is not simply a technical matter of finding the best means to an agreed end.

At the present juncture, our colleges try to reconcile all these conflicting aims—not because anyone thinks they should do that but because nobody thought of anything better

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while the structure grew into all directions. In the process the college has become a department store that houses a number of specialty shops and a rather well-developed bargain basement. It has vocational schools, traditional liberal-arts departments, and a number of excrescences serving communal, religious, philosophical, or political interests. Even Paul Goodman, that archdecentralizer, deplored this dissolution of the university into a diversity.

(From the point of view of minorities, I think it is a fatal mistake to segregate their special-interest departments out of the general college. They may succeed in building little empires of patronage for their leaders, but they stand to lose all the long-run advantages of integration with the main culture. From the vantage point of progressive philosophy, too, universalism is essential to education; it is reactionary policy to tolerate pockets of tribal cultism and of special-interest mystiques. If reason is to lead us, it must claim universal validity.)

For a Reform of the Teaching Profession

THERE IS, however, another enemy of universalism, one that the left has denounced for many decades: professionalism, the narrow view of the specialists who consider teaching a burdensome though unavoidable sideshow of research, who rarely read a book outside their field, and who are not capable of introducing their students to the wider aspects of their science. We know that students come to the college because they believe (mistakenly, I feel) that teachers will give them a philosophy (*Weltanschauung*); one student even sued Columbia College for failing to do that. Wrong as he was, he might have been right had he found not a single teacher, no older student or fraternity brother, no cafeteria group or guest lecturer, with whom he could discuss the relation of his field of studies to his place in the world, or who could have directed him to books, meetings, or study groups concerned with such basic problems. The university must provide opportunities for such meetings—above all, coffee-house facilities—but as an institution it cannot and should not act *in loco parentis* spiritually—nor could it, *a fortiori*, relieve any student of the obligation to make his philosophical decisions for himself, or with his friends. This, however, is not the issue we are dealing with here. The issue is that all too many teachers do not know how to relate their special field to the rest of the world, to general philosophy, and especially to the human environment. They do not give the student the tools, the intellectual precison instruments to make such decisions. No amount of curriculum reform and of curriculm planning will change this condition unless the teachers' attitude is changed.

The first reform I would suggest, therefore, is a clearer separation of research from teaching at the college level, and hiring practices that reflect an orientation toward teaching in preference to scholastic achievements. Let those who are primarily interested in research find their living in the graduate schools, in government, industry, and foundations; for we are no longer in the middle ages, when a scientist had to be either a teacher or a churchman. If we have to emulate a quality of earlier ages, I would recommend—how shall I put it?—a certain humility: a dedication to the job that does not demand compensation in terms of dollars, long vacations, tenure, and consultants' fees: a passion for teaching that forbids a teacher to take time away for writing papers, for attending conventions, going away on a Fulbright, and similar projects that college teachers now consider requirements of professional standing. This proviso is essential to the reform of teaching, a necessary self-selection of those who have the calling—for obviously, the training of such teachers cannot be programmed and planned.

It follows further that such a reform can become effective only under conditions of total freedom to teach and freedom to learn. That is to say: the teachers should be available on the campus; the students should audit them and select, each for himself, those teachers from whom he thinks he can learn

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something. There may be guidance or counseling, and the focus of a person's studies may be subject to control, test, or examination at periods—say after two years and again after four. But how much time a student takes to complete his studies, and whether he does so by attending lectures or by reading for himself or by participating in bull sessions, that should be up to him. (Lectures became obsolete when Gutenberg invented movable type.) But teachers should be more available for private sessions with students. (Remember we have freed them from research and committee meetings.) In a word, we must try to deprofessionalize the teachers; while in each field we must prevent the divorce of education from instruction, the study of cultural subjects should not be packaged with preprofessional or vocational training. We also wish to separate the purely academic concerns from the intellectual needs of the mass of students who have no ambition to engage in graduate studies. This seems to me a necessary condition for the two main targets that I have pursued in this paper:

- to restore the ideal of excellence to the purely academic purposes of higher learning;
- to liberate adolescents from the burden of studies that are unrelated to their vocational aims, but to raise the intellectual level and social status of the vocational and trade schools.

I hope that these interests can be served by the proposals that follow and that must be understood as a radical departure from existing attitudes.

For a Reform of the Curriculm

THE TWO last years of high school shall be phased out and colleges shall admit 16-year-olds who pass an entrance examination with grades better than B for 10th-grade standard performance. (Those not passing may try again and enter college at any age. The principle of equality does not require that all students begin at the same age level, or that those who need to catch up determine the pace of studies for those who don't have to catch up.)

- The college shall offer courses in general knowledge, topics of current interest, preprofessional and vocational training as well as training in manual skills, performing arts, and sports.

- Students shall have the choice between a number of curricula—such as scientific, humanist, social-political relations, technical services, practical skills—and they shall have auditing privileges for all other courses.

- Students may take interim exams from time to time in fields of their choice, and after accumulating a prescribed number of points for passing, they shall receive a college degree. Again, there is no limit on the time each may need to fulfill the requirements, for the principle of equality does not imply that all students progress simultaneously.

- This scheme should make it possible for each student to achieve some degree at some time, be it a "bachelor of arts" or a "bachelor of applied arts," and no trade need to appear as uneducated in the eyes of the others. While it should restore the ideal of excellence to scholarly pursuits proper, the scheme is specifically designed to restore dignity to those trades that are now considered as inferior because the training is merely manual. To counter this attitude, trade curricula shall also include instruction in the wider aspects of each industry, its commercial ramifications, its management problems, and knowledge of the sciences used in its processes. In fact, the kind of teaching here envisaged should make it possible for workers to change places across departments within a plant, to understand and to check management decisions, eventually to participate in the direction of their industry. If a sufficient number of workers come to their job equipped with such knowledge, the gap between educated and uneducated may be bridged.

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For a Reform of the Student Body

Meanwhile a comprehensive plan for reform of the college should consider two further proposals that have appeared in socialist literature from St. Simon and Owen to Marx and, indeed, have been tried out recently in Cuba and China. One is to combine productive work with education, the other is the use of a "national service" to perform the increasing number of unpleasant tasks that union labor no longer assumes: soil conservation, sanitation and health services, care for the aged, and the like.

The idea of national service or labor service has acquired a militaristic or totalitarian ring through its abuses by dictatorial governments; but it actually originates in two or three democratic principles: it asks people to repay the community for the cost of their education, it imposes the same kind of service on all (with the sole exception of the sick), and it instills in them the spirit of sacrifices and solidarity. It would be easy to make this plan palatable by saying, Make a stage of factory work compulsory for every future manager, of nursing for every future doctor, of pressroom work for every future editor, etc. Unfortunately, not every profession is suitable to this kind of preparatory stage, but the general idea has been accepted by industrial corporations, and recently several writers have suggested, I don't know with how much irony, that future judges should start out as jail guards or, better still, as prisoners. But in the spirit of Marx I should add that they would be expected to serve time only during half of the day, while the other half should be devoted to other aspects of their education.

Let us assume that between the ages of 16 and 21 the equivalent of one year is devoted to national service, the equivalent of another year to job-training in a shop, hospital, on the farm, etc., the equivalent of a third year to general studies; and the equivalent of two more years to preprofessional or vocational training, with time off for travel and vacations. By that time a person should know in which area he or she could develop a career, be it in the arts, sciences, social services, professions, or mechanical skills, business lines, or services. Some of these may require continued training for specific purposes and postgraduate studies. For others continued education would be entirely voluntary, but since the various educational lines have not been marked off by class divisions and age fences, we might indeed see a plumber who reads poetry for enjoyment. In that case (let me finish dreaming) we would know that he is not a frustrated teacher of English but chose to be both a worker and a poet. For, on the other hand, we know many doctors and lawyers (don't we?) who never touched a book outside their field since their college days. We shall not hold it against them that they availed themselves of the freedom not to learn; but the borderlines between those whose professions require academic training and those who became interested in other pursuits will be blurred.

This will become even more evident if and when teaching is no longer considered a specialized profession but teachers are drawn from all fields, be it that their achievements earn them a call to a university, be it that they offer their service in order to have a change of pace and environment, time to think, or a chance to talk. Students are always interested in teachers who speak from experience.

For a Reform of Community Attitudes

THERE SHOULD be no need for a senior college; it would be merged with the postgraduate courses of the university. Here specialization and high standards are, of course, essential; the intimate permeation of teaching with research and publishing, even with public duties is unavoidable. Fortunately in recent years this has not interfered with freedom of thought; at least in this country the academy is still the place where the free play of ideas is not just tolerated but desired and cultivated. The college, by contrast, needs to be liberated from community pressures, from career considerations and political influences. To do

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that it must first of all liberate itself from the attitudes that have survived from its elite age. Its reform must not be confined to the trivia of registration procedures or classroom relations. What is to be reconsidered is not the curriculum but the structure and purpose of the college. Higher learning (so-called) just as the more elementary forms of education must be seen as an on-going enterprise conducted for its own sake, out of idle curiosity, realizing man's greatest potential in the free, purposeless development of his powers. Only by separating it from the narrower purposes of status-gaining, career and professional or vocational training, can we discover all its possibilities. Yet, miraculously, in liberating this function, which we rescue from the ideal of the liberal-arts college, we also give meaning to the modern mass college with its vocational and professional schools and other interests.

It is obvious that the community pressures will continue to block an evolution of the college in the direction of a strictly "humanist" education, and it is not even desirable for the college to strive at humanist ideals within the context of a capitalist society. The result would be either a gross distortion of those humanist aims, perhaps their transformation into mere ideology or, worse, into mere techniques of leadership selection, or else the utopian attempt to constitute a "youth culture" and a preserved academic culture land divorced from the labors and worries of the greater society. Socialist goals are served best, not by building ideal "pedagogical provinces," but by allowing the learning process to communicate and interchange with all the other aspects of productive life. Learning should not be the privilege of any class or age group, of any professional or functional elite, and it should be a free exercise of the mind, independent of career goals and remuneration.

In conclusion, I would like to clear up some possible misunderstandings and to reconcile some apparent contradictions. I seem to criticize free tuition and open admission, yet to advocate free education for all. Indeed, I wish to assure every citizen all the education he or she is capable of; but I wish to take it out of the context of career competition and I wish to liberate from compulsive education those who do not feel the need for it at a specific age.

Likewise, I may seem to condemn the dilution of academic institutions by non-academic departments and nonacademic goals, and yet to offer a smorgasboard of career studies. Indeed, I wish to liberate studying from the elitist conceits that so far have endowed the "academic" careers with a halo of intellectual superiority. Modern technology, however, not only has rendered this class distinction obsolete, it even calls for its abolishment, and the training in manual skills no longer excludes but demands the expansion of verbal capabilities. Third, I seem to deprecate professionalism and to ridicule the humanist elites while insisting on the ideal of academic excellence and similar pretensions of the elite college. Indeed I see no contradiction between concern for the so-called masses and anxiety for the elite standards; the masses are constituted by the multitude and variety of elites. We do not honor them if we pretend that they don't care for excellence. To admit them to higher learning should mean to offer them usable knowledge.

Finally, I seem to have admitted that all teaching implies partisanship, and yet to recommend (and indeed to hold possible) a strictly "detached" ideal of knowledge and of instruction. This is what I call the psycho-sociological fallacy: if the analyst knows that our motives may not be pure and our independence may be illusionary, that does not mean that he recommends a deliberately partisan attitude; on the contrary, he warns us to eliminate the sources of irrational behavior. Sociology of knowledge tries to lay bare the social roots of our beliefs, but it does not distinguish between the true and the false knowledge. The pursuit of truth is still the business of the scholar, or of everyman in his character of scholar. As Emile Durkheim said:

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The object of education is to realize in each individual the attributes of the human species, carrying to the highest point of perfection . . . . The theory of education proposes to determine this abstract and unique ideal . . . . Modern human beings must be aware of the enormous diversity of types; to be able to live together, they must be educated to be equal in the single respect in which they resemble each other, their humanity. Let them revert to their old particularities, and you will see these great states dissolve into a multitude of atomized groups.

□



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Milovan Djilas

Wartime: Memories of Yugoslavia

Wartime *is the title of a large work by Milovan Djilas, the Yugoslav dissident, which will be published in June by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., and is copyright © 1977 by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. The book is a richly detailed history of the Yugoslav partisan movement, and its relation to other groups in Yugoslavia, during the Second World War. With the kind permission of the publisher, we have here excerpted a few sections from the book that provide a vivid picture of the experience of civil war and resistance.* —EDS.

It was a fanatical conviction that brought me [in 1942], exhausted and ailing, to Montenegro. I gave careful thought to my duties in a complicated new situation. I was frequently beset by a feeling of alienation from the region, the people, and their speech. It was a world which was no longer mine, and never could be again. In this alienated world, death was nothing unusual, whereas life had lost all meaning apart from survival. Yet life must have some meaning. That meaning had to be found in a heightened belief in ideas, in justice, in the rationality of dying. Later I accepted that alienation. I even made fun of it: yours or not, I would say to myself, this is the only world you have in which to survive.

On our way to Montenegro I noticed that the peasants treated us with a marked air of confidentiality—as if they had something important to tell us but didn't dare, or else didn't know how to express it. At the same time there was a noticeable reserve and awkwardness over our arrival among the Communists, particularly in the lower ranks. A kinsman of mine, an elderly peasant, joined us along the way: he walked in front of me the entire time, holding on to my stirrup, obviously hoping to make an impression on the authorities. This made me uncomfortable, for I knew nothing about his conduct. As it turned out, he was not guilty of anything. He even ventured to tell me that in the command they were executing people "for nothing." During bivouacs at night or while marching, we chatted about everything and everybody, and as the impressions and perceptions piled up, I was able to get the feel of things.

Until the beginning of 1942, although they bickered and even fought with the Chetniks, the Communists did not regard them as enemies and collaborators of the invaders. In fact, despite their verbal acrimony and moral revulsion, until the end of the war the Communists regarded the Chetniks in a special way, that is, not as fascists but as "domestic traitors"—adversaries who, for reactionary and chauvinistic reasons, were led into agreements and collaboration with the

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invader. On March 25, 1942, the third day after my arrival at the main headquarters in Montenegro, I wrote the following to Peko Dapčević, Mitar Bakić, and Milinko Djurović:

> The traitorous gentlemen are forcing a class war on us at a time when our task is the war of national liberation. We must not fall for this tactic, we must carry on the war of national liberation ever more resolutely. . . . This struggle must in no way lead us to an erroneous conclusion about poor Anglo-Soviet relations—a conclusion which many of our comrades draw from the fact that the émigré government in London, through its supporters in our country, has begun to collaborate openly with the invader. The Anglo-Soviet alliance is directed against Hitler's imperialism. . . . To protect their privileges, the Greater Serbian gentlemen in London have begun a class war, their tactic being to destroy the most dangerous opponent—that is, the Communist party and the Partisan movement—while temporarily collaborating with the remaining opponents. . . . The adherents of the London [émigré—M. Dj.] government have had to take the path of open collaboration with the invader because of the force and scope of the national uprising against that invader. Had we sat with folded arms, there would have been no conflict, and we too would be stuffing ourselves with roast lamb and drinking plum brandy. . . . Naturally, we cannot win this kind of war with military skill or textbook military tactics alone. Such a war can be won only by combined military and political action, and on fronts combined with partisan fighting.*

The weaknesses of the Chetniks were fairly clear to me. They sprang largely from their inconsistent, contradictory stand: they made themselves out to be nationalists, adherents of the Allies, who were opposed to the invader "in principle," while at the same time they accepted weapons and supplies from the Italians and coordinated their operations with them against the Partisans, most of whom were not Communists but a patriotic peasantry led by Communists. The Chetniks, or rather the regime for which they nostalgically yearned, had lost the war without a fight. Such a stand inspired no authoritative leadership or spiritual cohesion. All these weaknesses provided advantages for the Communists, who were confident and resolute, and had political leadership at the head of their military forces.

It became increasingly clear to me that our imprudent, hasty executions, along with hunger and war weariness, were helping to strengthen the Chetniks. Even more horrible and inconceivable was the killing of kinsmen and hurling of their bodies into ravines—less for convenience than to avoid the funeral processions and the inconsolable and fearless mourners. In Hercegovina it was still more horrible and ugly: Communist sons confirmed their devotion by killing their own fathers, and there was dancing and singing around the bodies. How many were executed in Montenegro and Sandžak at that time? I don't know, but several hundred doesn't seem too exaggerated. All too lightly the Communists destroyed the inherited, primeval customs—as if they had new and immutable ones to replace them with. By retrieving the bodies from the ravines and giving them solemn burial, the Chetniks made impressive gains, while pinning on the Communists the horrible nickname of "pitmen." But on the whole, though they were quite bloody, clashes between Chetniks and Communists in Montenegro—unlike those in Serbia, where the Chetniks earned the name of "cutthroats"—occurred without the killing of the young and old, or the raping of women: ancestral norms restrained ideologies.

Yet the fundamental causes and roots of the Chetnik movement in Montenegro were not quite clear to me at the time—nor are they clear to official politicians and historians even today. The Communists had in fact gained power in the uprising of July 1941—a power which they then consolidated and institutionalized. The opponents of the Communists—mostly from the royal government—could do nothing but rebel or

Zbornik dokumenata i podataka (1953), pp. 223-25.

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submit. These rebels did not have sufficient strength or means to resist without Italian support. In essence this was a counterrevolution pitting itself against a revolutionary regime. But the Communists and the Chetniks were deceived by their own propaganda—the former claiming that their main aim was the struggle against the invader, and the latter, that they were saving Serbia from annihilation. For people with such single-minded, heady views, all traditional values take on a one-dimensional, distorted aspect. The Communists in Montenegro celebrated Christmas Eve in early 1942 (January 6 N.S.) with recitations against aggressors and traitors from Njegoš's *Mountain Wreath*, while the Montenegrin Chetniks celebrated that same holiday the following year by the "inspirational reading" of the episode of the Massacre of the Renegades—the Moslems—from that same *Mountain Wreath*.

II

The revolution is hardest on revolutionaries. The truth of this was demonstrated most cruelly in those very same days with regard to the Tadić family. Tadija Tadić, a student, was a party member and commander of a Partisan battalion. His uncle Spasoje, a police agent, had gone over to the Chetniks. The Partisans didn't yet have an organized intelligence service, but the people were so divided by bloodshed that almost nothing could be concealed. Thus it was learned that Spasoje was hiding in a hut in the woods, and a squad was sent to kill him. His nephew Tadija was able to warn him, however, and instead of running away, Spasoje got hold of a submachine gun and like a mad dog killed two Partisans and wounded several others. Someone denounced Tadija for warning his uncle of the raid, and Tadija was arrested. Then the Tadić family rose up, a whole regiment of them. The Partisan command quelled the mutiny and arrested the ringleaders, all of them party members.

The arrested Tadićes were taken under guard to Gornje Polje. The investigation was conducted by Radoje Dakić and Sava Kovačević, but Milutinović [a Communist leader] and I were kept informed and we approved the sentence: three Tadićes were sentenced to death, I believe. The sentence was too severe for one of them—a raw and agitated youth—even though he had said, "A bomb should be thrown at the Committee!" Ljubo Tadić, today a well-known leftist philosopher, barely got out of the mess through "self-criticism." I believe he was the Tadić with whom I had a talk in my final review of the case.

It was decided that the Tadićes would be executed by a firing squad on a secluded spot on a cliff. Two royal officers suspected of a plot were to be executed with them. This was not done merely for economy but to associate the fate of party enemies with that of outside enemies. At their execution the Tadićes, particularly Tadija, shouted party slogans; one of the officers cursed and the other scowled in silence.

On their way back from the execution, the Partisans were somber but not depressed. They didn't resent the sentence passed on the Tadićes, and didn't really give a damn about the officers, yet everyone was struck dumb by the reality of what they had helped to create. It was as if something terrible had happened to them. Even though our army was crumbling, everyone knew that the Tadićes were not our enemies, that they had been moved by powerful and primeval clan ties. Tadija had been put through school by that uncle, and was himself a model family head. In all likelihood Tadija would not have warned his uncle had he realized how he would react. The Tadić family continued to fight as Partisans and many died for the cause, but they did not forget the terrible fate of their kinsmen. Blažo Jovanović told me later that the Tadićes wanted to claim the bodies of their executed kinsmen. Though our authorities don't permit it even to this day, I didn't oppose this request. I felt this encounter with the Tadićes to be a part of my own fate.

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III

Hierarchical relations began to take on a hardened external form at that time [1944]. Until then, at public occasions and meetings, care was taken only where Tito would sit. Also, everyone could see Tito or the Central Committee members if they weren't busy. Then appointments began. There were dinners with missions, and the seating arrangements brought us unprecedented headaches. It all fell on Ranković because of his gift for detail, and his involvement in organizational matters. He in turn dragged me into it, more because he felt unsure in matters of protocol than because the job had a propaganda aspect, too. Late into the night we would move all sorts of functionaries around diagrams of tables and halls—tables made of boards slapped together and covered with bed sheets, and halls with floors reeking of kerosene! When we had put it all together we went to Kardelj, and sometimes even to Tito. One suggestion from them would throw everything out of whack, and impose more hours of stultifying rearrangement.

Although there was no formal state hierarchy, an unofficial political hierarchy existed. Worse yet, functionaries began to get sensitive about rank and about the places assigned them. The most sensitive were the women comrades in the lower echelons, who would be separated from their friends or husbands and relegated to the impersonal middle of the hall. They were particularly unhappy if some "meritorious" woman were given a place of honor in the front two rows, or invited to a formal dinner. Yet none of us had a single change of underclothing, and we all ate tasteless stews, were bombed every day, and lived in constant fear that we would be driven into the woods. But power and authority impose their forms in misery as well as in luxury. Ranković and I developed a protocol more out of concern lest we offend some patriot than that we might do an injustice to some party functionary, since we could always appeal to the latter. I also once found Tito in the cave practicing his signature—as befitted his new role as a ruler, and the atmosphere of titles, honors, and idolatry.

IV

The Soviet Government lost no time in underscoring its dominant role in Yugoslavia through the mutual aid treaty with the newly formed government [1945]. The minister for foreign affairs, Šubašić, took all the credit, even though everything had already been arranged behind his back. On the surface the agreement made no sense: an alliance against a Germany which was on the verge of collapse, by countries which had been fighting together against it for nearly four years. But that was just a form, part of a pattern by which the Soviet government was establishing and reinforcing its influence.

Tito headed the delegation; without him, it wouldn't have had the necessary character. Besides Šubašić, the delegation also included two economic ministers. Tito told me with an enigmatic but friendly smile, just two or three days before our departure, that I too was to go to Moscow.

The delegation left on April 5, 1945, in a Soviet plane. Tito was so airsick that he vomited. As for me, the closer we got to Moscow—under a somber, opaque sky over a gloomy and ravaged land—the more keenly I felt a familiar and bitter loneliness; for months prior to this trip, I had been made to feel like a transgressor who had little chance of redeeming himself. Both the plane and my faith swayed painfully, and yet it all seemed quite unreal. The only support that I felt came from Tito. He had said nothing about the whole affair, but there was no change in his relationship of cordial patronage toward me. . . .

The treaty was signed on April 11, in the Kremlin, with Stalin drinking toasts to Yugoslav-Soviet friendship—the only charming episode. Stalin was sulky toward me. After supper, the toasts, and the inevitable films, he shook hands with me without a word. But I was by now more relaxed, whether because of the tolerable atmosphere or because I had grown tougher even toward Stalin. . . .

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I too was invited to an intimate supper in Stalin's villa. I was pleased about that, though I had a presentiment of an encounter with Stalin over my [earlier] insult to the Red Army. The supper was attended on the Soviet side by Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, and General Antonov; on our side, by Tito and us three Communist ministers. . . .

Tito was offered the place at Stalin's right. I sat across, to the right of Molotov. Face to face with Stalin, I suddenly acquired confidence.

As soon as the toasts and jests had warmed up, the conversation took on a comradely directness, and Stalin "remembered" to liquidate the dispute with me. He did it half jestingly: he poured a small glass of vodka for me to drink to the Red Army. At first—perhaps because of the great strain—I didn't understand what Stalin intended. Hard liquor gave me headaches, and so—in order not to spoil the party—I drank beer. I couldn't refuse the glass which Stalin offered me. I wanted to drink it to his health.

"No, no," Stalin insisted with pointed banter—as it dawned on me what he intended—"but just for the Red Army. What, you won't drink to the Red Army?"

I drank to the last drop, as if making a confession, but without shame or embarrassment, for it was to Stalin.

I briefly explained to Stalin the reasons behind my remark about the Red Army. All this was obviously long since clear to him: in the Soviet displeasure over my so-called attack, there prevailed a Great Power sensitivity for which accuracy and good intentions are irrelevant. Interrupting me, Stalin began to hold forth: "Yes, you have, of course, read Dostoevsky? Do you see what a complicated thing is man's soul, man's psyche? Well then, imagine a man who has fought from Stalingrad to Belgrade—over thousands of kilometers of his own devastated land, across the dead bodies of his comrades and dearest ones! How can such a man react normally? And what is so awful in his having fun with a woman, after such horrors? You have imagined the Red Army to be ideal. And it is not ideal nor can it be, even if it did not contain a certain percentage of criminals—we opened up our penitentiaries and stuck everybody into the army. The Red Army is not ideal. The important thing is that it fights Germans—and it is fighting them well, while the rest doesn't matter."

I felt divested in front of him, and even glad that it was so. . . .

Over the years, Stalin had embraced all sorts of increasingly irrational ideas and impulses with an ever more autocratic and total power. And we were led by him, out of necessity, just like our forebears in the enslaved and powerless South Slavic lands.

Stalin then proposed a toast to the Yugoslav army, adding, "But which will yet fight well on level ground!"

Tito restrained himself. Whenever Stalin made some witty remark, even though at our expense, Tito looked at me with a smile, and I would return his look with sympathy. But when Stalin said that the Bulgarian army was better than ours, Tito couldn't take it anymore. He shouted that the Yugoslav army would soon show that it had gotten rid of its weaknesses.

It seemed as if Stalin and Tito held a grudge against each other. Without striking at Tito personally, Stalin took sideswiping jabs at conditions in Yugoslavia. Tito treated Stalin as his senior, but without humbling himself, and even countered criticisms of Yugoslavia.

Tito said that socialism today was advancing in ways different from those of the past. This gave Stalin an opportunity to say, "Today socialism is possible even under the English monarchy. Revolution is no longer necessary everywhere. Just recently a delegation of British Labourites was here, and we talked about this in particular. Yes, socialism is possible even under an English king."

I interjected that in essence Yugoslavia had a Soviet government because the Communist party held all the key positions, and there were no serious opposition parties. Stalin retorted, "No, your government is not Soviet—you have something in between de Gaulle's France

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and the Soviet Union." Deep down I didn't agree with this assessment of Stalin's, particularly since it seemed to me that he not only didn't know, but didn't wish to recognize, the essence of the change in Yugoslavia.

Stalin didn't tolerate monologues, not even his own, though he did most of the talking. Only Tito and Molotov participated in the conversation. I did some talking, the rest almost none at all.

"This war is not as in the past," Stalin said. "Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach."

He also expounded on the reasons for his "Panslavic" policy: "If the Slavs keep united and maintain solidarity, no one in the future will be able to move a finger."

Someone remarked that it would take the Germans more than 50 years to recover. Stalin observed, "No, they will recover, and very quickly. Give them 12 to 15 years and they'll be on their feet again. And this is why the unity of the Slavs is important."

At one point he hitched up his pants and cried out, "The war shall soon be over. We shall recover in 15 or 20 years, and then we'll have another go at it."

One could tell, especially from Molotov's remarks, that the Soviet leaders respected Churchill as someone farsighted and dangerous.

As always there were many toasts, and much drinking and eating. On our way back, Tito, who also couldn't take large quantities of liquor, remarked, "I don't know what the devil is wrong with these Russians that they drink so much—plain decadence!"

Even Tito could understand why the Soviet top echelons drank so desperately.

V

It was in Montenegro that I welcomed the end of our own fighting: on May 15, 1945, the German forces—estimated at 130,000—finally recognized us as a legal Allied army and laid down their arms. There were individual cases of retribution in the course of the disarming. The captured Germans were sent to camps and put to work. Along with the Germans, our enemies who collaborated with the invaders or bound their destiny to the fascist powers—the Chetniks, the Ustashi, Home Guards, and the Slovenian Home Guards—also laid down their arms. Some of these groups got through to the British in Austria, who turned them over to us. All were killed, except for women and young people who were under 18 years of age—so we were told at the time in Montenegro, and so I later heard from those who had taken part in these senseless acts of wrathful retribution.

These killings were sheer frenzy. How many victims were there? I believe that no one knows exactly, or will ever know. According to what I heard in passing from a few officials involved in that settling of scores, the number exceeds 20,000—though it must certainly be under 30,000 including all three of the groups just cited. They were killed separately, each group on the territory where they had been taken prisoner. A year or two later, there was grumbling in the Slovenian Central Committee that they had trouble with the peasants from those areas, because underground rivers were casting up bodies. They also said that piles of corpses were heaving up as they rotted in shallow mass graves, so that the very earth seemed to breathe. In Zagreb, too, purges were conducted according to Belgrade standards. Serbian and Croatian nationalists each echo the other in claiming that their own side was treated more harshly than the other side. The same men, the same aims, the same means—they had to operate more or less in the same way everywhere . . . .

No one liked to speak of this particular experience—not even those who made a show of their revolutionary spirit—as if it were only a horrible dream. I too was stunned when I heard about it from the Montenegrin leaders, for a punishment is just only if meted out individually. But my astonishment lasted only a moment. After all, side by side with the invader they had waged war for many years against the children of their own people;

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they had run to the new masters; they had burned, tortured, slaughtered; they did not change even on the long road of retreat with the invader: they took no prisoners. The penetrating and decisive thought in these reflections was that the comrades, the party, thought it necessary to put an end to our hesitation and to Chetnik hopes.

I tried to persuade my comrades and myself: "Their treason has no end. The people and the homeland have no need of those who sullied their name and betrayed them in their most fateful hour. To kill collectively, without investigation, is senseless and contrary to our teaching, our faith in people—but in this case we've had enough! They all had a chance to see, to understand, and to leave." I don't claim I spoke these very words, but I did react in that spirit, defending our ideology and decision from doubts, momentary and eternal, about collective retribution, violence, and death. And everyone agreed, with bitter conviction.

Who issued the order for this extermination? Who signed it? I don't know. It is my belief that a written order didn't exist. Given the power structure and the chain of command, no one could have carried out such a major undertaking without approval from the top. An atmosphere of revenge prevailed. The Central Committee did not decide that. And what if it had? Doubtlessly the Central Committee would have gone along with those in power. There was never any voting anyway. And I would have agreed—perhaps with some reservation which would not have threatened my revolutionary resolve, my adherence to the party, and my solidarity with the leadership. As if there were no justice, truth, and mercy outside the ideology, the party, and an aroused people, and outside us leaders as their essence! We never spoke of it either in the Central Committee or privately among ourselves. Once in a rambling conversation—after the clash with the Soviet leadership in 1948, of course—I mentioned that we had gone too far then, because among the executed also were some who had been fleeing for ideological reasons alone.

Tito retorted immediately, as if he had long since come to a final, though hardly comforting, conclusion: "We put an end to it once and for all! Anyway, given the kind of courts that we had. . . ."

And so it was, somehow—"once and for all." Yet OZNA continued to carry out executions, according to its own often local and inconsistent criteria, until late in 1945, when at a meeting of the Central Committee Tito cried out in disgust, "Enough of all these death sentences and all this killing! The death sentence no longer has any effect! No one fears death anymore!"

The war and the revolution were at an end. But the hatreds and divisions continued to bring destruction and death, both inside and outside the country. The Allies threw us out of Trieste and its environs after the Soviet Central Committee informed us that, after such a terrible war, the U.S.S.R. could not embark upon another. The world seemed to turn against us Yugoslavs and we were alone, growing lonelier all the while. The revolutionary war was still going on inside us—we who were so fresh and self-confident. It was as if all this had not been a calamity, terrible and majestic in its totality.

Revolutions begin new epochs, whose direction no one can foresee, let alone determine. Would life be life if it had to conform to hypothesis? Revolutions must take place when the political forms are unable to develop reasonable and just solutions. Revolutions are justified as acts of life, acts of living. Their idealization is a cover-up for the egotism and love of power of the new revolutionary masters. But efforts to restore prerevolutionary forms are even more meaningless and unrealistic. But choice does not depend only on one's personal outlook but also on reality. With my present outlook, I would not have been able to do what I had done then.

Let us hope that in the end monolithic ideological revolutions will cease, even though they have roots in idealism and idealists. □

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Al Nash

A Unionist Remembers

Militant Unionism and Political Factions

In Long Island City, not far from Manhattan, there are several old, dilapidated factory buildings that once were the site of the plant where 10,000 workers were building the Brewster Buffalo and the Corsair, fighter planes used by the Army and the Navy during World War II. Then this complex was part of the Brewster Aeronautical Corporation, a sprawling operation that included a hangar factory, now part of Newark Airport, and another plant in Hatboro, Pennsylvania. The Brewster Corporation had grown almost overnight, mushrooming from a small establishment with a mere 500 workers producing pontoons for seaplanes into a large organization with more than 21,000 workers, financed by cost-plus contracts with the federal government.

Brewster, like many other defense corporations, was organized by a union. Most of the thousands of workers in this local were unaccustomed to working together in an organization of their own; because of the Great Depression, many had never before been employed. They entered their new jobs with little in common except the hope that they would be able to earn their first decent paycheck in years and that work in a defense plant would keep them out of the Armed Forces.

Brewster Local 365, UAW, was founded essentially in 1939 and ended in mid-1944, when the Navy ordered the Brewster aircraft plant closed. But before the end, a union community had emerged that was militant, innovative, and egalitarian, struggling to assert its newly acquired identity, rights, and aspirations. In the process, it attracted nationwide attention, partly because such writers as Agnes E. Meyer, publisher of the *Washington Post*, believed the union had considerable power over the plant's management and so called attention to it in the national press.

The local was also a prized object for various radical groups—Shachtmanites, Lovestoneites, Stalinists—as well as for conservatives who sought to hitch it to their respective political wagons. As a result, the members of this local became highly sensitized to union and political issues; they were indeed an unusually sophisticated and alert union group.

Local 365 was known in the UAW and in the New York City labor movement for its militancy, political consciousness, union democracy, and its refusal to abandon union standards, including those that were abandoned by the union movement at large during the war along with the right to strike. This local carried on a campaign among other unions to establish a labor party, to maintain doubletime on Sunday and other overtime standards, to revoke the no-strike pledge, to persuade the War Labor Board to yield more concessions to labor, and to condemn the murder of the Jewish socialist leaders Erlich and Alter by agents of the Soviet Union. The local contributed leaders to the UAW, including a regional director and international union staff members. After the plant closed, members of the local became leaders in other

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unions or organizers of new unions, and one former officer, Paul Krebs, was elected to Congress.

My own connection with Brewster began one day in September 1940, when a hiring official assigned me, along with others on an employment line, to work in the wing department. I had just completed my vocational training course in a federally sponsored defense work school and, as a young activist in the socialist movement, I now was eager for a job in industry, to be in touch with workers and do union organizing.

Brewster's wing department, which eventually employed 1,200 workers, was divided into several sections. In the early stages of assembly of the wing, when one section was completed, the leadman would ask the workers of that section to carry it to the next station, which they did, merrily shouting along the way.

There frequently were shortages of parts and consequently the work had to stop. Instead of retrenching, the company would hoard workers, because labor was scarce in those days and management wanted to be ready for the allocation of new contracts—besides, it was all "cost-plus."

During such work stoppages, workers would hide or work on "government" jobs, biding their time making trinkets or some other items for personal use. Much of the time, they congregated in the men's room, the town hall of most plants. Here they freely expressed their boredom and their cynicism, and their views on worldly affairs, sex, sports, or the news about the war.

I always thought it odd how articulate the workers were in the men's room, while it seemed so hard for so many of them to speak up and express themselves at union meetings or before a supervisor. The men's room was the workers' special preserve where one could smoke (although it was prohibited by management) and act as a more or less free person, for the moment not subject to the foreman's authority. Of course, there were limits to this freedom; company guards periodically raided the men's room to nab those who smoked, or a foreman might walk in to check the whereabouts of workers missing from their jobs.

Most of the men were young and newly married, and when I became chief steward of the wing department, I received cigars almost daily—a symbolic acknowledgment that both the new state of marital bliss and the fear of being recruited into the Armed Forces were producing a steady crop of babies. I became chief steward by methodical preparation. Ever since my first day of work, I had cultivated friendships with people in my group, eating lunch with them, playing cards, visiting them in their homes, and dropping occasional critical comments about our current steward and his way of handling things. Six months after I began working at Brewster, I was elected section steward, and a week later, chief steward. My objective now was to act both as a good unionist and a good socialist.

It was clear from the beginning that I had to build a base, an objective commonly spoken of in the radical movement but infrequently and inexpertly practiced. For example, I remember a member of the Shachtman group, the Workers' party, then a probationary employee at Brewster, speaking at a large meeting of the local called to discuss a new collective-bargaining agreement. He spoke forcefully against management and, to illustrate his point, patted his behind while saying, "My heart bleeds for the bosses." Many members greeted this gesture with laughter, but some were shocked because of the presence of women. Phil was elated because he felt that with one speech he had brought his name to the attention of a large section of the membership. Unfortunately, he also brought his name to the attention of the company and the next day was summarily fired.

I began somewhat more cautiously. I imitated the general foreman's routine of walking through the department. Everyday I visited each section in the department,

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exchanging pleasantries with the workers. My objective was to draw people closer to me and to the union and to develop a feeling of solidarity among my fellow workers. At the time we had a general foreman known as "the wild bull of the pampas," and workers upon seeing him enter their area would dive under the airplane wings to hide or look busy. It was easy to puncture his authority by standing toe-to-toe and slugging it out with him verbally in front of the workers. As a result, they became less timid and cooperated with me when I suggested that we refuse to work overtime unless senior workers, rather than the foreman's favorites, received preference for overtime. Many less senior workers gave up their own overtime and suffered financial losses to support the demand. Their solidarity, and the capitulation of the foreman, integrated the workers in the department into a strong union group and helped strengthen their confidence in me and so in the union.

There was another area of concern shared by us all. The general foreman insisted on holding the workers financially responsible for portable motors that were lost, even though there were no lockers or guards to protect tools and machinery. At one of our department meetings I persuaded the workers to agree to return their motors and other tools, which they borrowed from the company each day, to the tool crib for safekeeping. Usually, the average worker was handling about 20 to 25 tools, and so it would take 15 to 20 minutes for each worker to complete this transaction. We began lining up in front of the tool crib about four hours before quitting time. Naturally, work ceased; the general foreman took one look at the long line of workers waiting in front of the tool crib, called me over and informed me that he was dropping his request that workers pay for lost motors.

During these struggles with the general foreman I had given up my official job as an assembler in order to devote myself entirely to my functions as chief steward. (Soon all the stewards in my department followed my example.) I began conducting weekly lunchtime department meetings to discuss our problems and take votes on questions of common concern. I also made use of these meetings to organize pressure on foremen who violated the contract, comment on relevant public issues, and develop department identity and union consciousness.

Meetings were often spiced with songs and other entertainment. Some of the workers were former actors or vaudeville people and were pleased to perform before this enthusiastic audience. Soon workers from other departments also began to attend our meetings because, at the time, no other chief steward sponsored department meetings. Our meetings soon attracted some 300 to 400 workers and it became necessary to use loudspeaking equipment to reach all these people. Through the workers' voluntary donations we collected funds to purchase equipment, including records and a turntable, and "wired up" the three floors that housed our department. When the general foreman inquired what we were about, we explained that we were going to play music at convenient times to raise the morale of the department. The equipment, of course, enabled us to urge department members to attend union meetings and to make important union announcements.

When women began to enter the department, we added dancing to the meetings. The presence of the few black workers of both sexes and especially the presence of the women changed the ambience of the department. For a while, the women's presence created a festive spirit. Men vied with each other to work with them in a team. Romances developed. Christmas and New Year's became occasions for affectionate, and sometimes reckless, behavior.

The following poignant excerpt from the letter of a black soldier who had worked in my department may give a sense of how the first black workers employed in the plant felt about their acceptance by the union and their coworkers:

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I haven't forgotten you. In fact, how can I forget a bunch of real true Americans. You see to you boys it is an everyday occurrence to treat a colored boy just as one of you. I happened to be one of the first colored men to be hired by the company, and I don't mind telling you it gives me a lump in the throat every time I think of how the men and the union accepted me impartially as one of the boys. Some of you even went out of your way to make me feel at home. I'll never forget you as long as I live. Many a time I've sat at a union meeting and heard the officer or member address us as brothers; to you it might be just a formality, but to me it's more than that, it's Americanism and democracy in its full force . . . . Sgt. Rudolph Vargas

A few whites complained to me individually about having to share the same toilets with blacks and I remonstrated with them. Whether or not I persuaded them to a new point of view is a moot question, but these protests never became issues. I am sure that Rudolph Vargas must have felt some of this resentment, but on the whole his coworkers were friendly and accepted him, and his letter reflects the spirit in which he was received.

Ethnicity was always a factor in intraunion and worker relationships. Friendships were formed along ethnic lines, and stewards were often elected by the votes of members of their ethnic group. Votes were informally solicited on an ethnic basis, and there was some anti-Jewish feeling. Occasionally when I ran for office someone would write "kike" or "Abie" across my campaign posters. But there was probably more ethnic conflict between the Italian and Irish workers, the two largest groups in the plant, than between other groups. One Italian-American union politician for example, would write across his own campaign posters "To hell with Dagos, vote for the Irish," hoping to stimulate a torrent of Italian votes.

Nevertheless, there were many workers who set aside their ethnic biases and voted for candidates on the basis of their competence. The desire to be represented by able and effective representatives often overcame ethnic affinity between candidate and voter. I could never have been elected steward in Brewster and elsewhere if this had not been so. My ability to be elected lay in my socialist orientation; it made me concentrate the attention of the workers on the problems with management rather than on their own intergroup conflicts and so discourage discriminatory behavior that occasionally was displayed by a rank-and-file member. This is why most workers viewed me as a loyal, unprejudiced, and effective spokesman on their behalf.

The following episode, which occurred in 1944, may give some indication of the relationship between the pull of achievement and the pull of ethnicity among the workers. Although the president of Local 365, Tom De Lorenzo, was taken to be an Italian, it was revealed by the Vinson Committee of the Senate that he was Jewish and had another name. He explained that he had concealed his true name because he had found it impossible to get a job in Brewster as a Jew—and when he had given the hiring boss a non-Jewish name and said he was Italian, he promptly was hired.

At first there was skepticism about these charges, but when it became clear that they were accurate, workers became indignant and then wary about De Lorenzo's motive in changing his name. But Italian union leaders led by Marco Cicala, an effective leader in his own right and a vice-president of Local 365, backed De Lorenzo's explanation and regained the Italian workers' support for him. Despite the efforts of some of De Lorenzo's opponents to use the revelations of the Vinson Committee for partisan politics, in the next election, De Lorenzo was reelected.

De Lorenzo had the support of Italian and other workers because he was a remarkable union leader, both commanding and persuasive, feared and respected. Agnes E.

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Meyer attributes the local's "stronghold on the company" to "the continuous and excellent leadership of a powerful personality, its president, Tom De Lorenzo." He was a former liquor-store owner, hardly a training ground for this role; De Lorenzo indeed made the single most important contribution to shaping the militancy and union consciousness of the Brewster workers. He had the rare ability for expressing the desires of the workers in their own idiom and style. The union members saw in him a "puncher," the kind of fighter they would have liked to be themselves. For many stewards he became the model to emulate. His tiny, modest office, a floor up above a saloon, was always open to the union members. Tom showed little deference to members of management or to the officials of the Navy with whom he occasionally had to negotiate.

Interviewed and questioned by Agnes E. Meyer, who in effect accused him of "sabotaging production and endangering the national safety," he responded:

> The most important thing in this war is to preserve the system of government that we have, and among other things, the procedure for adjudicating union troubles. There is no sense in winning the war if we are going to lose all these privileges.

Badgered by her again, he added:

> If I had brothers at the front who needed 10 or 12 planes that were sacrificed, I'd let them die, if necessary, to preserve our way of life or rights or whatever you want to call it . . . . What's more, if I were in their place, I'd expect them to do the same thing. I'd expect them to let me die.

He was roundly censured by the press for expressing these sentiments.

Tom De Lorenzo did not confine himself to mere words. With his support or tolerance, the local had at least 13 strikes, slowdowns, or walkouts. He supported the Hatboro plant's strike against the Coast Guard's imprisonment of unionized plant guards in retaliation for their refusal to obey the Coast Guard order that violated the seniority provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement. On another occasion he led a week-long slowdown in the plant to persuade the War Labor Board to permit the union and management to upgrade the workers' wages. Eventually, in 1945, because of public and political pressure, he was drafted, although he was 37 years old, married, and the father of three children.

Bernie Rifkin (then educational director of the Hatboro Plant of Local 365 and later the education director of D.C. 37, AFSCME) used to speculate with me that if De Lorenzo and most of the people then in the leadership of the UAW had been locked in a large hall with several hundred workers, eventually, when the doors would be unlocked, De Lorenzo would emerge as the leader. De Lorenzo owed his reputation in part to an astuteness to which I was occasionally subjected. At our membership meetings, on those occasions when I found myself in oppostion to him, I might make a fairly effective speech that the members would applaud. But, typically, he would take the wind out of my sails by answering "I agree with Brother Nash; in fact, he doesn't go far enough," and then he would come to the inevitable "but . . . " and win his point.

The influence I gained as chief steward enabled me for a brief period in 1941 to act as campaign manager for Tom De Lorenzo's candidacy for the union presidency. As campaign manager I had to introduce department meetings throughout the plant and to plan a weekend conference of local union leaders that led to the endorsement of the demand for a Labor party and increased the militant tone of the local. I was, of course, as should be quite clear by now, only one among a number who contributed to this development. The forces that helped shape the character of the local, each in its own way, consisted of the union president and the members of his administration—Shachtmanites, Lovestoneites, Stalinists, the conservative group composed mainly of Irish and German workers, and a group of independent radicals and socialists.

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There were about 20 Shachtmanites at one time or another in the Brewster local, and they were the loyal opposition within the president's group, sometimes known as "Row A." They had one or two talented speakers and a number of chief stewards, and they pressed for greater responsiveness from the union leaders to the needs of the union membership. In their respective departments they helped to develop militant activists, to strengthen the union's democratic practices and to alert new members to union norms. We differed, however, because I felt that they were too loyal to De Lorenzo and hence insufficiently critical of the opportunitism and the occasional ruthless methods associated with "Row A."

The Stalinists also had talented individuals in the plant, but they were engaged in restraining militancy and pursuing other conservative policies, and this limited their influence in the union. Only on one occasion were they able to demonstrate some influence: then they combined with a number of conservatives to form "Row B" and succeeded in electing a number of delegates to the UAW convention of 1943. I inadvertently contributed to their success by sponsoring a third ticket in the election ("Row C"), thereby drawing away votes from "Row A."

The conservatives, among whom were active members of the American Legion and some ex-Coughlinites, constituted the core of "Row B." They were the second most powerful group in the union and had the backing of the regional director who was also a member of Local 365. Their very conservatism, however, restricted them in their various campaigns and caused their candidate, a staff member employed in the regional office, to lose in his efforts to oust De Lorenzo from the local's presidency.

Among the handful of Lovestoneites in the plant, two played a role in the early days when the local was founded and they were appointed to staff jobs by the regional director. The Lovestoneites were politically adroit, worked with the conservatives on "Row B," and made good use of their ability to advise the regional director.

Finally, there were such independent socialists and former radicals as Bernie Rifkin, Gabe DeAngelis (later assistant director of UAW Region 9), Jerry Harris (at present a UAW organizer), Sam Myers (current president of UAW Local 259), and myself. This group acted as the "intellectuals" of the local, worked loosely together, and occasionally was active in either "Row A," "Row B," or "Row C." We helped to write leaflets and publish the newspapers, agitated, and educated the members.

The presence of political groups and politicalized individuals helped develop a democratic union. In addition to these forces, there were a number of structural supports for union democracy. For instance, stewards were elected every six months and officers every year. The negotiating committee and the nominating committee were elected every year. In each case competition was keen. Membership meetings were held monthly and the hall always was crowded with members eager to listen to the debate. Each faction brought their followers to the meetings. Thus, on one occasion, when I and three of the stewards associated with me were fired by the company, we were able to draw 3,000 union members to support our demands for reinstatement at a meeting after work at a hall some distance from the plant. On another occasion we were able to persuade about 600 members of our department to march down the street (using banners we had prepared on company time) to a meeting in support of a strike called in Hatboro by our union.

Most of the local's struggles, of course, involved the management and the Navy, which moderated the factional struggles and acted as a centripetal force. Management changed hands on several occasions, which created considerable insecurity among the workers and increased their reliance on the union. In April 1942, for example, the Navy

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took direct control of the plant, and there were rumors that we would be treated like sailors. Only the presence of the union kept the workers calm and the Navy under control. Later, the Navy turned over the plant management to a group headed by Fred Riegel, a man who introduced himself to the workers as "Skippy." "Call me Skippy," he would say, and pitch pennies on the street sidewalk with workers at lunchtime. At other times he would mount a workbench and make speeches. One day, when he entered the sheet metal department to make one of his customary speeches, the workers ceased work and, before he could begin, commenced to pound the benches with their big metal mallets. Soon thereafter his activities stopped, and "Skippy" left the plant.

Eventually the Navy appointed Henry J. Kaiser, of shipyard fame, to run Brewster. Kaiser introduced a large number of technological changes causing departments to be broken up and workers to be transferred to other jobs and other shifts. Anger and fear erupted among the workers; in my department, I and a number of my stewards threatened a walkout, for which four of us were discharged though later reinstated. None of the changes in management, however, had any significant impact on production (which was poorly planned and also seriously impaired by the physical limitations of the plant itself) but they did result in binding the workers ever closer to the union.

Other struggles resulted in a different kind of education for union members. The Navy had suspended a number of production officials, including a few tool and die workers, because they were of German descent and suspect of being Nazis. I remember a meeting of the local's executive board at which one of the members said that he too happened to be a hyphenated American—an Italian-American. "It was not my idea," he said, "to be called an Italian-American. They pinned a label on me just as they pinned a label on German-Americans and others. Just because we are hyphenated does not mean we are disloyal. I move that we work to reinstate these suspended men." With the union's support, these workers were subsequently reinstated in their former jobs.

We often were a source of irritation and embarrassment to the international. R.J. Thomas, then UAW president, called us a "bunch of anarchists." I was fond of addressing letters in the local union newspaper to "Messrs. Thomas, Addes, Reuther, and Frankensteen." In April 1942, at the UAW's "Victory through Equality of Sacrifice Conference," we voted against giving up the right to strike, and at each wartime UAW convention we called for revoking the "no-strike pledge." In 1943, at the Buffalo UAW convention, we printed a daily paper in which we called for a "Mazey-Silvers-De Lorenzo bloc" to rebuild the union and to support Reuther's successful fight against those who advocated wage increases through negotiating an incentive system rather than struggling for a general wage increase.

The union published a biweekly, 10 to 12 pages long, an exciting and literate newspaper that trained members to a rather militant and often impudent form of unionism. The local also sponsored classes taught by an old socialist, Gus Claessens, and by Julius Manson, then a young member of the New York State Board of Mediation and now a professor of industrial relations at Baruch College. The local also supported a large educational committee and sponsored first-rate basketball and baseball teams, a bowling league, a fencing club, a riding club, a Piper Cub plane club, a dramatic group, a tool co-op, and a credit union.

Our local's collective-bargaining agreement was hardly typical. The agreement contained a clause requiring the management to obtain the union's permission before disciplining or discharging an employee. This was a source of considerable power for the stewards and made them an independent source of power in the union. The agreement also called for a union shop and hiring hall,

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thereby helping to centralize the union and to increase the power of administration in office. The agreement lacked an arbitration clause, and as a result forced management, whenever it wanted to make a significant change that affected workers, to negotiate with the union before the change was made, and to be more amenable to compromise.

For a long time we were able to prevent the introduction of time-and-motion study of jobs and workers. Indeed, one morning I was discharged for forbidding group leaders to cooperate with the time-study person and in the afternoon was reinstated when the local threatened a strike over the issue. The contract was loose enough to permit several hundred stewards eventually to devote their energies full-time to enforcing and policing it. Collective bargaining was truly carried on by each steward day-by-day.

The power of our local was described by Agnes E. Meyer who quotes the aforementioned Fred Riegel as saying about the agreement:

> If it is strictly invoked by labor, management has no prerogatives. It cannot hire or transfer men, change shifts, use discipline or do anything else without the O.K. of the shop committee, and every single move involves such lengthy arguments that thousands of man-hours are lost over the slightest move the management tries to make. The union leaders can do as they please, how, when, and where.

This is quite a mouthful—even if grossly exaggerated—but an indication of the local's power.

In part, the local could develop so independently in its own way because the international union was not able to exert tight control. At the time, various factions in the international were interested in persuading the leadership of Local 365 to join their respective camps and would appear at various regional conferences to talk to local union leaders, stewards, indeed anyone they could reach in order to win adherents for their faction. The votes and support of local unions were eagerly, sometimes desperately, sought. Hence international officials did not exert great pressure on the local when it engaged in actions that led to public outcries against the union and to pressure from Washington on the international "to straighten out the local." In these days the international executive board was composed of factions and had not acquired the power it can exert today.

The character of the local union depended largely on the sensitivity of Tom De Lorenzo and his associates, on the desires of the membership, and on the pressures exerted by the various factions and the steward system. In part, the innovations introduced by the local's leadership were possible because of the new kind of people who entered the plant and became blue-collar workers for the first time. Many of the local's leading activists had been entrepreneurs before entering the union and were accustomed to engage in self-initiated activities; others were socialists with organizational skills, experienced in carrying on struggles, and some had a white-collar background and were more educated and articulate.

The draft, the relatively well-paid jobs, and the absence of opportunities in nondefense industries made it possible for the union to attract individuals who found that their talents were admirably suited to coping with the needs of the workers and the union. Together, as leadership and as opposition, they transformed an aggregate of individuals into a vibrant union community.

What might have happened to this community had the plant survived the war is a matter of speculation. As it was, in May 1944 the Navy cancelled all its contracts with Brewster and almost immediately the company announced that it was shutting the plan. The union responded by calling a sitdown strike. On the outside walls of the building, along each floor of the Long Island City plant, we placed banners that said, "We have the tools, we have the workers, give us

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the work!" The strike lasted little more than a day, and made newspaper headlines across the country. A mass meeting was called that was addressed by Richard Frankensteen, then the vice-president of the UAW, who persuaded the workers to leave the plant on the promise that he would not stop fighting until the plant was reopened. For years later, a bitter joke circulated among workers that "Frankensteen must still be fighting, for the plant is still shut."

I remember the last meeting of my department, held in the plant the day after the decision was made to close shop. It was a poignant moment. We knew that our little world was now being destroyed, and that the unique relationship we had developed on the job would not be repeated elsewhere. Glad as they were that the war now seemed to be coming to an end, still, some of the workers observed sadly that these good jobs now most likely would soon disappear. They saw the closing of our plant as an early sign of this development. I could see tears, workers hugging each other, and others shaking hands as I began my remarks.

I urged them to remember that wherever they went they should unionize and carry on the traditions they had acquired in Local 365 and in the wing department.

As for me, I felt terribly depressed. The mass base, the warm friendships, the shared experiences, the political clout we had developed, all were to disappear. I would have to start from scratch again. I consoled myself by noting that I had learned to act as a unionist while remaining a socialist, resisting temptations and the easy road to opportunism and other kinds of practices to which many a socialist who had entered unions had fallen prey. Meanwhile I searched for another job. A few months later I was drafted into the Army.

Today the local itself still exists. When the plant closed, $80,000 remained in the union treasury; it was used to organize new shops. The local now represents close to 7,000 members, scattered through several hundred shops in the New York metropolitan area. Some of its old officers are still running the local, but it is a different relationship, a different time, a different local. □

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Stephen F. Cohen

Bolshevism and Stalinism

New Reflections on an Old Problem

Every great revolution puts forth, for debate by future scholars and partisans alike, a quintessential historical and interpretative question. Of all the historical questions raised by the Bolshevik revolution and its outcome, none is larger, more complex, or more important than that of the relationship between Bolshevism and Stalinism.

It is essentially the question of whether the original Bolshevik movement that predominated politically for a decade after 1917 and the subsequent events and social-political order that emerged under Stalin in the 1930s are to be interpreted in terms of fundamental continuity or discontinuity. It is also a question that necessarily impinges upon and shapes the historian's perspective on a host of smaller but critical issues between 1917 and 1939. With only slight exaggeration, one can say to the historian of these years: Tell me your interpretation of the relationship between Bolshevism and Stalinism, and I will tell you how you interpret almost all of significance that happened between. Finally, it is—or it has been—a political question. Generally, apart from Western devotees of the official historiography in Moscow, the less empathy a historian has felt for the Revolution and Bolshevism, the less he has seen meaningful distinctions between Bolshevism and Stalinism.

A reader unfamiliar with Western scholarly literature on Soviet history would therefore reasonably expect to find it full of rival schools and intense debate on this central issue. Not only is the question large and complex, but similar ones about other revolutions—the relationship of Bonapartism to 1789 being an obvious example—have provoked enduring controversies. Still more, the evidence seems contradictory, even bewildering. If nothing else, there is the problem of interpreting Stalin's revolution from above of the 1930s, an extraordinary decade that begins with the abrupt reversal of official policy and the brutal collectivization of 125 million peasants, witnesses far-reaching revisions of official tenets and sentiments, and ends with the official destruction of the original Bolsheviks and their historical reputations.

It is all the more astonishing, then, that the question has produced very little dispute in our scholarship. Indeed, during the great expansion of academic Soviet studies (I speak here mainly of the Anglo-American school) between the late 1940s and 1960s, a remarkable consensus of interpretation formed on the subject of Bolshevism and Stalinism. Surviving various methodologies and approaches, the consensus posited an uncomplicated conclusion: no meaningful difference or discontinuity was seen between Bolshevism and Stalinism, which were viewed

This is a slightly abridged version of an essay that appears in *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation*, edited by Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton, copyright © 1977 by W. W. Norton, Inc.). I omit here a large number of footnotes referring to the literature on the subject and documenting my own arguments. S.F.C.

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as being fundamentally the same, politically and ideologically. Inasmuch as scholars made an effort to distinguish between the two (which was neither frequent nor systematic, since the terms Bolshevik, Leninist, Stalinist were used interchangeably), it was said to be only a matter of degree resulting from changing circumstances and necessary adaptation. Stalinism, according to the consensus, was the logical, rightful, triumphant, and even inevitable continuation, or outcome, of Bolshevism. For 20 years this historical interpretation was axiomatic in virtually all of our major scholarly works, and it prevails even today.

The purpose of this essay is to reexamine this scholarly axiom, to suggest that it rests upon a series of dubious formulations, concepts, and interpretations, and to argue that, whatever its insights, it obscures more than it illuminates. Such a critique is long overdue for several reasons.

First, the view of an unbroken continuity between Bolshevism and Stalinism has shaped the thinking about all the major periods, events, causal factors, actors, and alternatives during the formative decades of Soviet history. It is the linchpin of a broader consensus, also in need of critical reexamination, about what happened, and why, between 1917 and 1939. Second, the continuity thesis has largely obscured the need to study Stalinism as a distinct phenomenon with its own history, political dynamics, and social consequences. Finally, this view has strongly influenced our understanding of contemporary Soviet affairs. Viewing the Bolshevik and Stalinist past as a single undifferentiated tradition, many specialists have minimized the system's capacity for reform in the post-Stalin years. Most of them apparently share the view that Soviet reformers who call upon a non-Stalinist tradition in earlier Soviet political history will find there only "a cancerous social and political organism gnawed by spreading malignancy."[1]

[1]Abraham Rothberg, *The Heirs of Stalin* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 377-78.

Two disclaimers are in order. A single essay cannot explore fully all the dimensions of this long-standing interpretation. I can do so here only elliptically, with the purpose of raising critical questions rather than providing adequate answers. Nor do I wish to devalue the many important scholarly works that adhere to the continuity thesis. Indeed, it is testimony to their enduring value that many contain rich materials refuting it.

I

The history and substance of the continuity thesis warrant closer examination. Controversy over the origins and nature of Stalin's spectacular policies actually began in the West early in the 1930s. For many years, however, it remained largely only a concern of the political left, especially anti-Stalinist Communists and most notably Trotsky. In the mid-1930s, after an initial period of inconclusive and contradictory statements, the exiled oppositionist developed his celebrated argument that Stalinism was not the fulfillment of Bolshevism, as was officially proclaimed, but its "Thermidorian negation" and "betrayal." By 1937, Trotsky could add: "The present purge draws between Bolshevism and Stalinism . . . a whole river of blood."

Trotsky's charge that Stalinism represented a counterrevolutionary bureaucratic regime that was "diametrically opposed" to Bolshevism—unequivocal, though somewhat ambiguous in its reasoning—became the focus of an intense debate among Western radicals, and among Trotskyists (and lapsed Trotskyists) themselves. The discussion, which continues even today, suffered from an excess of idiomatic Marxist labeling and ersatz analysis—was the Stalinist bureaucracy a new class? was Stalin's Russia capitalist, state capitalist, Thermidorian, Fructidorian, Bonapartist, still socialist?—and it suffered, too, from some understandable reluctance, even on the part of anti-Stalinists, to tarnish the Soviet Union's legitimacy in the confrontation with Hitlerism. Nonetheless, the debate was

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interesting and has been unduly ignored by scholars; it anticipated several arguments, favoring both discontinuity and continuity, that were later to appear in academic literature on Bolshevism and Stalinism.

Academic commentary on the subject began in earnest only after World War II, with the expansion of professional Soviet studies. The timing is significant, coinciding with the high tide of Stalinism as a developed system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and with the onset (or resumption) of the Cold War. This may help explain two aspects of the continuity thesis that are not easily documented but seem inescapable. One is the dubious logic, noted by an early polemicist in the dispute, that "Russian communism *had* to turn out as it has because it now can be seen to have, in fact, turned out as it has."[2] The other is that early academic works were "too often written in the atmosphere of an intense hatred of the present Russian regime."[3] These perspectives undoubtedly contributed to the scholarly view that the evils of contemporary Stalinist Russia were predetermined by the uninterrupted "spreading malignancy" of Soviet political history since 1917.

The theory of a "straight line" between Bolshevism (or Leninism, as it is regularly mislabeled) and major Stalinist policies has been recently popularized anew by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. But it has been a pivotal interpretation in academic Soviet studies for many years, as illustrated by a few representative statements.

Michael Karpovich: "Great as the changes have been from 1917 to the present, in its fundamentals Stalin's policy is a further development of Leninism." John S. Reshetar: "Lenin provided the basic assumptions which—applied by Stalin and developed to their logical conclusion—culminated in the great purges." Robert H. McNeal: "Stalin preserved the Bolshevik tradition. . . ." and approached the "completion of the work that Lenin had started." Adam B. Ulam: Bolshevik Marxism "determined the character of postrevolutionary Leninism as well as the main traits of what we call Stalinism." Elsewhere Ulam says of Lenin: "his own psychology made inevitable the future and brutal development under Stalin." Arthur P. Mendel: "With few exceptions, these attributes of Stalinist Russia ultimately derive from the Leninist heritage. . . ." The recitation could continue; but finally H.T. Willets, who confirms that non-Soviet scholars regard Stalinism "as a logical and probably inevitable state in the organic development of the Communist Party."[4]

What is being explained and argued in this thesis of "a fundamental continuity from Lenin to Stalin" should be clear. It is not merely secondary features, but the most historic and murderous acts of Stalinism between 1929 and 1939, from forcible wholesale collectivization to the execution and brutal incarceration of tens of millions of people. All this, it is argued, derived from the political—that is, the ideological, programmatic, and organizational—nature of original Bolshevism. The deterministic quality of this argument is striking, as is its emphasis on a single causal factor. Characteristic of our writing about Soviet history generally, social and political development after 1917 is explained almost exclusively by the nature of the party regime and its aggression upon a passive, victimized society. Authentic interaction between party-state and society is ignored. Not surprisingly, the literature of academic Soviet studies contains little social history or real social studies; it consists mostly of regime studies.

[2]Dwight MacDonald in *Partisan Review*, Winter 1945, p. 186.

[3]Michael Karpovich, "The Russian Revolution of 1917," *Journal of Modern History*, June 1930, p. 258.

[4]See, respectively, Karpovich in *Partisan Review*, July 1949, pp. 759-60; Reshetar, *Concise History of the Communist Party* (New York: Praeger, 1960), pp. 218-19; McNeal, *The Bolshevik Tradition* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 136-37; Ulam, *The Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 198, and *The Bolsheviks* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 477; Mendel, ed., *Essential Works of Marxism* (New York: Bantam, 1965), p. 199; Willets, "Death and Damnation of a Hero," *Survey*, April 1963, p. 9.

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NONE OF THIS is wholly explicable apart from the "paradigm" that dominated Soviet studies for so many years. Much has been written in recent years critical of the "totalitarianism" approach in terms of political science. But its unfortunate impact on our historiography has gone relatively unnoticed. In addition to obscuring the subject by using "totalitarianism" as a synonym for Stalinism, the approach contributed to the continuity thesis in two important ways.

While most Western theorists of Soviet "totalitarianism" saw Stalin's upheaval of 1929-33 as a turning point, they interpreted it not as discontinuity but as a continuation, culmination, or "breakthrough" in an ongoing process of creeping "totalitarianism." Thus Merle Fainsod's classic summary: "Out of the totalitarian embryo would come totalitarianism full-blown."[5] One result was a tendency to treat the whole of Bolshevik and Soviet history and policies before 1929 as merely the antechamber of Stalinism, as half-blown "totalitarianism." The other contribution of the approach, with its deterministic language of "inner totalitarian logic," was to make the process seem not merely continuous but inevitable. To quote one of many examples, Ulam writes: "after its October victory, the Communist Party began to grope its way toward totalitarianism." He adds: "the only problem was what character and philosophy this totalitarianism was to take."[6]

The continuity thesis was not the work of university scholars alone. A significant role in its development was played by the plethora of intellectual ex-Communists (Solzhenitsyn being among the more recent), whose intellectual odyssey carried them first away from Stalinism, then from Bolshevism-Leninism, and finally away from Marxism. As their autobiographical thinking developed, once-important distinctions between the first two, and sometimes all three, faded. Armed with the authority of personal experience (though often far from Russia) and conversion, lapsed Communists testified to the "straight line" in assorted ways. Some became scholarly historians of "totalitarianism." Others, including James Burnham and Milovan Djilas, produced popular theories presenting Soviet Communism in a different light—as a new class or bureaucratic order. But they, too, interpreted the Stalinist 1930s—the victorious period of the new class (or bureaucracy)—as the "continuation" and "lawful . . . offspring of Lenin and the revolution."[7] Historiographically, their conception differed chiefly in terminology: an unbroken continuity from a half-blown to a full-blown new class or ruling bureaucracy. Finally, there was the unique contribution of Arthur Koestler, whose novel *Darkness at Noon* presented Stalin's annihilation of the original Bolsheviks as the logical triumph of Bolshevism itself. The continuity thesis was fulsome, the consensus complete.

Just how complete this consensus was is indicated by the two major historians whose work otherwise fell well outside the academic mainstream—E. H. Carr and Isaac Deutscher. Neither shared the mainstream antipathy to Bolshevism; Deutscher was a partisan of the Russian revolution, and Carr viewed it with considerable empathy. Both presented very different perspectives on many aspects of Soviet history. And yet both, for other and more complex reasons, saw a fundamental continuity between Bolshevism and Stalinism. Carr's great *History of Soviet Russia* concludes before the Stalin years. But his extended treatment of 1917-29, and of the alternatives to Stalinism, is consistent with his early judgment that, without Stalin's revolution from above, "Lenin's revolution would have run out in the sand. In this sense Stalin continued and fulfilled Leninism. . . ."[8]

[5] *How Russia Is Ruled* (rev. ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 59.

[6] Adam B. Ulam, *The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism* (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 48, 49.

[7] Milovan Djilas, *The New Class* (New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 51, 53, 56, 57, 167-68; see also his "Beyond Dogma," *Survey*, Winter 1971, pp. 181-88. For James Burnham, see *The Managerial Revolution* (New York: Day, 1941), pp. 220-21.

[8] E. H. Carr, *Studies in Revolution* (New York: Universal Library, 1964), p. 214.

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Deutscher's views on the subject were more complicated and interesting, partly because he, almost alone, made it a central concern in his historical essays and biographies of Stalin and Trotsky. He carefully distinguished between original Bolshevism and Stalinism. He described major discontinuities, even a "chasm between the Leninist and Stalinist phases of the Soviet regime," and he was an implacable critic of scholars who imagined a "straight continuation" between the two. On balance, however, because the nationalized foundations of socialism were preserved, because Stalin's regime had carried out the revolutionary goal of modernizing Russia, and because the Bolshevik alternative (Trotskyism for Deutscher) seemed hopeless in the existing circumstances of the 1920s, Deutscher believed that Stalinism "continued in the Leninist tradition. . . ." Despite Stalinism's repudiation of cardinal Bolshevik ideas (chiefly internationalism and proletarian democracy, according to Deutscher) and its grotesque bureaucratic abuse of the Bolshevik legacy, the "Bolshevik idea and tradition remained, through all successive pragmatic and ecclesiastical reformulations, the ruling idea and the dominant tradition of the Soviet Union."[9]

In short, for all their other disagreements, a consensus on an unbroken continuity from 1917 to Stalin's death joined the mainstream scholarship and the counter-tradition represented by Carr and Deutscher. On this issue at least, the only dispute seemed to be whether the inexorable march of Stalinism should be dated from 1902 and the writing of Lenin's *What Is to Be Done?*, from October 1917 and the subsequent abolition of the Constituent Assembly, from 1921 and the ban on party factions, or from 1923 and Trotsky's first defeat.

In recent years a few books have challenged the continuity thesis and the academic consensus on Bolshevism and Stalinism. But the great majority of specialists, including the new generation, still believe that "Stalin epitomized the Communist mind . . .," that his acts were "pure, unadulterated Leninism," and that "Lenin was the mentor and Stalin the pupil who carried his master's legacy to its logical conclusion."[10]

II

The voluminous scholarship devoted to the continuity thesis observes certain tenacious conventions. They are, loosely defined, of two sorts: first, a set of formulations, historical approaches, and conceptual explanations of how and why there was a political "straight line" between Bolshevism and Stalinism; and, second, a series of interlocking historical interpretations said to demonstrate Bolshevik programmatic continuity between 1917 and Stalin's upheaval of 1929-33. Both need to be reexamined fully, though I can do so here only very briefly and, again, elliptically. I leave the question of programmatic continuity to the next section and begin with conceptual matters.

The problem begins with the formulation of the continuity thesis. Among its most familiar assertions is that Bolshevism contained the "seeds," "roots," or "germs" of Stalinism. To this proposition even the most ardent proponent of discontinuity must say—yes, of course. Unfortunately, this is to say very little, indeed only the obvious. Every historical period—each political phenomenon—has antecedents, "seeds," in the preceding one: 1917 in Czarist history, the Third Reich in Weimar, and so forth. In itself, however, this demonstrates nothing about continuity, much less about causality or inevitability.

The Bolshevism of 1917-28 did contain important "seeds" of Stalinism; they are too fully related in our literature to be reiterated

[9]"Russia in Transition," *Dissent*, Winter 1955, p. 24; *Russia in Transition* (New York: Grove Press, 1960), pp. 216-18; *Russia After Stalin* (London: Hamilton, 1969), pp. 21-22, 28-29, 33-34; and *The Prophet Unarmed* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 463.

[10]Adam B. Ulam, *Stalin: The Man and His Era* (New York: Viking, 1973), p. 362; Richard Gregor's introduction to *Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), p. 38.

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here. Less noted, and the real point, is that Bolshevism also contained other important, non-Stalinist "seeds"; and, equally, that the "seeds" of Stalinism are also to be found elsewhere—in Russian historical and cultural traditions, in such social events as the Civil War, in the international setting, etc. The question is, however, not one of "seeds," or even of less significant continuities, but of fundamental continuities or discontinuities.

Even less helpful are the three definitional components of the continuity thesis: Bolshevism, Stalinism, continuity. In customary usage, these terms obscure more than they define. The self-professed *raison d'être* of the "totalitarianism" school was to distinguish and analyze a wholly new kind of authoritarianism. Yet precisely this critical distinction is often missing, as illustrated by the familiar explanation of Stalinism: "Authoritarianism in prerevolutionary Leninism naturally and perhaps inevitably gave birth to Soviet authoritarianism."[11] Variants of this proposition explain that Stalinism continued the illiberal, nondemocratic, repressive traditions of Bolshevism.

This argument misses the essential comparative point. (It also assumes, mistakenly, I think, that some kind of democratic order—liberal or proletarian—was a Russian possibility in 1917 or after.) Bolshevism was in important respects—depending on the period—a strongly authoritarian movement. But failure to distinguish between Soviet authoritarianism before and after 1929 means to obscure the very nature of Stalinism. Stalinism was not simply nationalism, bureaucratization, absence of democracy, censorship, police repression, and the rest in any precedented sense. These phenomena have appeared in many societies and are rather easily explained.

Instead, Stalinism was excess, extraordinary extremism, in each. It was not, for example, merely coercive peasant policies, but a virtual civil war against the peasantry; not merely police repression, or even civil war-style terror, but a holocaust by terror that victimized tens of millions of people for 25 years; not merely a Thermidorian revival of nationalist tradition, but an almost fascistlike chauvinism; not merely a leader cult, but deification of a despot. During the Khrushchev years, Western scholars frequently spoke of a "Stalinism without the excesses," or "Stalinism without the arrests." This makes no sense. Excesses were the essence of historical Stalinism, and they are what really requires explanation.

Similar problems arise from the customary treatment of original Bolshevism, which defines it in so selectively narrow a fashion as to construe it as Stalinism, or "embryonic" Stalinism. I have tried to show elsewhere that Bolshevism was a far more diverse political movement—ideologically, programmatically, generationally, etc.—than is usually acknowledged in our scholarship.[12] But another convention of the continuity thesis should also be protested: the equating of Bolshevism and Leninism. Lenin was plainly the singular Bolshevik; his leadership, ideas, and personality shaped the movement in fundamental ways. But Bolshevism was larger, and more diverse, than Lenin and Leninism. Its ideology, policies, and politics were also shaped by other forceful leaders, lesser members and committees, nonparty constituents, and great social events, including World War I, the Revolution, and the Civil War. I am not suggesting that Leninism, rather than Bolshevism, was nascently Stalinist. Those who do so rely similarly upon an exclusionary selection of references, emphasizing, for example, the Lenin of *What Is To Be Done?* and 1919, while minimizing the Lenin of *State and Revolution* and 1922-23.

[11]Thomas H. Hammond in *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*, Ernest J. Simmons, ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 156.

[12]*Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938* (New York: Knopf, 1973).

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WHAT, THEN, of formulating continuities and discontinuities? This is among the most difficult problems of historical analysis. Most historians would agree that it requires careful empirical study of historical similarities and dissimilarities, and that the question of degree, of whether quantitative changes become qualitative, is critical. Not surprisingly, perhaps, this venerable approach plays a central role in our thinking about differences between Czarist and Soviet political history, and almost none in our thinking about Bolshevism and Stalinism. Thus a major proponent of the continuity thesis warns against equating the Czarist and Soviet regimes: "it is important to stress that there is a deep gulf dividing authoritarianism and totalitarianism, and if we treat the two as identical political formations, we end by revealing our inability to distinguish between continuity and change."[13] If this sensible admonition were to be applied to Soviet history, it would be difficult not to conclude, at the very least, that "differences in degree grew into differences of kind. . .what had existed under Lenin was carried by Stalin to such extremes that its very nature changed."[14]

As our scholarship stands, however, it appears that special approaches are reserved for interpreting Soviet history. One is the extraordinary determinism and monocausal explanations on which the continuity thesis so often depends. The vocabulary used to posit a direct causal relationship between the "political dynamics" of Bolshevism and Stalinism, especially collectivization and the great terror, may be unique in modern-day political and historical studies. It abounds with the language of teleological determinism: "inner logic," "inexorably totalitarian features," "inevitable process," "inescapable consequences," "logical completion," "inevitable stage," and more. Or to give a fuller illustration, a standard work explains that Stalin's collectivization campaign of 1929-33 "was the inevitable consequence of the triumph of the Bolshevik Party on November 7, 1917. . . ."[15]

Here serious questions about the historical approach are involved. For one thing, our language betrays a rigid determinism, which is not unlike the one that once prevailed in official Stalinist historiography and was properly derided by Western scholars. For another, while claiming to explain so much, this sort of teleological interpretation actually explains very little. It is, as Hannah Arendt observed many years ago, more on the order of "axiomatic value-judgment" than authentic historical analysis. And it is vulnerable logically. Replying to similar arguments circulating in the Soviet Union, Roy Medvedev has pointed out that if Stalinism was predetermined by Bolshevism, if there were no alternatives after 1917, then 1917 and Bolshevism must have been predetermined by previous Russian history. In that case, "to explain Stalinism we have to return to earlier and earlier epochs . . . very likely to the Tartar yoke." He adds, on a political note, "that would be wrong . . . a historical justification of Stalinism, not a condemnation."[16]

Implicit in all this is, I think, a Sovietological version of what Herbert Butterfield called the Whig interpretation of history. The past is evaluated in terms of the present, antecedents in terms of outcome. Or as one interpreter of continuity in Soviet political history has argued, "sometimes the past is better understood by examining the present and then defining the relationship of the present to the past."[17]

The approach is modified here by "sometimes," but it is clear and widespread. It is not wholly indefensible. The historian, as

[13]Merle Fainsod in *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*, p. 176.

[14]Boris Souvarine in *Marxism in the Modern World*, Milorad M. Drachkovitch, ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 102.

[15]Naum Jasny, *Socialized Agriculture of the USSR* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1949), p. 18.

[16]*Let History Judge* (New York: Knopf, 1971), p. 359.

[17]Zbigniew Brzezinski in *The Development of the USSR*, Donald W. Treadgold, ed. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), p. 40.

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Carr reminds us, is unavoidably influenced by the present and by established outcomes. In addition, careful application of contemporary insights may illuminate the past. But the Whig tradition in Soviet studies has given rise to unsatisfactory conventions on the subject of Bolshevism and Stalinism. Accompanying the teleological determinism, there is a tendency, projecting outcome backward upon the past, to Stalinize early Soviet history and politics; to ignore, for the "straight line" to 1917, the actual period, 1929-33, when historical Stalinism first appeared; and, throughout, to interpret the party ahistorically, as though it acted above society and outside history itself.

Two familiar, and equally questionable, lines of analysis are among the corollaries of our Whig historiography. One argues that the inner "political dynamics" (or "nature") of the Bolshevik party predetermined Stalinism. The other insists that changes in the Soviet political system under Bolshevism and Stalinism were superficial or secondary to continuities that were fundamental and observable. Whatever the partial truths of the first argument, it suffers from the implicit ahistorical conception of a basically unchanging party after 1917, an assumption easily refuted by evidence already in our literature. What is meant by "the party" as a historical determinant when, for example, its membership, composition, organizational structure, internal political life, and outlook underwent far-reaching alterations between 1917 and 1921 alone?

The causal "dynamic" cited most often is, of course, the party's ideology. Several obvious objections can be raised against this explanation of social and political development. It is even more one-dimensional: it ignores the fact that a given ideology may influence events in different ways. Christianity having contributed to both compassion and inquisition, socialism to both social justice and tyranny. And it relies upon a self-serving definition of Bolshevik ideology as being concerned mainly with the "concentration of total social power."

More important, the nature of Bolshevik ideology was far less cohesive and fixed than the standard interpretation allows. If ideology influenced events, it was also shaped, and changed, by them. The Russian Civil War, to take an early instance, had a major impact on Bolshevik outlook, reviving the self-conscious theory of an embattled vanguard, which had been inoperative or inconsequential for at least a decade, and implanting in the once civilian-minded party what a leading Bolshevik called a "military soviet culture." Above all, official ideology changed radically under Stalin. Several of these changes have been noted by Western and Soviet scholars: the revival of nationalism, statism, anti-Semitism; and conservative, or reactionary, cultural and behavioral norms; the repeal of ideas and legislation favoring workers, women, schoolchildren, minority cultures, and egalitarianism, as well as a host of revolutionary and Bolshevik symbols; and a switch in emphasis from ordinary people to leaders and official bosses as the creators of history. These were not simply amendments, but a new ideology.

Similar criticisms must be leveled against the other causal "dynamic" usually cited, the party's "organizational principles"—the implied theory that Stalinism originated with *What Is to Be Done?* This theory, too, is one-dimensional and ahistorical. Bolshevism's organizational character evolved over the years, often in response to external events, from the unruly, loosely organized party that participated successfully in democratic politics in 1917, to the centralized bureaucratic party of the 1920s, to the terrorized party of the 1930s, many of whose executive committees and bureaus had been destroyed.

Moreover, the argument is, in effect, an adaptation of Michel's "iron law of oligarchy," which was intended to be a generalization about all large political organizations and their tendency toward oligarchical rather than democratic politics. This may suggest a good deal about the evolution of the Bolshevik leadership's

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relations with the party-at-large between 1917 and 1929, as it does about modern parties generally. But it tells us nothing directly about Stalinism, which was not oligarchical but autocratic politics, unless we conclude that the "iron law of oligarchy" is actually an iron law of autocracy.

The party's growing centralization, bureaucratization, and administrative intolerance after 1917 certainly promoted authoritarianism in the one-party system and abetted Stalin's rise. To argue that these developments predetermined Stalinism is another matter. Even in the 1920s, after the bureaucratization and militarization fostered by the Civil War, the high party was not (nor had it ever been) the disciplined vanguard fantasized in *What Is to Be Done?*. It remained oligarchical, in the words of one of its leaders, "*a negotiated federation between groups, groupings, factions, and 'tendencies.*'" In short, the party's "organizational principles" did not produce Stalinism before 1929, nor have they since 1953.

There remains, then, the argument that discontinuities were secondary to continuities in the workings of the Soviet political system under Bolshevism and Stalinism. Though this is ideally an empirical question, here, too, there seems to be a critical methodological lapse. The importance of distinguishing between the official, or theatrical, facade and the inner (sometimes disguised) reality of politics has been evident at least since Bagehot demolished the prevailing theory of English politics in 1867 by dissecting the system in terms of its "dignified" and "efficient" parts. The case made by Western scholars for fundamental continuities in the Soviet political system has rested on what Bagehot called "dignified," merely apparent, or fictitious parts.

Looking at the "efficient" or inner reality, Robert C. Tucker came to a very different conclusion several years ago: "What we carelessly call 'the Soviet political system' is best seen and analyzed as an historical succession of political systems within a broadly continuous institutional framework." The Bolshevik system had been one of party dictatorship characterized by oligarchical leadership politics in the ruling party. After 1936 and Stalin's great purge, despite an outward "continuity of organizational forms and official nomenclature," the "one-party system had given way to a one-person system, the ruling party to a ruling personage." This was a ramifying change from an oligarchical party regime to an autocratic "Führerist" regime, "reflected in a whole system of changes in the political process, the ideological pattern, the organization of supreme power, and official patterns of behavior."[18] The apparent continuities regularly itemized—leader, the party, terror, class war, censorship, Marxism/Leninism, purge, etc.—were synthetic and illusory. The terms may still have been applicable, but their meaning was different.

Tucker's conclusion that Stalin's terror "broke the back of the party, eliminated it as a . . .ruling class," has been amply confirmed by more recent evidence. After the purges swept away at least a million of its members between 1935 and 1939, the primacy of the party—the "essence" of Bolshevism-Leninism in most scholarly definitions—was no more. Its elite (massacred virtually as a whole), general membership (by 1939, 70 percent had joined since 1929 or after), ethos, and role were no longer those of the old party, or even the party of 1934. Even in its new Stalinist form, the party's political importance fell well below that of the police, and its official esteem below that of the state. Its deliberate bodies—the Party Congress, the Central Committee, and eventually even the Politburo—rarely convened. Accordingly, the previous and different history of the party could no longer be written about, even to distort: between 1938 and 1953, only one doctoral dissertation was written in the Soviet Union on this once hallowed subject.

[18]Robert C. Tucker, in *ibid.* (see footnote 17), p. 33; also his *The Soviet Political Mind* (rev. ed.: New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), pp. 18, 179.

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It is sometimes pointed out, as a final defense of the continuity thesis, that "Stalinism" was never acknowledged officially during Stalin's reign, only "Marxism-Leninism." With Bagehot's method, of course, this tells us nothing. Moreover, it is not entirely accurate. As the cult of the infallible leader (which, it should be said, was very different from the earlier Bolshevik cult of a historically necessary, but not infallible, party) grew into literal deification after 1938, the adjective "Stalinist" was attached increasingly to people, institutions, orthodox ideas, events, and even history. This was a departure from even the early 1930s, when they were normally called Leninist, Bolshevik, or Soviet; it reflected, among other things, the sharp decline in Lenin's official standing. Catchphrases such as "the teachings of Lenin and Stalin" remained in use. But now less ecumenical ones were coined to characterize the building of Soviet socialism as "the great Stalinist cause," and Stalin alone now was named as "the genius-architect of Communism," and Soviet history as the "epoch of Stalin." The term "Stalinism" was prohibited from official usage; but the concept was ingrained, tacitly and officially.

If symbols can tell us anything about political reality, we do best to heed Leonid Petrovsky's commentary on the statue of Dolgoruky, which Stalin built on the spot where Lenin had once unveiled a monument to the first Soviet constitution. "The monument to the bloody feudal prince has become a kind of personification of the grim epoch of the personality cult. The horse of the feudal prince has its back turned to the Central Party Archives, where the immortal works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin are preserved and where a beautiful statue of Lenin stands."

III

Underlying all other arguments for the continuity thesis is, finally, that of a programmatic "straight line" starting with 1917. It is the view, widespread in Soviet-studies literature, that Stalin's wholesale collectivization and heavy industrialization drive of 1929-33, the paroxysmic upheaval he later properly called "a revolution from above," represented the continuation and fulfillment of Bolshevik thinking about modernizing, or building socialism in, Russia. In other words, even if it is conceded that the events of 1936-39 were discontinuous, what about those of 1929-33?

The argument for programmatic continuity rests upon interlocking interpretations of the two previous periods in Bolshevik policy: war communism—the extreme nationalization, grain requisitioning, and monopolistic state intervention effected during the Civil War of 1918-20; and NEP—the moderate agricultural and industrial policies and mixed public-private economy of 1921-28. In its essentials, the argument runs as follows: War communism was mainly a product of the party's original ideological-programmatic ideas (sometimes called "blueprints"), an eager crash program for socialism. These frenzied policies collapsed in 1921 because of the population's opposition, and the party was forced to retreat to the new economic policy of concessions to private enterprise in the countryside and the cities. Accordingly, official Bolshevik policy during the eight years of NEP—and NEP itself as a social-political order—are interpreted in the literature as being "merely a breathing spell," "a holding operation," or "a strategic retreat, during which the forces of socialism in Russia would retrench, recuperate, and then resume their march."

How these two interpretations converge into a single thesis of programmatic continuity between Bolshevism and Stalin's revolution from above is illustrated by one of our best general histories. War communism is presented as "an attempt, which proved premature, to realize the Party's stated ideological goals," and NEP, in Bolshevik thinking, as "a tactical maneuver to be pursued only until the inevitable change of conditions which would make victory possible . . . . " The author can then marvel at Stalin's policies of 1929-33: "It is difficult to find a parallel for a regime or a party which held power for ten years, biding its time until

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it felt strong enough to fulfill its original program."[19] The problem with this interpretation is that it conflicts with much of the historical evidence. As I have discussed these questions at some length elsewhere, I shall be concise.

There are three essential points to be made against locating the origins of war communism in an original Bolshevik program. First, odd as it may seem for a party so often described as "doctrinaire," the Bolsheviks had no well-defined economic policies upon coming to office in October 1917. There were generally held Bolshevik goals and tenets—socialism, workers' control, nationalization, large-scale farming, planning, and the like—but these were vague and subject to the most varying interpretations inside the party. Bolsheviks had done little thinking about practical economic policies before October and, as it turned out, there were few on which they could agree. Second, the initial program of the Bolshevik government, in the sense of officially defined policy, was not war communism but what Lenin called in April-May 1918 "state capitalism," a mixture of socialist measures and concessions to the existing capitalist structure and control of the economy. If this first Bolshevik program resembled anything that followed, it was NEP. And, third, the actual policies of war communism did not begin until June 1918, in response to the threat of prolonged civil war and diminishing supplies, a situation that immediately outdated Lenin's conciliatory "state capitalism."

None of this is to say that war communism had no ideological component. As the Civil War deepened into a great social conflict, official measures grew more extreme, and the meaning and the "defense of the revolution" became inseparable, Bolsheviks naturally infused these improvised policies with high theoretical and programmatic significance beyond military victory. The policies became ideological. Both the evolution of war communism and its legacy in connection with Stalinism require careful study (though the similarities should not be exaggerated). But their origins will not be found in a Bolshevik program of October.

The question of NEP is even more important. Not only were the official economic policies of 1921-28 distinctly unlike Stalin's in 1929-33, but the social-political order of NEP, with its officially tolerated social pluralism in economic, cultural-intellectual, and even (in local soviets and high state agencies) in political life, represents a historical model of Soviet Communist rule radically unlike Stalinism. In addition, the standard treatment of Bolshevik thinking about NEP is more complicated because all scholars are aware of the intense policy debates of the 1920s, a circumstance not easily reconciled with a simplistic interpretation of NEP as merely a programmatic bivouac, or the antechamber of Stalinism.

Tensions inherent in the interpretation are related to secondary but significant conventions in our literature on NEP. The programmatic debates of the 1920s are treated largely as an extension, and in terms of, the Trotsky-Stalin rivalry (or, perpetuating the factional misnomers of the period, "permanent revolution" and "socialism in one country"). Trotsky and the left opposition are said to have been anti-NEP and embryonically Stalinist, the progenitors of "almost every major item in the political program that Stalin later carried out." Stalin is then said to have stolen, or adapted, Trotsky's economic policies in 1929. Having portrayed a "basic affinity between Trotsky's plans and Stalin's actions," these secondary interpretations suggest at least a significant continuity between Stalinism and Bolshevik thinking in the 1920s, and underlie the general interpretation of NEP.[20] They are, however, factually incorrect.

The traditional treatment of the economic debates (we are not concerned here with the

[19]Donald W. Treadgold, *Twentieth Century Russia* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1959), pp. 165, 199, 258.

[20]Alfred G. Meyer, "Lev Davidovich Trotsky," *Problems of Communism*, Nov.-Dec. 1967, pp. 31, 37, and *passim*.

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controversy over Comintern policy or the party bureaucracy) in terms of Trotsky and Stalin bears no relationship to the actual discussions of 1923-27. If the rival policies can be dichotomized and personified, they were Trotskyist and Bukharinist. Stalin's public policies on industry, agriculture, and planning were Bukharin's, that is, pro-NEP, moderate, evolutionary. This was the cement of the Stalin-Bukharin duumvirate that made official policy and led the party majority against the left oppositions until early 1928. During these years, there were no "Stalinist" ideas, apart from "socialism in one country," which was also Bukharin's. If "ism" is to be affixed, there was no Stalinism, only Bukharinism and Trotskyism. This was understood at the time. As the opposition of 1925 complained: "Comrade Stalin has become the total prisoner of this political line, the creator and genuine representative of which is Comrade Bukharin." Stalin was no prisoner, but a willing adherent. He replied: "We stand, and we shall stand, for Bukharin."

Bukharin's economic proposals for modernizing and building socialism in Soviet Russia in the 1920s are clear enough. Developing the themes of Lenin's last writings, which constituted both a defense and further elaboration of NEP as a road to socialism, and adding some of his own, Bukharin became the party's main theorist of NEP. Though his policies evolved between 1924 and 1928 toward great emphasis on planning, heavy industrial investment, and efforts to promote a partial and voluntary collective farm sector, he remained committed to the NEP economic framework of a state, or "socialist" sector (mainly large-scale industry, transportation, and banking) and a private sector (peasant farms and small manufacturing, trade, and service enterprises) interacting through market relations. Even during the crisis of 1928-29, NEP was for the Bukharinists a viable developmental (not static) model, predicated on civil peace, that could reconcile Bolshevik aspirations and Russian social reality.

But what about Trotsky and the left? Though his political rhetoric was often that of revolutionary heroism, Trotsky's actual economic proposals in the 1920s were also based on NEP and its continuation. He urged greater attention to heavy industry and planning earlier than Bukharin, and he worried more about the village "kulak"; but Trotsky's remedies were moderate, market-oriented, or, as the expression went, "nepist." Like Bukharin, he was a "reformist" in economic policy, looking to the evolution of NEP Russia toward industrialism and socialism.

Even Preobrazhensky, the avatar of "super-industrialization" whose fearful arguments about the necessity of "primitive socialist accumulation" based on "exploiting" the peasant sector are often cited as Stalin's inspiration, accepted the hallmark of NEP economics. He wanted to "exploit" peasant agriculture through market relations by artificially fixing state industrial prices higher than agricultural prices. Both he and Trotsky, and the Bolshevik left generally, thought in terms of peasant farming for the foreseeable future. However inconsistent their ideas may have been, neither ever advocated imposed collectivization, much less wholesale collectivization as a system of requisitioning or a solution to industrial backwardness.

The debates between Bukharinists and Trotskyists in the 1920s represented the spectrum of high Bolshevik programmatic thinking, right to left. The two sides disagreed on important economic issues, from price policy and rural taxation to the prospects for comprehensive planning. But unlike the international and political issues that most embittered the factional struggle, these disagreements were limited, falling within the parameters of "nepism," which both sides accepted, though with different levels of enthusiasm.

In fact, the revised Bukharinist program, adopted as the first Five Year Plan at the 15th Party Congress in December 1927 and calling for more ambitious industrial investment as

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well as partial voluntary collectivization, represented a kind of amalgam of Bukharinist-Trotskyist thinking as it had evolved in the debates of the 1920s. When Stalin abandoned this program a year and a half later, he abandoned mainstream Bolshevik thinking about economic and social change. After 1929 and the end of NEP, the Bolshevik programmatic alternative to Stalinism, in fact and as perceived inside the party, remained basically Bukharinist. From afar, the exiled Trotsky leveled his own accusations against Stalin's regime, but his economic proposals in the early 1930s were, as they had been in the 1920s, far closer to, and now "entirely indistinguishable from," Bukharin's.

NEP had originated as an ignoble retreat in 1921, and resentment at NEP economics, politics, and culture continued throughout the 1920s. It was perpetuated in the heroic Bolshevik tradition of October and the Civil War, and probably strongest among cadres formed by the warfare experience of 1918-20 and the younger party generation. Stalin would tap these real sentiments for his Civil War reenactment of 1929-33. But, for reasons beyond our concern here, by 1924 NEP had acquired a general legitimacy among Bolshevik leaders. Not even Stalin dared challenge that legitimacy in his final contest with the Bukharinists in 1928-29. He campaigned and won, not as the abolitionist of NEP or the proponent of "revolution from above," but as a "calm and sober" leader who could make it work. Even after defeating the Bukharin group in April 1929, as NEP crumbled under Stalin's radical policies, his editorials continued to insist that "NEP is the only correct policy of socialist construction," a fiction that was still officially maintained in 1931.

The point here is not to explain the fateful events of 1928-29 but to illustrate that Stalin's new policies of 1929-33, the "great change," were a radical departure from Bolshevik programmatic thinking. No Bolshevik leader or faction had ever advocated anything akin to imposed collectivization, the "liquidation" of the kulaks, breakneck heavy industrialization, and a "plan" that was, of course, no plan at all. These years of "revolution from above" were, historically and programmatically, the birth period of Stalinism. From this first great discontinuity, others would follow.

IV

In treating Stalinism as "full-blown" Bolshevism, and the Soviet 1930s as a function and extension of 1917, the main scholarly disservice of the continuity thesis has been to discourage close examination of Stalinism as a specific system with its own history. I am persuaded by Tucker's argument that essential, even definitive, aspects of Stalinism, including critical turning points in its history and the "excesses," cannot be understood apart from Stalin as a political personality. Nonetheless, the agenda of what remains to be studied by way of broader political, social, and historical context and factors is very large. The present would seem to be a good time to begin this kind of innovative research. In addition to the availability of new materials and longer perspectives, the same questions are now being discussed in the Soviet Union, though for the moment largely by *samizdat* writers.

It is important, first of all, to shed the ahistorical habit of thinking of the Stalinist system as an unchanging phenomenon. The historical development of Stalinism must be traced and analyzed through its several stages, from the truly revolutionary events of the early 1930s to the rigidly conservative sociopolitical order of 1946-53. The 1930s themselves must be divided into periods, including at least the social upheaval of 1929-33, the interregnum of 1934-35, when future policy was being contested in the high leadership, and 1936-39, which witnessed the final triumph of Stalinism over the Bolshevik tradition and the political completion of revolution from above.

The years 1929-33, obscured in both Western and official Soviet theories of

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Stalinism, are especially important. They were the formative period of Stalinism as a system, which presaged and gave rise to much that followed. For example, several characteristic *idées fixe* of full Stalinism, including the murderous notion of an inevitable "intensification of the class struggle," first appeared in Stalin's campaign to discredit all Bukharinist and NEP ideas in 1928-30. Stalin's personal role in unleashing imposed collectivization and escalating industrial targets in 1929, when he bypassed councils of party decision-making, augured his full autocracy of later years. More generally, as Moshe Lewin has shown in a social history of 1929-33, many administrative, legislative, class, and ideological features of the mature Stalinist state took shape as makeshift solutions to the social chaos, the "quicksand society," generated by the destruction of NEP institutions and processes during the initial wave of revolution from above. In Lewin's view from below, the first in our literature and rich testimony to the need for social history, the Stalinist system was less a product of Bolshevik programs or planning than of desperate attempts to cope with the social pandemonium and crises created by the Stalinist leadership itself in 1929-33.[21]

As for subsequent events, it would be a mistake to interpret Stalin's terrorist assault on Soviet officialdom in 1936-39 as a "necessary" or "functional" byproduct of the imposed social revolution of 1929-33. A very different course was advocated by many party leaders, probably a majority, in 1934-35. More telling, there is plain evidence that the purges were not, as some scholars have imagined, somehow rational in terms of modernization, a terrorist Geritol that accelerated the process, weeding out obsolete functionaries, etc. The terror wrecked or retarded many of the real achievements of 1929-36.

[21] "Class, State and Ideology in the *Piatiletka*," in *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1933*, Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, forthcoming).

Nevertheless, there were important linkages between these two great upheavals, and they require careful study. The enormous expansion of police repression, security forces, and the archipelago of forced labor camps in 1929-33 were clearly part of the background and mechanism of 1936-39. There were also less obvious, but perhaps equally important, consequences. Even though forcible wholesale collectivization had not originated as a party, or even collective leadership, policy—the entire party elite, and probably the whole party, were implicated in the criminal and economic calamities of Stalin's measures, which culminated in the terrible famine of 1932-33. Every semi-informed official must have known that collectivization was a disaster, wrecking agricultural production, savaging livestock herds, and killing millions of people.

In official ideology, however, it became obligatory to eulogize collectivization as a great accomplishment of the Stalinist leadership. This bizarre discrepancy between official claims and social reality, uncharacteristic of original Bolshevism, was the first major step in the progressive fictionalization of Soviet ideology. It must have had a profoundly demoralizing effect on party officials, contributing to their apparently meager resistance to Stalin's terror in 1936-39. If nothing more, it implicated them in the cult of Stalin's infallibility, which grew greater as disasters grew worse, and which became an integral part of the Stalinist system.

The few authentic attempts to analyze Stalinism as a social-political system over the years were made mostly by Marxists who offer "new class" or "ruling bureaucracy" theories of the subject. This literature is fairly diverse and features wide-ranging disputes over whether the Stalinist bureaucracy can be viewed as a class or only as a stratum, and of what kind. It also contains valuable material on the sociology of Stalinism, a topic habitually ignored in academic studies, and reminds us that the new administrative strata created in the 1930s strongly influenced the

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nature of mature Stalinism, particularly its antiegalitarianism, rigid stratification, and cultural and social conservatism.

As a theory of Stalinism, however, this approach is deeply flawed. The argument that a ruling bureaucracy-class was the animating force behind the events of 1929-33 makes no sense, logically or empirically. Quite apart from the demonstrable role of Stalin, who is reduced in these theories to a replaceable chief bureaucrat, it remains to be explained how a bureaucracy, which is defined as deeply conservative, would have decided and carried out policies so radical and dangerous as forcible collectivization. Indeed, Stalin's repeated campaigns to radicalize and spur on officialdom in 1929-30, and after, suggest a fearful, recalcitrant party-state bureaucracy, not an event-making one. Nor is it clear how this theory explains the slaughter of Soviet officialdom in 1936-39, unless we conclude that the "ruling" bureaucracy-class committed suicide.

We are confronted here, as elsewhere, with the difficulty inherent in applying Western concepts, whether of the Marxist or modernization variety, to a Soviet political and social reality shaped by Russian historical and cultural tradition. One reason that Western-inspired theories apply so poorly to the Stalinist administrative elites created in the 1930s is that the latter were more akin to the traditional Czarist *soslovie*, an official privileged class that served the state (in this case a resurgent Russian state) more than it ruled the state. Arguably, there is today a Soviet ruling class or bureaucracy that has emancipated itself; but during its formation and agony in the Stalin years, for all its high position and great power over those below, it did not ultimately rule.

Approaches that take into account historical-cultural tradition are therefore essential, though they, too, have sometimes been abused in Western scholarship. Early studies of Stalinism in historical-cultural terms tended to become monocausal interpretations of a revolution (or of Communism) inevitably undone or fatally transformed by history. Instead of viewing tradition as contextual, they treated it as virtually autonomous and deterministic. As Carr has said, however, "every successful revolution has its *thermidor*." But the outcome is not predetermined; it is a problematic admixture of new and old patterns and values, and the nature of this outcome depends upon contemporary social and political circumstances as well. In 1932-33, for example, the Stalinist regime reinstated the internal passport system, once thought to typify Czarism and despised by all Russian revolutionaries. Here was an instance of revived tradition, but also of contemporary policy and crisis, since the retrogression came about in direct response to the social chaos, particularly wandering peasant masses in search of food, of 1929-33.

Cultural approaches can contribute to an understanding of many things, from Stalin's personal outlook and political autocracy, as Tucker has shown, to the social basis of Stalinism as a system. There is, in particular, the important question of Stalinism's popular support in Soviet society, a problem largely ignored and inconsistent with the imagery of a "totalitarian" regime dominating a hapless, "atomized" population through power techniques alone. Though the coercive aspects of the Stalinist system can scarcely be exaggerated, this seems no more adequate as a full explanation than would a similar interpretation of Hitler's Germany.

While its nature and extent certainly varied over time, it seems evident that there was substantial popular support for Stalinism, inside and outside officialdom, from the beginning and through the very worst. Some of this sentiment probably demands no special explanation, though it must be taken into account. Revolution from above was an imposed upheaval, but it required and obtained enthusiastic agents below, even if only a small minority, from the cultural to the industrial and rural fronts. In addition, revolutions from above (a little studied category) are by definition a great expansion

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of the state and its social functions, which means a great proliferation of official jobs and privileges. While many were victimized, many people also profited from Stalinism, and identified with it—not just the "whole system of smaller dictators" throughout Soviet administrative life, but the millions of petty officials who gained opportunity and elevation of status. Even the purges, Medvedev suggests, elicited the support of workers, who saw in the downfall of bosses and bureaucrats "the underdog's dream of retribution with the aid of a higher justice . . . . Impotence seeks the protection of supreme avenging power."[22] And there can be little question that the wartime patriotism of 1941-45 translated itself into considerable new support for the increasingly nationalistic, and victorious, Stalinist system.

Other aspects of Stalinism usually regarded as only imposed from above and without social roots also need to be reconsidered in this light and in longer perspective. The main carriers of cultural tradition are, of course, social groups and classes. In the 1930s, as Lewin has shown, the "petty bourgeois" majority of Russia swarmed into the cities to become large segments of the new working class and lower officialdom, the Drozdovs of tomorrow. In this context, is it sufficient to view Stalinist popular and political culture as merely artifices of censorship? Did not the literature, or the state nationalism, of 1936-53, for example, also have authentic social roots in this newly risen and still insecure officialdom, whose values, self-perceptions, and cultural babittry it so often seemed to reflect?

Finally, a dramatic example of cultural tradition and popular support was the Stalin cult, in some ways the major institution of the autocracy. Stalin promoted it from above, but it found fertile soil, becoming (as many Soviet sources tell us) an authentic social phenomenon. It grew from an internal party celebration of the new leader in 1929 into a mass religion, a "peculiar Soviet form of worship." Neither Bolshevik tradition, the once modest Lenin cult, nor Stalin's personal gratification can explain the popular dimensions it acquired. For this we doubtless must return to older values and customs, to "unwritten mandates borne by the wind." Not surprisingly, these popular sentiments have outlived Stalin himself. □

[22]Roy A. Medvedev, *On Socialist Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1975), p. 346.

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Patricia Cayo Sexton

Ms./Comrade

Participating in the Geneva meetings of the International Socialist Congress last November was a moving experience for me, comparable in its impact to my first encounters with Norman Thomas and with the auto workers' union. The Congress confirmed for me that democratic socialism is not only a great idea but a working reality in virtually every free society in the world.

Preceding the Congress and blending into it were sessions of the International Council of Social Democratic Women (ICSDW)—the ninth since its reconstitution in 1955. Present were about 25 of the 37 affiliated members: the core European countries, plus Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and the U.S.A. from the Americas; Israel and Senegal from the Near East and Africa; New Zealand from the distant East.

Women's status in these diverse nations is naturally varied, so generalities are not easy. By general consensus, the Swedes are out front on women's issues, as on many others. They lead in the representation of women in policy bodies, a crucial index of equality, with women about 27 percent of the Swedish parliament, and 40 percent of the Stockholm city council.

A higher proportion of women work in Sweden than in other countries though a large share of them work part-time (40 percent of all women workers). Sweden also has one of the largest networks of day-care centers to serve working mothers.

The comments of delegates lead me to the hypothesis that the greater the influence of democratic socialism, the more sexually egalitarian a society is likely to be. This thesis needs rigorous exploration, but the Swedish experience offers some validation.

Partnership marriage is a more lively issue in Sweden than in the U.S. To enable fathers to share child-rearing roles, the Swedes have changed maternity benefits insurance into *parenthood* benefits insurance. Seven months of benefits, at 90 percent of earnings, are now provided to either parent after childbirth, and the leave and benefits may be shared by parents as they wish. Working fathers, as well as mothers, also receive benefits when they need to stay home to care for sick children. The Swedes are considering further legislation on partnership marriage, and the six-hour workday, making home life fuller for both men and women, is on the agenda.

The first Social Democratic Women's Conference, held in Stockholm in 1907, voted against special "protective" legislation for women, and socialist women in Sweden and other Nordic countries have opposed such laws ever since. Swedes are now afraid that a general law against sex discrimination might impede positive steps to improve women's status. The Norwegian legislation, however, provides that positive special treatment of either sex because of their inferior status cannot be regarded as discriminatory against the opposite sex. Swedish Conference delegates urged women not to put too much faith in the efficacy of laws against inequalities. Instead, they urged them to organize and politicize women, and to apply constant pressure for equality on the job, in politics, and in the home.

Problems exist even in the best societies, but usually the awareness of them is acute. One Norwegian participant (a male) spoke from experience about privilege and the special needs of working-class women. His own wife, he said, was educated, earned a good income, and worked

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flexible hours; she could go home from work when needed, and she could afford household help. Most women, he pointed out, were less fortunate. Others spoke of the need, and difficulties, of involving working-class women in politics.

A Chilean (also male) said that participation among women in Latin America is the lowest in the world. In Africa and Asia, he said, women without skills can at least go into agriculture. In Latin America, they have nowhere to go, and they are offered no vocational training. In the socialist movement in Chile, he said, many women were involved in politics.

The Chilean also spoke against separate meetings and organizations of socialist women—a controversial issue. In many countries, including Sweden, women are organized into separate leagues, though many also participate in the main political body. These leagues have no counterpart in the U.S. They were typically organized several decades ago to get women active in politics, the assumption being that women would talk and act more freely in women's than in mixed groups. Many women feel that these groups have outlived their usefulness and that women should function only in the main political body. Mrs. Mario Soares, activist wife of Portugal's socialist prime minister, spoke against separate women's groups; and it was reported that the Italian women had decided not to set up a separate department in their party, and that the Swiss had liquidated their group because the men objected to it.

The issue is not simple. Our own way (in the U.S.) is to set up caucuses of women to lobby for women's interests within the main organization. We are so accustomed to such caucuses and so convinced of their legitimacy that few objections are raised. When they languish it is mainly because women grow tired of them.

In other societies, separate women's groups sometimes aid and sometimes impede the progress of women. My own impressions are that these groups *can* be effective caucuses for women, but their militancy is sometimes vitiated by the participation of women who do not actively seek equality with the main organization. These separate groups tend, therefore, to be less militant, demanding, and less focused on women's issues than our own women's caucuses.

The women delegates tended to be party or women's league officials. Many hold elected or appointed posts in their governments. None seemed to be there simply because of their husband's position. Though socialism tends to run in families, nevertheless, the wives of European political figures tend to be much less visible and active than their counterparts in the States. When they *are* visible, it is usually because they are standing in their own light.

Compared with socialist women in the States, these delegates were more working-class in style, more matronly in appearance, and more interested in social and "how to" issues than in socialist doctrine or intellectual analyses. Indeed, their interest in the latter may have been a little too thin at times to probe with sufficient depth the experiences of the diverse societies that were represented. Rather few of the women, I would guess, had academic or "intellectual" backgrounds. The associations of these delegates were more likely to be with other public institutions where appointments depend much more on affiliation with parties that have political power.

MANY WOMEN spoke about the need for greater women's representation in their parties and in the Socialist International (S.I.) Congress. Only about 23 of the approximately 200 Congress delegates were women, and only one women serves on the governing Bureau, a post apparently created for Golda Meir and now occupied by Belgian Irène Pétry, the most vigorous critic in the ICSDW of the exclusion of women from policy posts.

During a Helsinki seminar in 1971, the ICSDW discussed the influence of women with Social Democratic parties and agreed that women's lack of power within S.I. parties reflected the general position of women in society. But for *socialists* this is hardly an excuse. At the seminar's request, the S.I. Congress of Vienna in 1972 adopted "Equality of Women in Politics" as a theme for its agenda (a theme known as the Vienna Resolution). That Congress set up a study group to investigate the position of women within member parties, but the poor response by the parties to the questionnaire later sent out only underscored the sluggish attention given to women's issues.

Many women delegates to the '72 Congress, returning in 1976, spoke about how little progress had been made on behalf of sex equality in the interim. "There is something wrong," one speaker said. "We have been making these demands throughout the history of the socialist movement. Yet we return again to make the same demands."

The Action Program proposed at the conference asked the ICSDW Bureau to "decide on specific

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actions and means needed for the achievement of parity and partnership between men and women in family life, in public life, in the labor force, and in all processes of development and political activities . . . including an investigation into the system of quota representation of women in elected bodies, within parties, in trade unions, in local and national governments, and in international organizations."

Though some parties impose quotas, and though several delegates spoke for a 25 percent female quota in party leadership, voiced opposition was as common as support, and no vote on the issue was taken.

On the lively issue of birth control and abortion, the conference called for "instruction in sexual knowledge for children and young people, appropriate information on control of conception, easier access to contraceptives, and a comprehensive advisory service." The interruption of pregnancy "should no longer be seen as a penal offense, the punishment which has existed hitherto should be replaced by responsible individual decisions of women."

Most European women must cross a sturdy cultural barrier if they are to achieve equality. Perhaps only women who have moved in both European and American political circles can sense the strength of the traditional European male bias against women, one that is present even among socialists and pervasive among intellectuals. Somehow women don't count there. They are not to be taken seriously or looked to for authority. While this is changing, American women can at least be thankful that our society is not as conservative culturally as it is politically.

Then too, some of the traditions of women are not helpful. For what it's worth, it struck me at these meetings, and similar ones I have attended, that the collective behavior of women is different from that of men. Women apparently feel that the primary function of meetings is a didactic one. You schedule speakers, the meetings begin promptly (as does the classroom with the sounding of gongs); then you sit at attention while the speaker instructs you. To leave the room, chat with neighbors, read a paper, rise and walk or stand, sleep—is to risk violating the codes of collective conduct. However tiresome the speeches (and bad ones invariably outnumber the good, even among socialists), one must bear them in passive and polite silence. These codes, derived from the schoolroom, are not literally enforced, but those who depart from them are likely to feel disruptive. Women pride themselves, as they did publicly at the conference, on their punctuality, attendance, and attentiveness.

Men are usually far more interested in the informal than the formal aspects of meetings. Their behavior suggests that they regard most speeches as necessary evils—background Musak rather than the main event. They are attentive when someone with power or real expertise speaks, but only if the speech is brief and pointed. Their main occupation is with negotiations backstage: social exchanges, power relations, relevant information, "business." They do a lot of hand-shaking, introductions, standing around in groups. Women, on the contrary, seldom shake hands and rarely mill around the bar in groups if they can help it. Such behavior is undoubtedly related to the relative powerlessness of women.

Perhaps to avoid the appearance of a caucus, the conference scheduled as many male as female speakers and gave the spotlight to a man, the president of Senegal. It also scheduled three main themes for discussion, including peace and development along with equality.

As for development, it was reported that of the 800 million illiterates in the world, 500 million are women, and that in developing areas, especially Asia and Africa, women are more vulnerable to hunger and poverty than are men. Economic growth and development by itself, many said, does not result in greater equality; therefore, problems of poverty and inequality need to be attacked directly. Senegalese President Leopold Senghor, poet and Ph.D., insisted that the issue of sex equality was more cultural than economic, and that it should be approached through education. (In Senegal, where 80 percent of the population is Moslem, women are equally represented in secondary schools, and monogamy—if selected at marriage—is enforced by law.)

Peace, it would seem, is an issue that mobilizes women as few other issues can. More than half of the Declaration to the S.I. was devoted to support for détente, limitations of arms, balanced disarmament, and condemnation of terrorism, colonialism, racialism. "Real peace, especially as it is understood by the Socialist International, cannot be restricted to the absence of violent conflicts; it includes unequivocally the basic values of freedom and social justice."

Mrs. Soares confirmed the devotion of women to peace; about 80 percent of Portuguese women voted Socialist in the last elections, she said, mainly

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out of despair with colonial wars and the desire for peace at home and safety for their families.

Other evidence of the power of peace came to me on my Irish trip, following the Geneva Congress. There, an astonishing group of peace women have risen from the rubble of Ulster and are leading the most vital and courageous peace army of mainly working-class women that may ever have assembled. Whatever happens there, what we can learn from this movement is that: (1) working-class women *can* be mobilized; (2) they can create gifted, charismatic leaders; (3) they can join in common cause with professional and other women; (4) peace, and an end of violence against their children and menfolk, can activate women as perhaps nothing else can.

In Ireland, the men say: only the women can bring peace. The clergy and the politicians have tried, but only the women offer some hope. Many of these Irish peace women are democratic socialists, implicitly or by explicit choice. (The Social Democratic Labour party, an S.I. member—perhaps the only dominantly Catholic member—has captured about a quarter of the vote in Northern Ireland, though it was launched only five years ago.) The peace women say they will build a decent society, in which all will share, starting from the bottom up.

My Swiss and Irish experiences showed me that there is a vast and untapped reserve of impressive talent out there, in all social strata, among democratic socialist and other women. They should not wait to be asked. As Willy Brandt put it at the Congress, "Women must demand more of others, and they must demand more of themselves." □

Note: The ICSDW Bulletin is published at 88a St. Johns Wood High Street, London NW8 7SJ.

HAVE YOU MOVED?

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Eva Hoffman

est — the Magic of Brutality

Confidence has been at a low ebb lately. Hunger for injections of invigorating optimism runs high. Politicians recognize the need to bolster the national ego and stoke collective hopes. Jimmy Carter repeatedly exhorts us to have greater faith in ourselves, to trust our strength and virtue. At a time when the economy is feeble, America's prestige impaired, and the authority of its government undermined, there are good reasons for public doldrums. Even though it is not clear how faith can be translated into effective action, people respond eagerly to the stimulant of a more energetic and confident vision of themselves.

The need for such stimulants is evident not only in political campaigns but in a number of less exalted cultural phenomena—for example, the current popularity of "Assertiveness Training" and "erhard seminar training" (est). Recently people have flocked to these "trainings," which promise to tone the muscles of their will and teach them strategies for success. The two programs share aims and some techniques, but est is more ambitious, complex, and invidious. This odd phenomenon—part therapy, part didactic instruction, part military drill—has inspired crusading fervor in many of its participants. Detached commentators have responded with amusement, puzzlement, cautious approval, or distress. It is hard to know what to make of est; its rhetoric is often vague and silly, and its numerous inconsistencies baffle analysis. But a movement with some 150,000 followers that has considerable effects on people's attitudes and behavior should not be ignored. In fact, est is neither an impenetrable mystery nor a naive pseudoreligion but a sophisticated scenario for enacting and assuaging disaffections.

The plot of this scenario is not immediately discernible from the program's surface features. The training is given to 250 people at once, during two long, strenuous weekends. Mostly, the participants sit in monotonous rows of straight-backed chairs; they are allowed one food break and

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one bathroom break daily. The simulated ordeal is probably appealing. There is always something cathartic about surviving a test of mettle, perhaps especially to people whose lives contain abstract rather than physical obstacles.

This Spartan format is filled up by a bewildering mixture of events and ideas. The lectures, "processes" and exercises that comprise the training draw on every mind-bending technique fashionable in the last decade. There are sprinklings of Zen, leftovers of Gestalt, fragments of TM. There is no reason why such a loosely scrambled package should have any calculable effect on large numbers of people, and much of this patchwork is probably ornamental—an obligatory bow to the self-improvement gourmets, a way to fill time and offer some practical good advice. The underlying design of the "est experience" becomes intelligible only if one ignores much of this varnish, as the overtaxed minds of the trainees must, and concentrates on the fundamental motifs of the training.

The central subjects of est revealed by this stripping operation are the desires and anxieties about power, control, and acquisition; est rhetoric is permeated by images of contests, battles, conquests, and defeats. Experiences are most often described as "games" played by "rules" in which the two poles of human possibilities are winning and losing. The arena in which games are most avidly played is the sphere of work, and the prizes are distinctly material. Work seems to be the most vital interest of est's customers. In their vignettes they emerge as people more troubled by career *Angst* than by unruly libido, beset by fears of failure, of losing their jobs, and of their superiors. The baits est uses to lure potential participants is a recognition of these anxieties. Guests at the introductory seminar are regaled with stories of successful requests for salary raises, more mature (i.e., parsimonious) management of money, and better jobs acquired by est graduates. In a "process" for feeling in command, the trainees are led through a businessman's fantasy; they are asked to imagine a private office, complete with files of information, an "ability cabinet" from which they can choose any role they please, gadgets like tape recorders and video deck, and the power to summon anybody they wish by pressing a button.

The tacit promise is that two weekends will convert the timid and ineffectual into triumphant executives who "get all the cheese in life," and "make it to the finish line first." In this transformation, the trainees are assisted by flamboyant assurances of their own capabilities. The est philosophy answers the need to win with the myth of the perfect will. Anyone, the myth proclaims, can have anything they want if they want it badly and sincerely enough—because each self is a "cause" rather than an "effect" of its experience. For, according to the est myth, people "choose," absolutely everything they are and everything that happens to them—the amount of energy they have in the morning, the way they are treated by their boss, their success or failure. Thus, to be a winner, you only need to dare greatness; if you lose, it is because you have not embraced victory ardently enough. In this fable of untrammeled freedom nothing intervenes between desire and fulfillment except strength of will. The world is bypassed as cause and short-circuited as obstacle. It becomes a yielding substance, a fluid field for manipulation by the self. "Trying," with its connotations of hesitating or deliberating is looked upon as an inferior mode of action, an indication that the will is not forceful enough to get what it wants by sheer willing.

These overreaching powers are accompanied by "great responsibility." The aim is "Making people responsible for their acts." This would surely be a laudable goal, if it were not for the magically encompassing meaning est attributes to this concept. Real responsibility, like real choice, implies conflict, doubt, the possibility of mistakes and refusal. But total responsibility precludes the exercise of these prerogatives. If somehow you are equally and automatically responsible for your illness, the latest plane crash, or your failure to become Enrico Caruso in spite of a squeaky voice, then you are accountable without your own intention or participation. You can be faulted or approved for the outcome of any given situation even if you have not planned, schemed, or made decisions, because you have, willy-nilly, chosen that outcome.

IT IS PLEASANT to indulge in the fantasy that external circumstances are so many paper barricades, to be knocked down by the potent touch of our desires. But the grandiose conception of volition advanced by est is not only vacuous, it is also surreptitiously cooptive. The will is rendered impotent despite its omnipotence—inflated into an unverifiable mystique of prowess and control, an invisible energy always in operation, but divested of its capacities for initiative, judgment, rejection,

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or affirmation. The self, as the only locus of responsibility, becomes entirely answerable for its satisfactions or discontents. It is pointless to judge or change external circumstances, to gripe, complain, protest, or rebel. The world may be a malleable place, but there is no need to tamper with it; est rhetoric gives expression to this futility in slogans enjoining people to accept their lot, whatever it is. "Choose what is instead of getting stuck in what you want," an est epigram advises.

The covert implications of total choice and responsibility are brought home in the training by means more vivid than innuendo—notably, by the treatment the initiates receive from the person in charge. The essential task of the trainer seems to be to browbeat his audience into submissive and infantile obedience. The trainees are handed a list of "agreements" fit for first-graders and, in a characteristic double-think, are told that they are choosing them voluntarily. Those who transgress the rules (by bringing "illegal" candy and chewing gum, for example) are publicly shamed, and those who question the legitimacy of the agreements are ridiculed or told "this is how it is." The trainees' resistance is weakened and their self-esteem deflated by a barrage of psychological abuse. The trainer insults and vilifies them and pronounces them worthless. No wonder the number of objections and protests dwindles to almost nothing by the second weekend. The alleged power of each individual will is here quite without efficacy. Trainees are confronted with an arbitrary authority without recourse to argument or rationality.

The dialectic between aggrandizement of the will and supression of its power is, it seems to me, basic to est. That est works, at least temporarily, need not be doubted, but most testimonies are unclear about the nature of its effectiveness. It might be possible to see the contradictions of its message as a salutary lesson about freedom within limits and the liberation attained by embracing necessity. But such an interpretation does not capture the tone and the flavor of the est experience—it does not account for the kinds of limits enforced within the training, or the degrading methods used by a martinet. In these respects, est is more akin to the rigors of basic training than to the consolations of philosophy, and the resemblance throws some light on the rationale of est's discomposing methods. In a basic training course that indoctrinates people into the army, the uses of deliberate humiliation are quite transparent. Future combatants have to learn how to yield to commands and squelch their own egos in the interests of collective action. Yet the recruits cannot be reduced to mere passivity since they need to perform at a high pitch of efficiency. To that end, they are spurred on to greater exertions, taught new tasks, praised for competence. The desired result is disciplined and unquestioning action, maximum effort combined with instinctive obedience.

The purposes of est are less narrowly defined than those of basic training, but perhaps, in a not so figurative sense, est also prepares its trainees for combat—the combat of ordinary work life in which most people engage. The est scenario duplicates and intensifies the hierarchical, bounded structure of corporations and other institutions that employ most of est's trainees. The model has rigid limits, but it is empty of moral or imaginative meaning. Its incentives are utterly pragmatic. Within this structure, the trainees are conditioned to the organization game. Their energies and competitive drive are incited by images of success, fantasies of power, visions of financial glory, but their impulses, egos, and personal idiosyncracies are thwarted by sheer coercion. Thus est does not seem to be, as its promotion implies, a preparatory course for executive presidents but the training for a docile rank and file that can hustle and conform at the same time. It is not surprising that the final apotheosis of the training, the "it" for which the trainees wait eagerly, should be the grim revelation that people are no more and no less than machines—automated wills whose only choice is to function more or less efficiently in accordance with somebody else's directives.

Why do people voluntarily submit to a regimen as harsh and demeaning as est? Why has this program supplanted the Esalen cults of the '60s as the remedy to which people turn to relieve their anxieties and realign their psyches? The contrast between est and the earlier popular therapies is revealing. The impetus of encounter groups, and the "human potential" psychology from which they developed, was to uncover and express the essential, "authentic" self, unrestrained by social convention, discipline, or habit. These groups were voraciously intent on insight and sincerity. "Games", "acts," and other self-protective strategies were seen as evasions or repressions. The presumption, not always borne out, behind this insistence on authenticity, was that others—the group—would be sympathetic and supportive, that it was safe to be vulnerable. Moreover, the naked, unmediated self was seen as a vehicle for discovery,

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a measure of human possibilities—and those possibilities could lead to embracing entirely new "life-styles."

But this overweening emphasis on feeling, interior experience, and personally improvised morality may have been a short-lived anomaly, a thin grafting upon the pragmatic American skin. In its less coddling and more instrumental view of identity, est is closer to the mainstream of American psychologies and more germane to its time. For self-realization, est substitutes self-interest; for self-knowledge, skillful moves in the game. Sensitivity, reflection, insight, and exploration of the past are dismissed as ephemera. "Understanding is the booby prize in life," is an Erhard apothegm. Complexities of human relationships are given short shrift. The few "sharing" interludes are used to illustrate the uniformity of people's problems, and the trainer responds to public confessions (made through microphones) curtly or with matter-of-fact acknowledgment. The process of facing other people is called, not "trust" as it might have been at Esalen, but "danger," and it is felt to be so frightening that people dissolve into tears, terror, or catatonic withdrawal in the mere act of looking another person in the eye.

In the encouragement of competitive behavior, in the hostility of the group, and in the barrenness of est's affective and moral vocabulary, there is an implicit shortage of goods—both material goods that have to be scrambled for and psychological supplies that, in greater abundance, might allow for more sympathy and generosity. The simulated shortage and the real economic insecurities est mirrors may in large part account for the differences in the therapies popular a decade ago and now. When, for a brief time, affluence seemed assured, easy to gain, and even boring, people could turn their attention toward such psychological luxuries as alternative life-styles or self-fulfillment. In a recession economy, the quest for emotional extras becomes too expensive. People need all of their energies to maintain what they have to stay even. No wonder that they respond to therapies that endorse materialistic incentives, arouse the will to act, and urge the virtues of unprotesting discipline. "Let it all hang out," encounter groups told us. "Get your act together—and toe the line," is the lesson of est.

The subterfuge involved in preaching the familiar and bracing creed of individualism might perhaps be seen as a saving illusion, which makes it possible for people to adjust to circumstances they have to accept anyway. But the charade of power that est offers its trainees is in fact insidious. It engenders a false equanimity and deflects attention from the abdication of individuality; it instills a gerry-built confidence distracting from legitimate discontent. The authoritarian training relieves people from the complexities of questioning, uncertainty, and doubt. This relief from the dilemmas of freedom might be felt as temporarily liberating, but it exacts too high a price in the surrender of skeptical intelligence and the kind of thoughtfulness that might lead to a truer estimate of individual powers and a more genuine social responsibility. □

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Rose Laub Coser

Changes in Family Structure

HERE TO STAY: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, by Mary Jo Bane. New York: Basic Books. 195 pp. $11.50.

Conservatives panic at the thought of the demise of the American family; utopians call for its abolition. Both seem to agree that equality for women is not compatible with family life. Countering such conceits, Mary Jo Bane, a feminist, presents us with a persuasive argument that, as in the past, changes in family structure do not threaten the family as an institution. She argues that equal rights for women at work and in the home are compatible with family life. Nor is it threatened by smaller households, a larger incidence of divorce, and women's work outside the home, three factors often taken as indices of the "crumbling of the American family," with warnings of the massive neglect of children.

Bane exposes the myth that the extended family has prevailed in the past. In the U.S., the nuclear family has always been the modal type, and the change that has occurred is smaller than nostalgia would make us believe. In Rhode Island in 1875, for example, 18 percent of the families included live-in relatives. This compares with 7.5 percent of American families in 1970. And if households are smaller because of lower fertility, argues the author, children are not necessarily worse off. They may have some disadvantages if they have fewer sisters and brothers, yet under these conditions they are faster in mental and physical development and tend to think better of themselves.

Divorce is the scareword to those who sound the alarm. Glick and Norton of the Census Bureau predict that 30 to 40 percent of marriages by women born between 1940 and 1944 will end in divorce. This contrasts with 12 percent of the marriages contracted by women born in 1900-1904. Despite this dramatic change, Bane shows that the vast majority of divorced people remarry. She further calls attention to the fact that rising divorce rates don't necessarily mean more intolerable marriages; they may mean that we no longer tolerate intolerable marriages because we have alternatives.

But Bane's most telling argument comes when she looks at family disruptions from the vantage point of the children involved. Rather than asking how many couples split, she asks how many children experience the loss of a parent. From this perspective children largely are better off today than they were in the past when more of them were orphaned at an earlier age, and when, owing to higher fertility, a larger proportion of children were born to older parents. In addition, children of divorced or widowed parents have increasingly continued to live with one parent instead of being sent to relatives or orphanages. By 1975, despite rising divorce rates, only 2.7 percent of children under 14 lived with neither of their parents.

The real *bête noire* to those who worry about family stability is women's work. Of married women with children under six, 40 percent were in the labor force in 1974 in contrast to 12 percent in 1950. But again Bane looks at this from the standpoint of the children and asks how much less time working mothers spend with their children than do nonworking mothers:

> [A] national study done in 1965 found that the average nonworking mother spent 1.4 hours per day on child care. A study of 1,300 Syracuse families in 1967-68 showed that the average nonworking mother

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spent 66 minutes a day in physical care of all family members and 48 minutes in other sorts of care on a typical weekday during the school year. The same Syracuse study found that the difference in the amount of time working and nonworking mothers spend exclusively with their children is exceedingly small.

Whether mothers stay home or not, the most important change that has been introduced in the lives of children in the last quarter of a century is television. The average sixth-grade child watches TV about 31 hours a week. This contrasts with an average of 19 hours children spend in school. A full-time mother does not seem to be needed as much as in the past—just as, one might add to Bane's argument, a full-time cook or housewife is not needed when the food industry supplies goods formerly produced at home. There is no evidence that having a working mother per se has harmful effects on children. Where such effects are shown, the author wisely remarks, they occur in the context of poverty or other family difficulties. There is some evidence that "where the mother's employment is not a symptom of deeper family trouble, children seem not to turn out any differently from other children."

In Bane's own words, "demographic materials suggest that the decline of the family's role in caring for children is more myth than fact." She also shows that 95 percent of Americans marry at least once, that married men and women report more happiness than do singles, and that marriage is generally beneficial to people. Family life benefits men more than women: married men are in better physical and emotional health and are more successful than the single, divorced, or widowed, and their death rates are lower. While these advantages accrue to women as well, they accrue to men to a much larger extent.

AS I READ BANE as a sociologist, she seems to say that we cannot deduce from individual dissolutions of marriages that the family as a social institution has been weakening. I agree with her, for I am convinced that as long as children have at least one parent, they have someone on whom they have a legitimate claim—whether or not mother is home all day.

It is not a mother's continuous presence (which may do the child more harm than good) that is needed, but the continuous conviction that she can be called upon. Just as there can be a "false presence" on the part of a nonworking mother, so there can be a genuine emotional presence on the part of a working mother. And just as traditionally there has been much false presence or real absence on the part of fathers in nondisrupted families, there can be—increasingly so with the change in sex roles—father's emotional presence whether he is at work or at home.

I think the notion of "claim" helps Bane's argument. First, it explains much of the desirability of the family as an institution—as against adults simply living under one roof. It is not just that family members protect each other, adults and children alike, and are a source of mutual support; it is that family members have a legitimate claim upon each other for such support, in all aspects of their lives together. This is especially important, as Bane also notes, in a society otherwise consisting of segmented relationships. In the second place, the notion of "claim" would make her avoid such Pollyannaish statements as "Since single-parent families seem to live on their own whenever they can afford to, they must see advantages to the arrangement." In fact, single parents do not have a *claim* on relatives to be taken into their households, and thus they "prefer" to live by themselves. People learn to want to do what they have to do.

Bane does not seem to pay sufficient attention to the fact that even though kin do help each other out, it is becoming more and more a matter of *choice*, since the obligation to do so has lost its firmness. To recognize that there is today more of a breakdown of reciprocities between generations would not detract from her main point about the stability of the family as an institution. It is not necessary to downplay, as Bane does, the change that has occurred in the living arrangements of the aged. To explain the fact that children do not take their parents into their households with the regularity they did in the past, we do not have to choose between Bane's explanation that either there may be "less need" for this or that American children are "more wicked" than in the past. We must recognize that with the strengthening of boundaries between generations, with the increasing financial independence—alleged or real—of the aged and the downplaying of tradition, old people today don't have the *claim* on their children they used to have. Reciprocities between the generations have been weakening. Just as young people whose marriages got disrupted through divorce do not have a firm claim on their parents to be taken back into the parental family, so the aged whose marriages have been disrupted through death don't have a claim on the next generation to be taken into the younger household. If many of

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the aged "prefer" not to live with their children's families, it is because they have learned to choose an alternative more or less imposed by the weakening of generational bonds.

The individualistic bias of Bane's philosophy is also present now in her treatment of child-care centers or other solutions that would make maternity less restricting for women. Bane rejects day-care centers, as she rejects requirements that employers treat maternity as temporary disability, grant nonprejudicial maternity and child-care leaves, or that the government subsidize these. Her reason is not one of principle or philosophy, but rather economic efficiency. She argues that all these cases involve too much cost that would have to be borne by the public either as taxpayers or as consumers. Instead, she favors arrangements between spouses in contractual form that get the support of the law, specifying the division of labor upon which the marital partners will agree, or the various alternatives they may envisage to divide the burdens of child care equally between them.

I believe that such laws would be tremendously helpful in providing the social support needed for changes in familial division of labor to assure equality between men and women. For without such changes child-care centers would not accomplish all that much; mother would still pick up the children and take them there, and she would still be responsible for taking care of illness or for securing the necessary household help. Under conditions of inequality in the home, pressing for child-care centers or similar supportive institutions would only emphasize that it is the woman, and not the man, who has to get relief from parenting.

YET I BELIEVE that Bane is mistaken in rejecting child-care centers. If it is true, as she also shows, that women are happier at work than in the household, it is worth helping create conditions that make happier mothers, for they will make happier children as well. Further, while children need mothers and fathers for emotional growth several hours a day and a day or two a week, we still don't know what the best balance is between emotional closeness at home and professional care. Surely not all mothers are good mothers, just as not all fathers are good fathers. Most are partly good and partly not so good. And frustrations for reasons of being "cooped up" or the feeling that one has forfeited one's opportunities do not improve the quality of mothering.

I would like to argue strongly for public support, even if nonparents will thereby subsidize parents and if mothers who choose to stay home will thereby subsidize those who do not. A society endures costs in order to implement its values. Just as the public pays for social security and should pay for health for all, those who do not have children should help pay for those who do. The advantages accruing from professional care of children, especially those whose homes are ridden with poverty or other problems, and from having a happy mother at night and on weekends, will also come to those who don't have children, just as a higher educational level profits those who do and those who do not have school-age children. Child-care centers would help alleviate the problems that beset the poor and single-parent families and could lead to a reduction in juvenile crime, child abuse, and battered children. But in the middle and upper class also (which could afford to pay for child-care centers, and should) mothers who have a free choice of careers would be happier, in better mental condition, hence make happier families. This cannot be done without child-care centers, and parental leave would help as well (in Sweden both parents are given seven months to be divided between them, at 90 percent pay). Such support would help reduce family tensions and perhaps even the divorce rate.

Working mothers generate work not only for child-care center personnel, but for other services as well. And this also benefits society. (But please let's not staff neighborhood play groups, as Bane suggests, with "elderly volunteers"!) Men may well come to realize that their own well-being is well served by having a working wife. Jacob Mincer and Solomon Polachek (in the *Journal of Political Economy* for March/April 1974) calculated that the cost per year for the average woman with college education who does not work over a five-year period is almost $17,000; for the woman with less than high school education it is almost $8,000. Lest I be accused of implying that "money is more important than caring for children," let me hasten to add that such amounts buy a lot of leisure and togetherness for a family!

Even if in places it calls forth some disagreements, Bane's book is thought-provoking and refreshing. It is a pleasure to see the feminist stance put forward with such poised reasoning. I assume that the author is not responsible for the dust jacket. It shows the photograph of a father and a mother, gloriously happy, holding on their laps two equally happy children—father a toddler boy,

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mother a preschool girl. The little boy looks into the distance and points ahead with his finger; the little girl sits back, leaning against mother's bosom. Both mother and father clearly focus their expressions of delight and hope on the little boy. *Plus ça change, plus ça reste la même chose.* □

Murray Hausknecht

Black Ballots, Black Protest

BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1964, by Steven F. Lawson, New York: Columbia University Press, 474 pp. $20 (cloth); $6.95 (paper).
STRATEGIES FOR FREEDOM: THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF BLACK PROTEST, by Bayard Rustin. Columbia University Press. 82 pp. $5.95.

Jimmy Carter was able to recapture the South for the Democrats because he was the overwhelming favorite of the black voters. Quite probably they also made the difference between victory and defeat in some key northern states. Carter, then, may very well be the first American president who owes his election to blacks, and this marks the end of an era in American history. The appearance of the two books under consideration here signify an equivalent symbol. The conventional historical monograph is a signal that there is an intelligible pattern of events distinguishable from those that preceded it and those to come. Similarly, the analysis of the contemporary civil rights movement by one of its leading strategists indicates that those within the movement, the historical actors, share with the professional historian the sense that an era has ended.

Immediately following the Civil War it seemed as if the ex-slave had achieved the formal rights of citizenship, that is, the necessary condition for eventually becoming part of the society. For a brief period most adult southern blacks were able to vote and elect legislators in the former Confederate states, but by the last decade of the century southern blacks were effectively disenfranchised by a combination of legal mechanisms and brute intimidation. The loss of voting rights was part of a series of actions leading to the segregation of southern life.

Segregation meant that the disjunction between the blacks' formally free status and their actual status made their situation more galling than ever. It is one thing to be a slave and have your humanity denied; it is perhaps a more bitter thing to be proclaimed free and still be denied human status. The other side of the coin was that while the maintenance of White Supremacy committed whites to measures subverting the freedom and dignity of black people, each episode of violence and each new legal device—poll taxes, literacy tests—drew attention to the legal and moral codes that were being violated. A moral uneasiness among whites was the obverse of the bitterness among blacks, and the only remedy for both was the integration of the blacks into the society.

Segregation also meant, as it still means, that opportunities open to others were closed to blacks. To overcome the barriers to jobs, education, and housing would require power, and the vote was a critical part of that needed power. It is possible to argue that Americans place too much emphasis on the right to vote; that we tend to believe once a group achieves voting rights a significant change in its circumstances automatically follows. Whatever the validity of that position, it ignores some important functions of the vote. For individuals the right to vote is a public recognition of their status as citizens; it is an affirmation, and one that is crucial for minority groups, that they are indeed part of the society. Nor ought one to underestimate the satisfaction of these same minorities when a candidate who clearly identifies with their interests, whether a member of the same group as the voters or not, is elected—the more oppressive the group's situation the greater the satisfaction derived from an electoral victory.

For southern blacks there must be a kind of satisfaction unknown to others in merely entering a voting booth. Some measure of the difficulties experienced in getting to that point is found in the fact that the first suit to overthrow the legality of the white primary began in 1924, and it took a full 20 years before the Supreme Court finally killed the

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institution. It took another 10 years of bitter fighting to pass the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

The southern politician, Lawson says, "instinctively understood that enfranchisement would crack the white-supremacist edifice. When blacks obtained and cast ballots in large numbers, they would shatter the myths perpetuated by whites about Negro apathy and contentment." If the fight against enfranchisement was to preserve the practical benefits of White Supremacy, the battle for suffrage in Congress also had its pragmatic aspect. A major consideration behind the introduction of a civil rights bill in 1956 was the calculation by Herbert Brownell, Eisenhower's Attorney-General and most trusted political adviser, that the Negro vote could swing that year's congressional elections in favor of the Republicans. (Given this kind of thinking it should suprise no one when reminded that Richard M. Nixon had a very good reputation among civil rights groups; one that, quite typically, he blew in 1960 when he remained silent while John Kennedy telephoned his sympathy and offer of assistance to Martin Luther King in a Georgia jail.) Suffrage bills, Republican and Democratic alike, had to be "trimmed to suit a variety of political figures . . . . These facts of political life meant that the reformers . . . had to accept bargains that more potent political brokers negotiated."

The governing political principle had not changed much from Rustin's description of the way it operated during the New Deal: "Whatever his own sentiments might have been, FDR's political impulse was to ignore the complaints of blacks for fear that any positive action would divide the Democratic party and deal a mortal blow to his domestic program." That impulse was effectively countered in 1941 by A. Philip Randolph's organization of The March on Washington. Faced with "mass action," Roosevelt acceded to the demands for the creation of a Fair Employment Practices Commission. Similarly, the pace of suffrage reform stepped up in the '60s as a result of the civil rights movement. That is to say, without the movement the enfranchisement of blacks would have been delayed even longer.

The civil rights movement was sparked by the 1954 Supreme Court decision and Mrs. Rosa Parks's refusal to move to the back of the bus. Her courageous act was the immediate cause of a sustained, successful political action by an entire black community and the emergence of Martin Luther King as a national leader. The Montgomery bus boycott demonstrated that blacks could unite for political and economic ends once they knew the federal government would not leave them entirely at the mercy of local forces. King's leadership was crucial, of course, but Rustin reminds us that King's success was not simply a matter of "charisma." He was a black Baptist preacher and the black church was "the only institution indigenous to the black community"; the movement rose out of the structure and culture of the black community. King and his fellow preachers, who eventually became the leadership of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, were able to evoke the courage and perseverance of ordinary people in the face of white retaliation, because leaders and followers were linked by real communal bonds. The culture of the black community also legitimated the "almost complete autonomy" of the preacher within his church, and that autocratic structure, carried over into the SCLC, was highly functional for a movement facing one crisis after another.

THE "high moral tone" of that leadership also helped. King's moral rhetoric, combined with the ideology of nonviolence and the skillful exploitation of the attacks on peaceful demonstrators, took advantage of the moral uneasiness experienced by Americans. At the same time the movement suggested a way of alleviating discomfort; support of civil rights legislation could relieve moral distress. For the morally calloused who were nonetheless frightened of the social and political implications of "mass action," support of the civil rights legislation seemed to be a way to defuse the situation. What Rustin says about the 1963 March on Washington applies in significant degree to the movement as a whole. "The March succeeded because it was the product of sound political philosophy and intelligent, responsible strategy." It insisted on nonviolence and its "program was not utopian; it could readily be translated into legislation."

That legislation allowed the power of the government to be invoked by blacks in their struggle to become part of the society. That is, if the movement failed to achieve its ultimate goal of integration, it succeeded in the not inconsiderable task of providing the necessary means and conditions for future success.

The failure of the movement to go beyond the point it reached in 1965 owed much to its successes. The confrontation between the Mississippi

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Freedom Democratic party (MFDP) and the movement leadership at the 1964 Democratic party convention captures some important difficulties the movement encountered. The MFDP challenged the regular Mississippi delegation because blacks had not been permitted to participate in its selection. The challenge was met by a Lyndon Johnson-inspired compromise to seat two Freedom Democrats and a promise to outlaw discriminatory practices in the party. King and Rustin, aided by Walter Reuther and Joseph Rauh, urged acceptance of the compromise: ". . . when you are working within the political system, you can no longer deal in absolute terms. You must be prepared to compromise, to make and accept concessions." Thus Rustin, then and now.

The MFDP represented the triumph of political action under the worst possible conditions; a political effort, mainly by young people, which had cost the lives of three of them. Their success was partly the result of a rising social and racial consciousness; a commitment to a social and psychological black identification stimulated by the movement. The Freedom Democrats came to the convention animated by a hope that for the first time since Reconstruction the blacks of Mississippi could significantly control their own political fate, a hope that would not have been possible without the movement. It was too much to ask of those sharing this hope that they recognize the hard requirements of "working within the political system." (In the years to come Vietnam would make the attraction of "working within the political system" even more problematic to many young people who had been awakened to political consciousness by the rhetoric and deeds of a Rustin and a King.) As all social movements founded on the principles of freedom and equality tend to do, the civil rights movement created the conditions for its own fragmentation. The movement fostered the emergence of local political interests that sometimes ran counter to the broader, long-term interests of all blacks. The inherent contradictions were recognized by King who is quoted by Lawson as saying to a Freedom Democrat about the compromise, "Being a Negro leader, I want you to take this, but if I were a Mississippi Negro, I would vote against it."

The difficulty was not simply the emergence of the centrifugal forces of parochial politics and the desperate ideologies of black separatism. With civil rights legislation passed, the movement had to concentrate its energies on other goals. These were broad social and economic goals relating to income, employment, skills, and education, and the problems of urban ghettos. These goals are not easily "translated into legislation," and when the attempt is made, as in Johnson's Great Society programs, they are not sympathetically received as solutions to moral unease. The necessary strategies and tactics are also less easily specified. The tasks are made all the more difficult because they involve goals that can only be attained by blacks and whites acting together in a society still bitterly divided along racial lines.

What remains to be done and the difficulties to be overcome are spelled out by Rustin in his closing pages. He reminds us in his conclusion that "the issues of economic democracy confront us still. The struggle to achieve a more humane economic order will not be fought along racial lines but will be defined by broader class realities." If in the next ten years we move a little way toward that more humane society, it will be in part the result of the gains made ten years ago by the civil rights movement. □

Lewis Coser

Sweet Hopes of the Future Unmasked

UTOPIA AND REVOLUTION, by Melvin J. Lasky. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 726 pp. $35.

Condorcet, the great exemplar and martyr of the French Revolution, wrote under the shadow of death that "the friend of humanity can enjoy unmixed pleasure only by surrendering to the sweet hopes of the future." Melvin Lasky, editor of *Encounter*, here attempts to unmask all those who think like Condorcet that it is one of the glories of man's estate to dream of a better future. He wishes to "document" that all such sweet dreams necessarily end up in nightmares.

This belated contribution to the end-of-ideology thesis is conceived as a grand attack on all utopian thought. Dante and Joachim of Flores, Giordano Bruno and Milton, Comenius, Thomas More, as

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well as their numerous intellectual descendants: all were victims of a utopian revolutionary vision. The basic elements of this vision "were fury and bewitchment—the fury comprising an all-encompassing indictment of the evil of the old ways of living and believing, the bewitchment amounting to a transporting vision of the politics of paradise which would issue in society's salvation."

What Rose L. Coser once wrote about another book applies to this one as well: it has not been written, it has been assembled. Lasky piles quotes upon quotes, cites literally hundreds of authorities in the manner of medieval scholastics, and ends up with a concoction that is as undigestible as it is unreadable. Two pages, taken at random (58-59), mention or quote from the following: Darwin, Keynes, Max Weber, Marx, Nietzsche, Spengler, Toynbee, Kierkegaard, Proudhon, Eliade, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Karl Loewith. Lasky has gathered file cards upon file cards with obsessive diligence, and he now disgorges all these *Lesefruechte* in one inchoate heap. There is no structure to this work, no discernible progression of argument, only a wearisome succession of citations. Originally gathered as means to a rhetorical end, the file cards have gained functional autonomy; having escaped from the author's control, they perform a ghostly dance of their own, dominating the work of the author much like commodities in Marx's vision came to dominate the men who created them. There is, however, one redeeming feature: keep the book on your shelves right next to the *Thesaurus,* it is a splendid source for usable quotations. But remember its price.

WHAT THEN has Lasky wrought? Not much more than a compendium of instances meant to show that generous dreamers have always bewitched mankind into believing that the burdens of Adam's curse might yet be lifted from the shoulders of suffering humanity. As it turns out in Lasky's vision, even those utopian rebels or revolutionary thinkers who were not sick, sick, sick themselves have only served to accentuate the ills of their society. Beware of the evils of extremist thought, he counsels the reader, never leave the "high middle ground" of incremental reform, stick to pedestrian routines of politics and thought, recognize that "all change is piecemeal" (p. 166), lest you stray into the quagmire of the politics of the impossible.

Lasky wants to be taken seriously as an intellectual historian, but he is most of the time nothing but an embittered polemicist. A few examples will suffice. *Dissent* editor Michael Walzer turns out in these pages to be "a young Marxist commentator who has turned from a diet of Lenin and Trotsky to John Milton and John Knox." The author avers that "when the revolution is prized as the perfect method for the perfect result, it guarantees paradise at a stroke." Tell this to Lenin or Trotsky, to Saint Just or Danton, even to Chairman Mao—all men who agonized in public as well as in private about the enormous distance still to be traversed between the revolutionary upheaval and the stable institutionalization of the revolutionary achievements!

Lasky is in his true element when he can point out how many among erstwhile utopians, revolutionaries, or root-and-branch reformers came to end up in their later life as guardians of the proprieties of the establishment. In his eyes, the enthusiastic poet Wordsworth, who once believed that it was a "joy to be alive" in the age of the French Revolution, is only redeemed when as an old man he wrote of the "pestilence of revolution, impiously unbound." When he can quote Marchmont Nedham, an erstwhile Cromwellian revolutionary, who later wrote, "'Tis a damn'd Cause, that damns the Laws, And turns all up-side down," Lasky can hardly contain his admiration. How sweet to Lasky to be able to report the subsequent careers of some erstwhile Levelers:

> Winstanley becomes a Quaker quietist...the restless radical conspirator, John Wildman, is knighted by King William for his sterling services as postmaster general; John Rogers abandons agitation for a career in medicine and dedicates a treatise . . . to Clarendon, whom an entire generation would once have considered the very sign of the Beast.

Though More, alas, did not recant, Lasky is still happy to be able to report that in one of his late works, troubled and embittered about the temper of the times, More could write that he would be prepared "to [burn his own books and those of Erasmus] with mine own hands, rather than folke should (though through their own fault) take any harm of them." In Lasky's view it is better to recant than to persist, but it is far better still to become a complete renegade. Max Scheler once pointed out that the renegade has as his chief goal to "engage in a continuous chain of acts of revenge on his spiritual past." Such are the types for whom Lasky reserves his admiration!

Lasky makes no attempt to explain the emergence of utopian ideas in terms of the ills of the

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age, or the hatefulness of social conditions. Unconcerned about the unhinged times in which utopian longings typically arise, he concentrates attention upon what he feels are unhinged minds. He does not follow Frank Manuel when the latter writes that "Utopia provides what men most keenly miss," that "Some Utopian dreams express so forcefully a poignant longing of masses of men that their words reverberate for centuries." Lasky averts his glance from the pain and frustration of troubled men and women so as to be able to defame those who attempted, often rather clumsily to be sure, to assuage human misery.

This, in my opinion, is a mischievous book. It will, however, do little harm since very few readers will have the fortitude to wade through its author's formless prose. □

David Bensman

The Problem of Scarcity

SCARCITY: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, by Gus Tyler. New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co. 245 pp. $8.95

Is scarcity inevitable in post-OPEC America, where natural resources are in ever shorter supply and the terms of trade continue to deteriorate? It is not inevitable, Gus Tyler argues. High unemployment and reduced purchasing power are the results of our monopolistic economic system and our inegalitarian social structure. A program of radical, pragmatic social reform could inaugurate a new era of economic growth and enable America to begin solving its urban and energy problems, improve health care, and provide decent housing for all. Specifically, Tyler proposes renewed antitrust action, substantial tax reform, and increased federal planning and investment to stimulate those economic sectors the major corporations neglect.

The ideological terrain is familiar; in many ways *Scarcity* is a reaffirmation of the left Keynesian doctrine that many liberals and radicals were quick to abandon in the minidepression of 1974. But Gus Tyler is original and adventuresome; his book is not the least bit stale. Replete with significant data from a wide variety of government and private reports, *Scarcity* takes up OPEC, multinational corporations, agricultural policy, the decline of northern cities, and he subsumes them all in a persuasive, coherent framework.

Moreover, Tyler achieves an unusual feat; his economic analysis is readable. Indeed, *Scarcity* is probably the first book suitable for workers' education classes to appear since the Sextons' *Blue Collars and Hard Hats.*

Unfortunately the first three chapters are weak: Tyler gives a historical overview that is too sweeping, scattered and abstract, though never simplistic. But then the book shifts into high gear; as it turns to contemporary problems, the writing becomes forceful and specific, alternately ironic and angry.

I disagree with some of Tyler's analyses. He still advocates the "New Cities" proposal of the Johnson years, arguing that if the federal government were to stimulate the construction of a large number of cities of moderate size, these could take some of the burden off the deteriorating cities of the North, permitting the latter to achieve a new equilibrium at reduced population levels. A reason to be skeptical: even at our present slow rate of population growth, future housing needs far outstrip any conceivable "New Cities" program. If the federal government were to build up 100 cities of 100,000 people each in the next 30 years, that would provide new housing for only 10 million people. Given a population increase several times that number, would there really be room for redistribution of very many urban dwellers? And if there were redistribution, working- and middle-class people, rather than the poor, would be most likely to settle the new towns; this would exacerbate, rather than solve, current problems. The deterioration of New York, Detroit, and Newark can only be solved by federal programs directly

(continued on page 224)

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IQ and Equality:
On the Jensen Debate

Editors:

Philip Green's discussion of Arthur Jensen's work [in the Spring, Summer, and Fall 1976 issues of *Dissent*] does not lead the reader to a very accurate understanding of what this work is about. A proper summary of it would proceed as follows: Large and socially consequential differences between individuals in learning achievement and IQ are strikingly evident, and we would like to know how to go about to effectively reduce these differences. One might begin by seeking to elucidate the etiology of these differences, and a first step would be to divide the possible causative agents into the two categories, environmental or genetic, such as is routinely done by geneticists in tracing the etiology of various diseases.

Having successfully made such a determination, by measuring the "heritability" of the trait of interest, one could greatly narrow one's search for a beneficial therapy. (See my article, "Sense and Nonsense about the Jensenist Heresy," in the *Alternative: An American Spectator*, April 1976.) If the heritability measurement suggested an environmental causation, one would then seek to tease out from the total environment the particular factors that caused the condition, and to eliminate them as a cause of pathology. If, instead, genetic factors appeared as the main causes of the condition, then careful study of their specific functioning might well suggest a therapy that could alleviate the condition and that would, of course, be supplied selectively to those particular persons needing it. In this way we would, in effect, diversify (rather than render more uniform) the environment to suit each individual. Well-known instances of this are surgical repair of "innate" defects in the newborn, such as harelips or heart abnormalities, blood replacement in Rh-incompatible babies, insulin and dietary treatment of genetically conditioned diabetes, and dietary control of genetically caused phenylketonuria. All of these are instances of purely *environmental* treatments that alleviate the effects of *genetic* abnormalities, and they make the point very clearly that the finding of a genetic etiology for a given ailment does not carry with it the slightest presumption that it would necessarily be harder to treat through appropriate environmental means than if the ailment were caused by an environmental factor. After all, many conditions now thought to be largely environmentally induced—such as cancer—are notoriously difficult to prevent through control of the causative environmental factors, in part because there are simply so many potentially carcinogenic substances—most of them only weakly so—widely diffused in the milieu that positive identification of any one of them is difficult, and elimination of any one of them would have only a slight effect, if any, on overall cancer rates. Clearly, whether investigations disclose an environmental or genetic etiology is by itself entirely neutral as concerns the ease of achieving egalitarian goals; either result is equally likely to lead to ways of diminishing invidious differences.

This approach can be directly applied to identifying the causes of differences in IQ. This is just what Jensen has done. His conclusion is, as is well-known, that genetic factors rather than existing environmental disparities are the main causes of these differences, and his program for dealing with them in a way that would reduce their magnitude stresses, naturally enough, educational diversity suited to each person's needs.

Because the implications of this suggestion have been so widely misunderstood, it's worth spelling out a few specific ideas. It is reasonable to imagine, for example, that individuals might differ for genetic reasons in their *rates* of mental maturation—that is, of passage through Piaget's several stages of mental "readiness" to grasp certain concepts and skills. If so, then an educational system that presents new information to each child in a timed progression carefully related to when, regardless of chronological age, this individual child is actually "ready" to receive it, has a greater potential for reducing differences in ultimately realized scholastic achievement than a system that ignores such differences and forces all children, "ready" or not, into a uniform learning sequence. Or, children could differ in the *rates* at which they could process and absorb new information. Once again, a school system that takes such individual variations into account—say, by permitting time for more repetitions for those needing it without overtones of "fault" or "dumbness" or "failure"—should have a better chance of decreasing differences in achievement than a system that expects all its students to learn at exactly the same rates. Or, children might differ, as Jensen has suggested, in their relative aptitudes for learning in associational or conceptual modes. Since much basic information can be taught in *either* conceptual ("new" math, phonetic reading) *or* associational ("old" math, "look-say" reading) modes, an educational system that makes either approach available to every student depending on whichever is in fact most effective for him will, as before, probably be far superior in narrowing differences in achievement as compared with a system that uses exclusively one or the other mode. These are only a few examples of the ways that wise educators could readily accommodate, through purely *environmental* means, variations in learning styles that could well have purely genetic causes, and in this way greatly reduce the differences in overall educational achievement that would otherwise result.

It is worth underlining that attempts to impose a uniform educational structure upon a genetically variegated population of this sort would no more achieve, however well-meant, the *outcome* of lessened differences

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than a policy of absolutely uniform medical treatment of all newborn babies—including those with harelips, Rh-incompatible blood, or phenylketonuria—would lessen the severity of *these* differences; it would likely magnify them instead. The lesson is that the true etiology of such differences has an existence that is wholly independent of whether or not we have correctly diagnosed them, and policies based on an incorrect understanding run the grave risk of exacerbating rather than decreasing these differences. Thus, the matter of correctly identifying whether differences in IQ are caused mainly by existing environmental or genetic variations is *an absolutely essential step for the successful realization of egalitarian goals!* The normative posture of egalitarianism should, therefore, operate *only* in choosing what policies to follow *after* the purely empirical question of environmental vs. genetic causation has been decided.

We can now summarize very briefly the core of "jensenism." He contends that the evidence presently available shows that genetic differences are far more significant than existing inequalities in the social environment in accounting for individual variations in learning patterns. Therefore, schools must not treat these differences as superficial and thus easily ignored for educational purposes; instead they should form the basis of an individually diversified educational structure that promises to be far more beneficial for all students than the system we have now. In this light, the past failure of compensatory education is *not* to be understood as showing that "nothing can be done," but only that these particular programs were based on a faulty interpretation of individual variations in learning styles (to wit, that they didn't "really" exist at all and were merely adventitious reflections of social inequalities that could be simply reversed by a bit of extra "verbal stimulation" and the like). In contrast, properly designed educational sequences centered around the variety of individual mental patterns *could* potentially do much to palliate the vast scholastic inequalities we currently see.

Now, what about blacks? The critical consideration is whether or not they are to be regarded as a special category for whom the above generalizations are not valid. It is Jensen's contention that they are *not*. . . :

> If [group differences] are not essentially different [from individual differences], then differences between individuals classified as members of different groups can be treated as individual differences. In fact, it is very hard to find differences between groups that do not behave just like individual differences as far as abilities and schooling are concerned. Though there are average group differences on cognitive ability tests, we find it impossible either by direct inspection or by fine-grained statistical analyses to discriminate between the intelligence test protocols of black and white children. There is just nothing you can find in the child's test performance itself that will tell you whether a child with an IQ, of, say, 100 is black or white. The same is true of scholastic achievement tests. Moreover, the correlations among various tests are the same for black as for white children, and tests of cognitive ability predict scholastic performance the same for black children as for white. In dealing with individual children, race and social class per se seem to make no difference. I have never seen any demonstration that individual prescription for any educational purpose need take race into account at all. (A.R. Jensen, "Equality and Diversity in Education," in *Education, Inequality and National Policy*, N.F. Ashline, T.R. Pezzullo, and C.I. Norris, eds. [Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books/D.C. Heath, 1976], p. 130.)

In other words, IQ tests appear to measure the same kind of mental faculty, with the same reliability and predictablity of scholastic achievement, for blacks and whites. And when matched for IQ, blacks and whites learn the same information, at the same rates, and by means of the same educational procedures. It is also true that the IQ *differences* between any two individuals are equally refractory to being narrowed by means of making environments more "uniform" (at least as this has been tried so far), regardless of whether the two individuals are both black, both white, or one of each. These facts argue for a *common* explanation of the etiology of IQ differences that is valid for blacks as well as for whites, namely, that regardless of ethnic or racial identity, IQ differences among individuals are not mainly due to existing environmental differences. And a *common* educational prescription, namely, individually adapted instructional pathways, seems to offer the best hope for reducing the differences in scholastic performance between all individuals, and, thereby, also between the groups they might compose.

What are the reasons for making *any* statement at all about the causes of group differences? First, group differences are inextricably linked to how we interpret individual differences—after all, we simply *sum* the results of individuals in arriving at the averages for groups. One cannot, therefore, at one and the same time logically hold that group differences are socially caused but that individual differences involving members of these groups are not so caused. What we believe about the source of group differences inevitably feeds back to color our interpretation of individual differences, and the sorts of educational prescriptions that follow therefrom. In this case, the very critical matter at issue is whether school systems should *selectively* ignore manifest mental differences when these happen to concern members of different social groups, or beneficially adapt to them.

And second, it cautions us against adducing variations in group representations that might happen to arise in the course of the assortment of individuals into diverse instructional sequences as presumptive proof that this assortment is unfair. The key and sufficient criteria for judging both the value and the fairness of this procedure should not be that groups are proportionately represented but rather that such diversification is carried out in accord with equally applied standards, and that it in fact makes education more effective for everyone.

Regrettably, it is not yet sufficiently appreciated that any normative statement about the relative standing of

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groups—including the one requiring that they be represented in equal proportions everywhere throughout the society—is by its nature racist. For a prescription that would cause us to shade our judgments about individuals so as to bring about the "proper" group distribution is, by its nature, racist; fully as much so as when a statement about the "superiority" of one group relative to another is, wrongfully, used to justify ignoring the qualities of the specific individuals involved in a given selection. (Jensen, it should be noted, is scrupulous in maintaining that no statement about groups should interfere with our treatment of persons solely in terms of their individual qualities, and his critics should be fair enough to recognize this.) It is, therefore, amply evident that only a public policy that affirms *individuals* as the fundamental social units in relation to which justice is defined—and that hence allows group representations to fall wherever they happen to fall as the fully *dependent* consequence of individually fair treatment—can effectively advance us toward the splendid goal of social justice for all.

WILLIAM R. HAVENDER
Berkeley, California

PHILIP GREEN Replies:

William R. Havender's thoughtful discourse unfortunately misses the point of my articles entirely.

At a key point he paraphrases Jensen's "well-known" conclusion that "genetic factors rather than existing environmental disparities are the main cause of these differences. . . ." Well-known conclusions can be false, though. In the first two of my articles I showed that the existing evidence gives little reason to accept that proposition and much reason to reject it. Dr. Havender (who holds a Ph.D. in genetics from the University of California, Berkeley) does not challenge any aspect of that analysis.

The only new point he raises purports to be empirical but is actually logical—or, rather, illogical. He takes off at some length from Jensen's statement that "compensatory education has been tried and it has failed." Because of that alleged failure we are supposed to believe that "environmentalists" have not yet found a way to translate their theory into educational practice successfully, which is certainly as true for them as for everybody else. In the next breath we are given to understand that therefore the genetic hypothesis ought to be taken as validated—an invalid syllogism of the most elementary kind. I suggested plentiful reasons rather to believe that the environmentalists'—or anyone's—main problem has been lack of will, resources, and skills (the art of education being still in its historical infancy). Moreover, in the first two articles I provided extensive evidence that all kinds of living conditions do enable people to have on the average higher IQs than they would if they lived under different environmental conditions (evidence that Dr. Havender unaccountably ignores).

The only thing we actually have established is that we're not as good at changing people through formal education as through varying their place of residence, social class, the nature of their treatment by adults, etc. These latter conditions may not have to do with what is ordinarily understood by "compensatory education," but they're certainly not the working out of genetic codes.

This aspect of Dr. Havender's critique thus seems irrelevant to what I wrote, and wrong on the facts as well. But he has another, perhaps more important argument: that Jensen's genetic hypothesis ought to be appealing to *Dissent* readers—to egalitarians generally—because it offers grounds for a more liberating approach to education than does the contrary, environmentalist hypothesis. Thus the sentence I quoted from earlier concludes, ". . . and his program for dealing with them in a way that would reduce their magnitude stresses, naturally enough, educational diversity suited to each person's needs."

Of course, it is not exactly satisfactory to offer as grounds for accepting the truth of a proposition the allegation that we would like the results of acting on it. But no matter. Let us pretend that, there being no finally determinative evidence about nature vs. nurture either way (which is the case), we must become vulgar pragmatists and believe what is useful to us (which is not what Pierce or Dewey had in mind!). What on earth is useful about believing in the genetic hypothesis? That it justifies individuated education? So does the environmentalist hypothesis (an individual acts as a member of a class in appearance, but the real person underneath is being hidden; search for his or her underlying talent to bring it to light rather than accepting the environmentally distorted report about "intelligence" contained in IQ scores). Radicals believe in individuated education, so do conservatives, and liberals, and just about everybody who might be asked the question, Do you think mass education or individuated education preferable? (Though the more knowledgeable would doubt that a social system such as ours would provide the resources necessary to establish a system of individuated education for everyone in need of it.)

What does it matter what is the *source* of a child's inability to master certain material, as long as the inability is recognized? What does it matter what is the source of the child's *ability* to learn in another way, so long as that ability is recognized? Only fools will use the new math to educate a child who consistently fails to grasp verbally logical relationships, and although there may be thousands of such persons in our educational systems they are foolish because they haven't thought very much about what they're doing, not because they're "environmentalists."

In the end the only apparent point in Dr. Havender's lengthy discussion of education seems to be, by implication, that adopting a genetic approach leads us to respect IQ testing more, and IQ tests will tell us

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definitively who is capable of being educated one way and who another. That is pernicious nonsense. Again, I have set out sufficient reasons for acting on the presumption that IQ tests exhibit *expressed* abilities rather than *innate* capacities, and I will not reiterate the argument, since once again Dr. Havender says absolutely nothing to call it into question. A low IQ score simply tells us that action is necessary somewhere in the child's life, or in the society's structure, but the problem is just as likely to be in, say, the brutal home life of an individual or the constricting circumstances of a group as in allegedly inherent capacities.

Finally, consideration of the uses of IQ tests leads us to the major shortcoming in Dr. Havender's defense of Jensen. IQ tests can indeed be used for individuated education (to identify "underachievers," e.g.) but in our class- and caste-bound society they are much more likely to be used to establish formal or informal tracking systems. Indeed, that is mostly how they have been used, as both Jensen and Havender ought to know. The real question then is, Which way does Jensen's work lead—toward individuated education or toward arbitrary and discriminatory tracking? Is Jensen's message about the liberation of individuals or is it about the invidious comparison between groups?

Jensen's work gives us such an unequivocal answer that I fail to see how Dr. Havender has managed to miss it. The famous "genetic hypothesis," for example, which has become the cornerstone of Jensen's subsequent work, is that "genetic factors are strongly implicated in the average *Negro-white* intelligence difference" (my emphasis). He went on to write a 300-page book that is entirely about *racial* differences in IQ. Even were the book truthful, it would be useless as a guide to the education of individuals since the only practical lesson we can possibly glean from it is, Every time you see a black child be on the lookout for signs of cognitive inferiority. What is "true" is "useful" indeed! And the long quotation from Jensen in Havender's letter actually supports this outlook since the twin propositions that blacks have lower IQs than whites in any social class (and thus to Jensen less real cognitive ability), and that IQ tests really do measure their innate abilities faithfully, give this message to blacks: If you happen to have a high level of *cognitive* ability then fine, you're as good (on the average) as we are, but frankly you probably don't and thus aren't and what's more, little or nothing can be done about it. Is this egalitarianism?

But in any event, and worse yet, that book and Jensen's work on race generally is not even truthful. As I demonstrated with what I feared was argumentative overkill in the second article of this series—an article that Havender seems not to have read—Jensen has consistently falsified sources and corrupted "scientific" argumentation in order to justify the unsubstantiated assertion that as a group black people lack innate conceptual ability compared to whites as a group. Why did he do all this if he's only interested in demonstrating that individuals should be treated individually in educational systems? The bulk of his work is not only irrelevant to that noble proposition but traduces it—vilely.

My three articles—at least the two that dealt with Jensen—were not about genetics and individuals (and, as I noted, there is doubtless some genetic causation of differences in the various kinds of intelligence as between individuals), but about genetics and *race*. On that issue Jensen's work is not merely inegalitarian, it is also false, and any deductions made from it must be equally false. Jensen likes to believe, and Havender seems to agree, that he has been treated as a heretic. Perhaps some people who have been afraid to take a hard look at his "evidence" and arguments have done that, but I must plead not guilty to the implicit charge of being among them. "Jensenism," to sum up, is not a heresy. It is, in my opinion, a hoax. □

BOOKS *(continued from page 220)*

aimed at reviving their economies; however unlikely it is that such programs will be adopted, there is no substitute for them.

I cannot disagree with Tyler's argument for economic growth; it would make reform easier, and could be achieved, for the near future, if we had significant action on antitrust legislation, tax reform, federal planning, and investment. But Tyler tends to treat economic policy in a political vacuum; he does not discuss what kind of political movement would be necessary to promulgate the reforms he proposes, nor does he deal with the sort of opposition his programs would provoke. In the short run, at the very least, Tyler's radical measures might provoke a strike of capital and severe economic dislocation. Of course, this is a dilemma no liberal or socialist writer has overcome. In the meantime, *Scarcity* deserves to be read. □

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

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

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

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